Town of Hodgenville v. Kentucky Utilities Co.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1933
• Citation: 250 Ky. 195,61 S.W.2d 1047
• Parties: TOWN OF HODGENVILLE v. KENTUCKY UTILITIES CO.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

61 S.W.2d 1047

250 Ky. 195

TOWN OF HODGENVILLE v. KENTUCKY UTILITIES CO.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

June 23, 1933

Appeal from Circuit Court, Larue County.

Proceeding between Town of Hodgenville and Kentucky Utilities Company. From an adverse judgment, Town of Hodgenville appeals.

Affirmed.

Williams & Handley, of Hodgenville, for appellant.

Gordon Laurent & Ogden, of Louisville, and O. M. Mather, of Hodgenville, for appellee.

DIETZMAN Justice.

Section 3699 of the Kentucky Statutes, being part of the charter of cities of the sixth class, in part provides: "No ordinance or resolution granting any franchise shall be passed by the board of trustees within five days after its introduction, nor at any other than a regular meeting."

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether an ordinance granting the appellee a franchise for the business of generating and selling electric current in the town of Hodgenville, appellant herein, was passed at a regular meeting of its board of trustees or not. The facts are not in dispute. The franchise in question was duly introduced at a regular meeting of the board held in April. The next regular meeting of the board held more than five days after the introduction of this franchise ordinance came on May 7, 1923. The board being unable to transact all the business before it on that evening, the meeting was adjourned to May 14th. That night the board again being unable to finish its business the meeting was again adjourned to May 21st, at which adjourned meeting the ordinance granting the franchise in question was passed.

The law is by the great weight of authority that an adjourned meeting is but a continuation of the regular meeting, of which it is an adjournment, and that any business which could have been transacted at the regular meeting may be transacted at such adjourned meeting. Thus in 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) § 633, it is said: "If a regular meeting is adjourned, any business which would have been proper for the body to consider at that meeting may be considered and acted upon at the adjourned meeting, but if it is a special or called meeting which is adjourned, nothing can be done at such adjourned meeting unless it could have been considered and acted upon at the special or called meeting. An adjourned meeting of either a regular or stated or special or called meeting is but a continuation of the same meeting."

In Green v. Town of Irvington, 81 N. J. Law, 723, 73 A 602, it was held that an adjourned meeting is not a new meeting but a mere continuance of an original meeting. To the same effect is Dockett v. Old Forge Borough, 240 Pa. 98, 87 A. 421. In 43 Corpus Juris, 499, it is written: "Meetings of the council or board on a day other than the stated one for regular meetings, assembled pursuant to adjournment of the regular meetings, are not special meetings, or a distinct class of meetings, but according to the great weight of authority are regular meetings with all the power and authority for municipal affairs possessed on the stated day for assembling and all municipal action taken at such meeting is as valid as if taken on the first day of the session."

From the foregoing, it would seem that there could be no question but that the adjourned meeting of May 21st was but a continuation of the meeting of May 7th, and that being such any business which could have been transacted at the meeting of May 7th could also be transacted at its adjournment of May 21st. However, counsel for appellant cite the case of Tandy & Farleigh Tobacco Co. v. City of Hopkinsville, 174 Ky. 189, 192 S.W. 46, 50, and insist that under its holding the meeting of May 21st was an...