Town of Hartsville v. McCall

Decision Date08 June 1915
Docket Number9116.
Citation85 S.E. 599,101 S.C. 277
PartiesTOWN OF HARTSVILLE v. MCCALL ET AL.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Darlington County Frank B. Gary, Judge.

E. B McCall and another were convicted of violating an ordinance of the Town of Hartsville, prohibiting the transportation of alcoholic liquors within the corporate limits. From a judgment reversing the conviction as to E. B. McCall, the town appeals. Reversed.

L. M Lawson and J. M. Spears, Sol., both of Darlington, for appellant.

E. C Dennis, of Darlington, and D. W. Galloway, of Hartsville, for respondent.

HYDRICK J.

The respondent McCall resides and his place of business is outside the limits of the town of Hartsville. He ordered three gallons of whisky from Richmond, Va., which the testimony tends to prove and the trial jury found was for unlawful use. On arrival of the whisky at the express office within the town, McCall sent a written order to the express company to deliver it to R. R. Bain, who received it and put it in a dray. The drayman carried it to McCall's store, outside the limits of the town, and delivered it to him, and he paid the drayage. McCall was not actually present within the town at any time during the transportation of the whisky, and took no part therein, except as above stated. Upon the foregoing facts he and Bain were tried before the mayor of the town and a jury for violating an ordinance of the town, which makes it unlawful to transport alcoholic liquors with in the corporate limits for unlawful use. The mayor refused to direct a verdict of acquittal as to McCall, and the jury found both defendants guilty. From the sentence, they appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the judgment as to Bain, but reversed it as to McCall. From the judgment of reversal as to McCall the town appealed to this court.

The circuit court did not state the ground upon which the reversal of the judgment as to McCall was based, but it was evidently based upon the ground taken by him in the mayor's court for a directed verdict, to wit, that because he was not personally within the limits of the town during the transportation, and took no part therein, except to write the order and send Bain for the whisky and pay the drayage, all of which was done by him outside the limits of the town, he had not violated the ordinance within the town, and the mayor's court had no jurisdiction to try him for what he did outside the corporate limits. This must be so, because, if the reversal had been based upon any other of the grounds of appeal, the judgment would have had to be reversed as to Bain also.

The circuit court erred in reversing the judgment of the...

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