777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 04 September 2020
• Docket Number: SC 20339
• Citation: 251 A.3d 56,336 Conn. 819
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: 777 RESIDENTIAL, LLC v. The METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION

336 Conn. 819

251 A.3d 56

777 RESIDENTIAL, LLC

v.The METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION

SC 20339

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 29, 2020

Officially released September 4, 2020^*

John W. Cerreta, with whom, on the brief, were Carl R. Nasto, assistant district counsel, and William J. Sweeney, New Britain, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant).

Joseph E. Faughnan, New Haven, with whom were Philip G. Kent and, on the brief, Caleb F. Hamel and Jason L. Stevenson, New Haven, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.^**

D'AURIA, J.

In this appeal and cross appeal, we must construe General Statutes § 7-249 to determine whether the defendant, The Metropolitan District Commission, had authority to levy a supplemental sewerage benefit assessment (supplemental assessment) against the property at 777 Main Street, Hartford, owned by the plaintiff, 777 Residential, LLC, and, if so, whether it used a proper methodology in calculating that assessment. Since at least 1849, there has been a property located at 777 Main Street. In 1849, a two-story building used as a bank was at that address. At that time, a new sewerage line was constructed under Main Street, connecting the property to the Hartford sewerage system. As a result of that construction, a predecessor of the defendant levied a sewerage benefit assessment against the owners of this property in the amount of $215, calculated on the basis of the street frontage¹ of the two-story building. The assessment was paid in a onetime lump sum payment. In 1966, this building was demolished, and a new twenty-six story commercial office building was constructed at 777 Main Street. No supplemental assessment was levied as a result of this construction.

In 2012, the plaintiff purchased the property at 777 Main Street. After receiving the necessary building permits and approvals, the plaintiff converted the property from a commercial office building into a 285 unit residential condominium community. For each residential unit, the plaintiff constructed a kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, and living area, creating 285 separate residences inside the already existing building. In 2015, after construction had begun, the defendant notified the plaintiff that it was levying a supplemental assessment on the property in the amount of $473,330, calculated on the basis of the schedule of flat rates the defendant had adopted in 1995, setting a flat rate of $1655 per residential unit. The defendant arrived at the $473,330 figure by multiplying this flat rate by the number of residential units, which it set at 286 units, rather than 285 units.

After the supplemental assessment was approved following a public hearing, the plaintiff paid the supplemental assessment under protest in a single lump sum and appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 7-250.² In its appeal, the plaintiff challenged the defendant's authority to levy the supplemental assessment on the ground that, after the initial assessment, there had been no "new construction or expansion of the buildings or structures on the property," as required under § 7-249 for the levying of a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant had improperly used a different method for calculating the assessment than was used for calculating the initial assessment in violation of § 7-249. It is these arguments that the parties present to us on appeal.³

The parties filed motions for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim regarding the defendant's authority to levy the supplemental assessment, with both parties arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had authority to levy the supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had no authority to levy the supplemental assessment because conversion of the property from a commercial space to residential units did not constitute construction or expansion of a building or structure under § 7-249, as the size of the building remained unchanged. The defendant argued to the contrary that it had authority because creation of 285 residential units constituted construction of new "structures," namely, the residential units. Interpreting the term "structures" to have a "wide meaning,"⁴ the trial court agreed with the defendant that the creation of the residential units constituted construction of structures, thereby authorizing the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. Thus, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this issue.⁵ A bench trial was set to determine all remaining claims.

After trial, the trial court concluded that the defendant's supplemental assessment calculation violated § 7-249 because it should have been calculated on the basis of street frontage, as was the initial assessment. The trial court therefore invalidated the assessment and ordered the defendant to recalculate the supplemental assessment using the proper method. The court further ordered that, "[i]f the street frontage associated with 777 Main Street has remained unchanged since the initial assessment, the [defendant] is directed to return the amount paid by [the plaintiff] ... [and, if] the street frontage ... has changed since the initial assessment, [the defendant] is directed to make the appropriate calculation in compliance with this memorandum of decision."

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that it had to use the same method to calculate the supplemental assessment as had been used to calculate the initial assessment in 1849. The plaintiff cross appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the defendant had authority to levy the supplemental assessment because the plaintiff argued that conversion of the building into residential units did not constitute construction of structures under § 7-249. The appeal and cross appeal were transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

We agree with the defendant both that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant had authority to levy the supplemental assessment and that the trial court incorrectly determined that it used an improper method in calculating the supplemental assessment. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's decision to render summary judgment in favor of the defendant and reverse the trial court's judgment regarding the claim of improper methodology. Additional facts will be set forth as required.

I

The claims raised by both parties center on the proper interpretation of § 7-249⁶ —whether the creation of the residential units constituted construction of "structures," and, if so, what method was required to calculate the supplemental assessment. We are therefore faced with "an issue of statutory construction requiring a conclusion of law. When construing a statute, we adhere to fundamental principles of statutory construction ... over which our review is plenary." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Forest Walk, LLC v. Water Pollution Control Authority , 291 Conn. 271, 281, 968 A.2d 345 (2009).

In construing § 7-249, our analysis is guided by General Statutes § 1-2z, the plain meaning rule, which requires that we "first ... consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to the broader statutory scheme. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. ... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dudley , 332 Conn. 639, 645, 212 A.3d 1268 (2019).

In determining whether statutory language contains ambiguity, "we must carefully examine the entire text of the statute. ... [I]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole and read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a reasonable overall interpretation ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 647, 212 A.3d 1268. "[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction, Inc . v. Eder , 280 Conn. 672, 678, 911 A.2d 300 (2006).⁷

"Although we generally begin with the text of the statute, we note that we are not writing on a clean slate ...." Stiffler v. Continental Ins. Co ., 288 Conn. 38, 43, 950 A.2d 1270 (2008). Although this court has not addressed either of the claims raised by the parties, we have construed § 7-249 for other purposes, which we briefly review prior to addressing the parties' claims.

The defendant "is a municipal corporation created in 1929 by a special act of the General Assembly. 20 Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511 [1929]. It was given broad powers relating to sewage disposal, water supply and regional planning as well as powers limited to certain highways." Rocky Hill Convalescent Hospital, Inc . v. Metropolitan District , 160 Conn. 446, 450, 280 A.2d 344 (1971). The defendant has been designated the water pollution control authority for the metropolitan district, which includes "eight member and five nonmember towns in the greater Hartford area ...." Glastonbury v. Metropolitan District Commission , 328 Conn. 326, 327, 179 A.3d 201 (2018) ; see General Statutes § 7-246. The defendant's authority is limited to "those powers that have been expressly granted to it by the state or that are necessary for it to discharge its duties and to carry out its objects and purposes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)...