Town of Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 March 2017
• Docket Number: AC 39746
• Citation: 171 Conn.App. 624,157 A.3d 1215
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: TOWN OF LEDYARD v. WMS GAMING, INC.

171 Conn.App. 624

157 A.3d 1215

TOWN OF LEDYARD

v.WMS GAMING, INC.

AC 39746

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Considered December 14, 2016

Officially Released March 21, 2017

Lloyd L. Langhammer, in support of the motion.

Aaron S. Bayer and David R. Roth, in opposition to the motion.

DiPentima, C. J., and Beach, Alvord, Sheldon and Prescott, Js.^*

DiPENTIMA, C. J.

The motion before the court challenges our jurisdiction over the appeal of the defendant, WMS Gaming, Inc., from the decision of the trial court rendering summary judgment as to liability only in favor of the plaintiff, the town of Ledyard, with respect to certain attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff. The plaintiff moves to dismiss the defendant's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the trial court's decision is not an appealable final judgment because the trial court has not determined the amount of the attorney's fees. We conclude that the trial court's decision rendering summary judgment as to liability only in favor of the plaintiff with regard to the attorney's fees at issue is not an appealable final judgment. Accordingly, we grant the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal.

The record before the court reveals the following facts and procedural history. In 2008, the plaintiff commenced the underlying action to collect unpaid personal property taxes that it had imposed on slot machines that the defendant owned and leased to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation (Tribal Nation) for use in its gaming facilities. As relief, the plaintiff sought $18,251.23 in unpaid personal property taxes, plus costs, interest, and penalties. In addition, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 12–161a.

Shortly after the plaintiff had commenced the underlying state action, the Tribal Nation filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut challenging the authority of the state of Connecticut and the plaintiff¹ to impose the taxes at issue in the present state action.² Although it was not a party to the federal action commenced by the Tribal Nation, the defendant filed a motion to stay the present state action pending the outcome of the federal action, which the trial court, Martin, J. , granted.

On March 27, 2012, the District Court ruled on cross motions for summary judgment filed in the consolidated federal action. The District Court, determining that the authority of the state and the plaintiff to impose the taxes was preempted by federal law, granted the Tribal Nation's motion for summary judgment and denied separate motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff and the state, respectively. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard , United States District Court, Docket No. 3:06CV1212 (WWE), 2012 WL 1069342, *12 (D. Conn. March 27, 2012), rev'd, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013). On July 15, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment, concluding that the authority of the state and the plaintiff to impose the taxes was not preempted by federal law. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard , 722 F.3d 457, 477 (2d Cir. 2013).

After the proceedings had resumed in the present state action, the parties executed a stipulation. Under the stipulation, the parties agreed that the defendant had tendered payment to the plaintiff for all outstanding taxes, accrued interest, and accrued penalties at issue. They further agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in the underlying state action, the amount of which would be determined by the trial court and the payment of which would be accepted by the plaintiff as satisfaction of all of the taxes, interest, penalties, attorney's fees, and costs recoverable by the plaintiff with respect to the underlying state action. They disputed, however, whether the trial court could also find the defendant liable for attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff in defense of the federal action commenced by the Tribal Nation to which the defendant was not a party (federal action attorney's fees). The parties agreed to submit to the trial court the issue of whether the defendant was liable for the federal action attorney's fees.

After executing the stipulation, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment as to liability only with respect to the federal action attorney's fees. On October 6, 2016, the trial court, Vacchelli, J. , issued its memorandum of decision granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and rendering summary judgment as to liability only in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the federal action attorney's fees. The trial court concluded that the defendant was liable for the federal action attorney's fees pursuant to § 12–161a.³ The trial court further stated that the plaintiff could file a motion for attorney's fees within thirty days and that a hearing would be scheduled thereafter to determine the amount of the attorney's fees to which the plaintiff is entitled. Shortly thereafter, on October 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees.

On October 25, 2016, prior to the trial court scheduling a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, the defendant appealed the trial court's decision with respect to the federal action attorney's fees. The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal followed.

The plaintiff moves to dismiss the defendant's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the trial court's decision rendering summary judgment as to liability only in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the federal action attorney's fees is not an appealable final judgment because the trial court has not determined the amount of the attorney's fees to which the plaintiff is entitled. In response, the defendant contends that the trial court's decision is immediately appealable under the rationale of Hylton v. Gunter , 313 Conn. 472, 97 A.3d 970 (2014). We agree with the plaintiff.

"As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. The lack of a final judgment implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear an appeal. A determination regarding ... subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law ... [and, therefore] our review is plenary. ... The right of appeal is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met. ... It is ... axiomatic that, except insofar as the legislature has specifically provided for an interlocutory appeal or other form of interlocutory appellate review ... appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments of the trial court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 478, 97 A.3d 970.

We begin our analysis with a review of Paranteau v. DeVita , 208 Conn. 515, 544 A.2d 634 (1988). In Paranteau, the plaintiff tenants sued the defendant landlord, alleging, inter alia, a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes §§ 42–110a et seq.Id., at 517, 544 A.2d 634. The trial court rendered judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs on all counts and implicitly awarded them attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42–110g(d), but delayed determining the amount of the attorney's fees. Id. Following a hearing held over twenty days after the judgment had been rendered, the trial court determined the sum of the attorney's fees to be $2580. Id. The defendant in Paranteau filed an appeal eight days after the hearing, challenging both the judgment on the merits as well as the supplemental postjudgment attorney's fees order. Id., at 518, 544 A.2d 634. The plaintiffs timely filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was untimely. Id. This court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal in toto. Id.

After granting the defendant's certification to appeal in Paranteau , our Supreme Court reversed this court's judgment in part. Id. Our Supreme Court first determined that this court properly had dismissed, as untimely, the portion of the appeal challenging the judgment on the merits, concluding that "a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for the litigation remains to be determined." Id., at 523, 544 A.2d 634. It then determined that this court had improperly dismissed, as untimely, the portion of the appeal challenging the trial court's supplemental postjudgment attorney's fees order, concluding that "such an order may raise a collateral and independent claim that is separately appealable as a final judgment." Id. In a footnote, it further explained: "A supplemental postjudgment award of attorney's fees becomes final and appealable ... not when there is a finding of liability for such fees, but when the amount of fees are conclusively determined. A finding as to liability only, prior to a determination on the issue of damages, is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies. ... Furthermore, a timely appeal from a supplemental postjudgment award of attorney's fees may challenge not only the amount awarded, but the underlying recoverability of such fees as well." (Citation omitted.) Id., at 524 n.11, 544 A.2d 634.⁴

This court has relied on Paranteau to dismiss appeals, in whole or in part, challenging awards of attorney's fees where the appeals were filed prior to the conclusive determinations of the amount of the attorney's fees. See Bailey v. Lanou , 138 Conn.App. 661, 675–77, 54 A.3d 198 (2012) (dismissing, sua sponte, portion of appeal challenging award of statutory attorney's fees where trial court had not determined amount of attorney's fees prior to filing of appeal); McKeon v. Lennon , 131 Conn.App. 585, 610–11, 27 A.3d 436 (dismissing portion of appeal challenging award of attorney's fees where trial court had not determined amount...