Town of Manchester v. People ex rel. Grady

Decision Date17 February 1899
Citation178 Ill. 285,52 N.E. 964
PartiesTOWN OF MANCHESTER v. PEOPLE ex rel. GRADY.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Scott county; Robert B. Shirley, Judge.

Application for mandamus on the relation of Mary E. Grady against the town of Manchester. From a judgment in favor of relator, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Mark Meyerstein, for appellant.

J. M. Riggs and James Callans, for appellee.

On the 6th day of May, 1895, in the circuit court of Scott county, a judgment was entered in an action at law, in favor of the relator, Mary E. Grady, against the appellant town, in the sum of $750. The town of Manchester is a municipal corporation, incorporated by a special charter adopted by the general assembly in 1861. The special charter vested in the ‘town council’ of the said town power to assess and collect a tax upon all taxable property within its limits of not exceeding 1 per centum per annum upon the value of such property as is assessed for taxation for state and county purposes. The amount produced by such levy of 1 per centum was sufficient only to pay the appropriations made by the town council for the necessary current expenses of the municipality. The town council contended it did not possess power to levy more than the said 1 per centum, and refused to make a greater levy or to make an appropriation for the payment of the said judgment. The appellee relator insisted the act of the general assembly entitled ‘An act to amend an act in regard to the assessment and collection of municipal taxes,’ approved June 11, 1897, authorized the town council of the said town to levy, assess, and collect taxes for corporate purposes at the rate of not exceeding 2 per centum upon the aggregate valuation of all property in the said town, and exhibited in the said circuit court of Scott county her petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding the said appellant town to levy taxes at such rate, not exceeding 2 per centum upon all taxable property in the said town, as might be necessary to defray the current expenses of conducting the municipality, and, in addition thereto, to produce a fund to be applied to the payment and discharge of the judgment in her favor against the town. The court overruled a demurrer to the petition, and the appellant town abided its demurrer. Judgment was entered awarding the writ as prayed in the petition, and appellant has prosecuted this appeal to obtain a reversal of such judgment.

BOGGS, J. (after stating the facts).

Section 1, art. 8, c. 24, Hurd's Rev. St. 1891, as amended by an act adopted for that purpose June 18, 1891, in force July 1, 1891, entitled ‘Cities,’ etc. (Laws 1891, p. 83), vests the city councils of cities and boards of trustees of villages with power to levy and collect taxes in an amount not exceeding the rate of 2 per centum upon the aggregate valuation of all taxable property within the municipality, as the same was equalized for state and county taxes for the preceding year, and also directs the mode or manner in which such corporate authorities shall proceed in order to execute the power so granted to them. Said section 1 of article 8 of said chapter 24 (said chapter being usually denominated the General Act for the Incorporation of Cities and Villages'), when the act was adopted, did not contain the provisions now found in it limiting the rate of taxation, and requiring the council or board of trustees should adopt an ordinance specifying in detail the purposes for which appropriations were made and the amount appropriated for each purpose, and did not mark out a course of procedure to be observed when the corporate limits of the city, town, or village were situated partly in two or more counties; but it was amended by an act of the general assembly May 28, 1879, in force July 1, 1879, which limited the rate per centum to be levied, and required the adoption of a general appropriation ordinance; and was again amended by the act of the general assembly approved June 18, 1891, which incorporated in the section the provision with reference to cities and towns which were situate partly in two or more counties. The section as originally enacted and as re-enacted by the amendatory acts referred to had and has reference only to cities and villages incorporated under the provisions of the general act of which it is a part, and within itself did not operate to increase or diminish the power to levy and collect taxes possessed by any municipality organized under and existing by virtue of a special charter, or to regulate the manner in which such municipalities having special charters should levy and collect municipal taxes. The condition then was that cities and villages organized under the general incorporation act were alike restricted in point of power to levy and collect taxes, and were required to observe the same course of procedure with reference thereto, while cities and villages organized under special charters had such limitations and restrictions as were to be found in their respective charters. In order to secure uniformity in the mode of levying and collecting such taxes in all cities and towns in the state, whether acting under special charters or under the general incorporation act, the general assembly, at the sessionthereof in the year 1877, on the 23d day of May of that year, adopted the following enactment, which became effective July 1, 1877, to wit: Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, represented in the general assembly, that all cities, villages and incorporated towns in this state, whether organized under the general law or special charters, shall assess and collect their taxes in the manner provided for in article eight (8) of the act entitled ‘An act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages,’ approved April 10, 1872, and in the manner provided for in the general revenue laws of this state; and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.' This enactment had no effect to authorize cities and villages acting under special charters to levy a greater rate of taxation than the respective charters thereof permitted, but only operated to secure uniformity in the mode or manner of levying and collecting taxes in all the cities and villages in the state, whether acting under the general incorporation act or under special charters. After this last-mentioned enactment, cities and villages organized under the general incorporation act had authority to levy taxes at the rate of 2 per centum upon the aggregate value of all taxable property within their limits, while the cities and towns acting under special charters had power to levy at such rate only as should be specified in their respective charters. It was deemed better the limitation as to the rate per centum of taxation should be uniform in all cities and villages in the state, and, to accomplish this, the general assembly adopted the following act, which was approved June 11, 1897, and in force July 1, 1897, viz.: Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, represented in the general assembly, that ‘An act in regard to the assessment and collection of municipal taxes,’ passed May 23, 1877, be and the same is hereby amended so that hereafter it shall read as follows: All cities, villages and incorporated towns in this state, whether organized under the general law or special charters, shall assess and collect their taxes in the manner and shall have power to assess and collect them at the rate provided for in article eight (8) of the act entitled ‘An...

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16 cases
  • South Park Com'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1911
    ...E. 900;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82;Meul v. People, 198 Ill. 258, 64 N. E. 1106;Town of Manchester v. People, 178 Ill. 285, 52 N. E. 964;People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, 27 N. E. 217;Blake v. People, 109 Ill. 504. An act concerning libraries in public par......
  • People ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Stitt
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • December 5, 1917
    ...that general subject and as subordinate branches thereof, the several objects which the statute assumes to effect. Town of Manchester v. People, 178 Ill. 285, 52 N. E. 964. Every act must embrace a single subject, but may include other provisions which are not foreign to the general subject......
  • People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1911
    ...incorporated into an act which fairly tend to effectuate the object of the act as expressed in the title. Town of Manchester v. People, 178 Ill. 285, 52 N. E. 964;Meul v. People, 198 Ill. 258, 64 N. E. 1106;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82. The Constitution ......
  • People v. Joyce
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 12, 1910
    ...People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82;Meul v. People, 198 Ill. 258, 64 N. E. 1106;Town of Manchester v. People, 178 Ill. 285, 52 N. E. 964. The act embraces and is concerned with but one subject, viz., the establishment of a system of parole, and the various prov......
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