Town of Godfrey v. City of Alton

• Decision Date: 03 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74--377,74--377
• Citation: 33 Ill.App.3d 978,338 N.E.2d 890
• Parties: TOWN OF GODFREY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ALTON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 890

338 N.E.2d 890

33 Ill.App.3d 978

TOWN OF GODFREY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ALTON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 74--377.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Dec. 3, 1975.

Steven N. Mottaz, Thomas, Mottaz & Eastman, Alton, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Thad R. Carter, Coppinger & Carter, Alton, for defendant-appellee.

EBERSPACHER, Justice:

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Town of Godfrey, Et al., from a judgment entered for the defendant, City of Alton, by the circuit court of Madison County on plaintiffs' action for a declaratory judgment or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus.

The facts set forth in plaintiffs' complaint are undisputed. The Town of Godfrey is a township organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois. The City of Alton is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois. Godfrey Township is in Madison County, which has a population in excess of 150,000. Godfrey Township contains territory in excess of four square miles and has a population in excess of 16,000. Plaintiffs want to submit to the voters of the Town of Godfrey the question of whether or not the entire Town of Godfrey should incorporate as a village. Illinois Revised Statutes 1973, Chapter 24, paragraph 2--3--5a, provides, in pertinent part,

'Whenever in any county of 150,000 or more population * * * any area of contiguous territory contains at least 4 (four) square miles and 2,500 inhabitants residing in permanent dwellings, that area may be incorporated as a village * * *.

If (however) the area lies within 1 1/2 miles of the limits of any existing municipality, the consent of that municipality must be obtained before the area may be incorporated.'

A request was made of the City of Alton for its consent to allow voters who are residents of Godfrey Township and not residents of the City of Alton, but who reside within the one and one-half mile zone of the City of Alton to vote on the question of incorporation, and to allow that area to incorporate. The City of Alton refused to give its consent.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment declaring that portion of the Statute requiring the consent of any existing municipality before the area within 1 1/2 miles of that municipality can incorporate as a village unconstitutional. The plaintiffs contended in their complaint that the consent requirement was unreasonable, arbitrary, vague, and discriminatory. In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus compelling the City of Alton to grant its consent. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant after finding 'that the statute in question is not unconstitutional.' This appeal followed.

In addition to agreeing to the foregoing facts the parties each agree to the following principles of law: first, that the legislature has control over the creation and the corporate boundaries of municipalities located within the State of Illinois; secondly, that municipalities have no power beyond their corporate limits except as provided by statute; and lastly, that the legislature can delegate authority to municipalities to control beyond its boundaries when such constitutes a valid exercise of police power. The consesus between the parties terminates at this juncture and herein lies the dispute between the parties--the constitutionality of the statutory provision requiring the Town of Godfrey to secure the consent of the City of Alton before it may incorporate as a village (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 24, par. 2--3--5a).

The plaintiffs contend on appeal that such a requirement is, (1) an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, (2) without adequate standards and guidelines, (3) in violation of the Constitutional prohibition against laws granting special privileges or immunities, and (4) in violation of the Constitutional prohibition against the passage of special or local laws when a general law is or can be made applicable. No argument is, however, advanced concerning the propriety of the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a writ of mandamus.

Prior to commencing our review of the plaintiffs' contentions we consider it helpful to reiterate the general policy and procedure for review of a statute's constitutionality. A strong presumption of constitutional validity attaches to a legislative enactment. (Livingston v. Ogilvie, 43 Ill.2d 9, 250 N.E.2d 138; Board of Library Directors, etc. v. City of Lake Forest, 17 Ill.2d 277, 161 N.E.2d 272.) Doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality (People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807), and the burden of showing unconstitutionality is on the party who asserts it (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351, Reh. den., 411 U.S. 910, 93 S.Ct. 1523, 36 L.Ed.2d 200, On remand, 54 Ill.2d 237, 296 N.E.2d 342, Cert. den., 414 U.S. 1039, 94 S.Ct. 539, 38 L.Ed.2d 329; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485; Jaris v. Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago, 58 Ill.2d 15, 317 N.E.2d 51). In construing the provisions of a statute it is not only proper, but often necessary, to consider the provisions of other statutes relating to the same subject matter for the purpose of determining legislative intent. (Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill.2d 233, 133 N.E.2d 371; Hepner v. County Board of School Trustees, 8 Ill.2d 235, 133 N.E.2d 39.) It is a cardinal rule of construction that in ascertaining legislative intent, courts should consider the reason for the enactment and the objectives sought to be obtained by the statute. (People v. Swartz, 21 Ill.2d 277, 171 N.E.2d 784; Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill.2d 233, 133 N.E.2d 371.)

The statute in question, Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 24, par. 2--3--5a, is one of numerous statutes which enable a municipality to control the development of contiguous territory located within one and one-half miles of its corporate limits and not contained within any other municipality. The Legislature has been fit to delegate to municipalities various powers over such contiguous territories including, for example, the power to zone (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 24, par. 11--13--1 Et seq.). As early as 1921, the General Assembly provided for municipalities to establish a planning commission which had the power to provide 'reasonable requirements in reference to streets, alleys and public grounds in unsubdivided lands within the corporate limits and in contiguous territory outside of and distant not more than one and one-half miles from such limits, and not included in any city, village or incorporated town, * * *.' (Laws of 1921, p. 260.) The act as originally passed was not amended until 1949 when certain sections were renumbered and a new paragraph was added to one of the subsections. In 1953 these powers were further delineated and municipal planning commissions were empowered to provide 'reasonable requirements for public streets, alleys, ways for public service facilities, parks, playgrounds, school grounds, and other public grounds.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, ch. 24, par. 53--2(2).) Our Supreme Court reviewed this statute in Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371, and reached the following conclusions,

'* * * there is nothing in these legislative provisions relative...