Town of Littleton v. Taylor, 93-250

Decision Date12 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-250,93-250
Citation640 A.2d 780,138 N.H. 419
PartiesTOWN OF LITTLETON and another v. Kathryn TAYLOR.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Moulton, Samaha, Vaughan & Foley, P.A., Littleton (Stephen U. Samaha, on the brief and orally), for plaintiff, Town of Littleton.

Douglas & Douglas, Concord (Charles G. Douglas, III orally and on the brief and Susanna L. Giombetti, on the brief), for the intervenors, Eddy L. Moore, Ferne J. Foster, Jr., and Kenneth E. Curran.

Stebbins, Bradley, Wood & Harvey, PA, Hanover (David H. Bradley, on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

BROCK, Chief Justice.

Three taxpayers (the intervenors) from the Town of Littleton (the town) appeal an order of the Superior Court (Morrill, J.) dismissing the town's petition for declaratory judgment. The intervenors argue that RSA 669:7 (1986) and the common law doctrine of incompatibility of offices precludes the defendant's simultaneous employment as librarian and service as town selectman. The defendant cross-appeals an order of the Superior Court (Morrill, J.) denying her motion for attorney's fees. The defendant argues that she should be awarded attorney's fees under the "public trust" theory set forth in Silva v. Botsch, 121 N.H. 1041, 1043, 437 A.2d 313, 314 (1981). We affirm the order concerning declaratory judgment, reverse the order concerning attorney's fees, and remand.

The defendant, Kathryn Taylor, was appointed librarian of the Littleton Public Library (the library) by the Littleton Board of Library Trustees (the board) pursuant to RSA 202-A:11, V (1989). Twelve years later, she was elected to the office of town selectman for a three-year term and took office. The next day, the town's two other selectmen petitioned in the name of the town for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The town sought both a judgment as to whether the defendant's simultaneous employment as librarian and service as town selectman violated RSA 669:7, and an injunction against her participation as selectman until the issue was resolved. The two selectmen asserted neutrality on the issue, and three town residents intervened in order to protect the interests of the town's taxpayers. All parties submitted an agreed statement of facts. The court dismissed the town's petition, holding that the defendant had not violated the statute as she was not a full-time employee of the town. The court denied the defendant's motion for reimbursement of her legal fees incurred in defending the action.

We will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion or a finding that the decision is unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous. In re Kearsarge Regional School District, 138 N.H. 211, ----, 636 A.2d 1033, 1035 (1994).

The intervenors argue that the defendant's simultaneous employment as librarian and service as town selectman violate RSA 669:7. The statute reads, in pertinent part: "No full-time town employee shall at the same time hold the office of selectman."

The trial court found that the defendant "is not a full-time employee of the Town. She is a full-time employee of the Town Library." Consequently, we first determine if the trial court erred in finding that the defendant is a full-time employee of the library.

In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, we consider factors such as managerial and fiscal control. Samaha v. Grafton County, 126 N.H. 583, 586, 493 A.2d 1207, 1210 (1985). The characteristics of the defendant's employment were enumerated in the parties' agreed statement of facts. Those facts are consistent with the trial court's determination that the defendant was an employee of the library and not of the town. They provide ample evidence of the library board's managerial and fiscal control over the librarian and the town's lack thereof. For example, the board appoints the librarian, determines compensation and other terms of employment, and has the exclusive power to discharge or remove the librarian from office. RSA 202-A:11, V, :17 (1989). Neither the town's board of selectmen nor the town manager has any authority to assign duties to, to supervise the work of, or to remove the librarian. In contrast, public employees of the town are appointed and removed by the town manager, who also sets their compensation. RSA 37:6, II (1988); P. Loughlin, 13 New Hampshire Practice, Local Government Law § 383, at 260 (1990). We find no error in the trial court's conclusion that the defendant is a full-time employee of the library. See Samaha, 126 N.H. at 586, 493 A.2d at 1210.

