Town of Lovilia v. Cobb

Decision Date11 February 1905
Citation126 Iowa 557,102 N.W. 496
PartiesTOWN OF LOVILIA v. COBB.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Monroe County; C. W. Vermillion, Judge.

Defendant was accused by information before a magistrate of keeping open his place of business, to which persons resorted for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors, on Sunday, contrary to the ordinances of the plaintiff town. He was convicted before the magistrate, and appealed to the district court. In that court defendant demurred to the information, but before the demurrer was ruled upon plaintiff filed an amendment to the information, pleading the location of the place which defendant was alleged to have kept open as being in the town of Lovilia. Thereupon the demurrer was overruled. The case then went to trial before the court, a jury having been waived, resulting in a judgment of guilty. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.Mitchell, Tomlinson & Price, for appellant.

J. F. Abegglen, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

An ordinance of the plaintiff town prohibited any one from engaging in any calling, avocation, or business on Sunday, or from keeping open any place of business of any kind, or from permitting persons to resort thereto for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors on the Sabbath day, except that the work be of necessity or charity. The information charged the defendant with keeping open his place of business on Sunday, which place was resorted to for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors. The charge is clearly within the ordinance, and unless there be some invalidity in the act, or some error in the proceedings under which defendant was convicted, the judgment must stand. Defendant contends, however, that the ordinance for several reasons is invalid. Among others, it is said that the town had no authority to enact the same because the acts charged are an offense under the laws of the state, and therefore the ordinance is inconsistent therewith. Without setting forth the statutes which it is claimed cover the same matter, it is sufficient to say that none of them cover the acts charged. Even if they did, we are not prepared to hold the ordinance invalid. No such facts are charged as would show a violation of the “mulct law,” and there is nothing to show that defendant was acting under this law; hence Iowa City v. McInnerny, 114 Iowa, 587, 87 N. W. 498, is not in point. Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399, 6 N. W. 586, 37 Am. Rep. 212, is controlling on this proposition. The general welfare clause of section680 of the Code authorized the town to adopt the ordinance in question. Bloomfield v. Trimble, supra.

2. Further, it is argued that the ordinance is invalid because it embraces more than one subject, and the object thereof is not clearly expressed in the title. There is nothing in this contention. State v. Wells, 46 Iowa, 663. The title of the ordinance was “An Ordinance Concerning Misdemeanors.”

3. Next it is argued that the mayor who originally tried the case had no jurisdiction--First, because the information was not marked filed by him; and, second, because it did not locate the place where the offense was said to have been committed. The first point is without merit. True, the original information was not marked filed; but this was not essential to give the magistrate jurisdiction. It was in fact sworn to before the mayor, and left with him...

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