The intervenors argue that the trial court's order is "confusing" and "legally erroneous" because it stated that the defendant was "the full-time public librarian for the Town," but that she "is not a full-time employee of the Town." Any confusion on the intervenors' part stems from their erroneous assumption that employment as librarian of a public library in a town automatically equates to employment by that town. A "public library" is defined as a library "which provides regular and currently useful library service to the public without charge," and which receives regular financial support from public sources, such as a town, or private sources. See RSA 202-A:2, I (1989). Further, a "public library" is "every library regularly open to the public, or to some portion of the public, with or without limitations, ... whether its ownership is vested in the town, in a corporation, in an organized association, or in individuals." RSA 41:21 (1991).

The intervenors' argument ignores the trial court's specific finding that the library "is a separate and distinct entity" from the town. The Littleton Public Library was established pursuant to a contract between Andrew Carnegie and the town in 1902. Carnegie donated funds to construct the library building in return for the town's pledge to provide continuing financial support. The Littleton Board of Library Trustees is the governing board of the library. RSA 202-A:2, II (1989). The publicly elected board is vested with the entire custody and management of the library and of all the property of the town relating thereto, except trust funds held by the town. RSA 202-A:6 (1989). The board has adopted and maintained bylaws which govern the library. RSA 202-A:11, I (1989).

The library budget is funded by both town taxes and private sources. The board determines how to expend, and has the power to expend, all funds provided to the library. RSA 202-A:11, II-IV (1989). Most important, the town has no power to discontinue the library. RSA 202-A:18 (1989 & Supp.1993). We find no error in the trial court's finding that the defendant's employment as librarian of the Littleton Public Library does not equate to employment by the Town of Littleton. Cf. Jaskolka v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 45, 49, 587 A.2d 256, 258 (1991). Consequently, the defendant's simultaneous employment as librarian and service as town selectman do not violate the statute. See Tappan v. Shaw, 113 N.H. 353, 354-55, 306 A.2d 762, 763 (1973).

The intervenors also argue that the common law doctrine of incompatibility of offices precludes the defendant from simultaneous employment as librarian and service as town selectman. We disagree. The doctrine bars an individual from holding two offices when one office is subordinate to the other, as the governmental checks and balances are eliminated because an individual is reviewing his or her own work. P. Loughlin, supra § 622, at 420. We have held that membership on a school district's prudential committee (officers of the school district) was incompatible with the position of auditor of that same school district. Cotton v. Phillips, 56 N.H. 220, 223 (1875). Prudential committee members administered the affairs of the school district, took custody of and disbursed the money apportioned to the district, and made contracts with school teachers. The auditors examined the accounts and vouchers of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Sivalingam v. Newton
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • October 5, 2021
    ...other instances in which a public official has successfully prevented his or her removal from office. See Town of Littleton v. Taylor, 138 N.H. 419, 421, 424-25, 640 A.2d 780 (1994) (requiring a town to pay fees, under the substantial benefit theory, to a selectwoman who successfully defend......
  • Horton v. McLaughlin
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • February 18, 2003
    ...of JCC, 145 N.H. at 112, 751 A.2d 514; see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 253, 113 S.Ct. 732. Instead, relying on Town of Littleton v. Taylor, 138 N.H. 419, 640 A.2d 780 (1994), Foster v. Hudson, 122 N.H. 150, 441 A.2d 1183 (1982), Silva v. Botsch, 121 N.H. 1041, 437 A.2d 313 (1981), and principal......
  • Quirk v. Town of New Boston
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • August 14, 1995
    ...fees, we defer to the trial court's decision and will not overturn it absent an abuse of discretion." Town of Littleton v. Taylor, 138 N.H. 419, 424, 640 A.2d 780, 783 (1994). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Because "no person should be penalized for merely de......
  • In re Stanton
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • May 24, 2002
    ...an employer-employee relationship exists, we generally consider factors such as managerial and fiscal control. Town of Littleton v. Taylor, 138 N.H. 419, 421, 640 A.2d 780 (1994). Our focus is "whether on all the facts the community would consider the person an employee." Boissonnault v. Br......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT