Town of Manchester v. Town of Townshend

• Citation: 192 A. 22,109 Vt. 65
• Parties: TOWN OF MANCHESTER v. TOWN OF TOWNSHEND ET AL
• Decision Date: 04 May 1937
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

192 A. 22

109 Vt. 65

TOWN OF MANCHESTER v. TOWN OF TOWNSHEND ET AL

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 4, 1937

February Term, 1937.

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act---Decisions of Other Courts as Precedents---Equitable Nature of Action---Joinder of Defendants at Common Law---In Equity and under Act---Bill in Equity as Multifarious---As Not Multifarious---Action under Act Held Not Maintainable for Equitable Discovery---Defendants Held Misjoined in Action against Towns to Determine Liability for Support of Pauper.

1. Under the provisions of P. L. 1602, that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (P. L. Ch. 68) "shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it," decisions of the highest courts of other states are, speaking generally, more or less imperatively binding precedents in cases where similar questions are presented.

2. An action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is equitable in its nature, and is governed by applicable established rules of pleading.

3. At common law, in order that there may be a joinder of defendants, there must be a joint obligation or joint liability on the part of such defendants.

4. In equity, there may be a joinder of defendants where there is a community of interest in questions of law and fact, and only under such a situation can there be a joinder of defendants under the Declaratory Judgments Act according to established rules of pleading.

5. A bill in equity is multifarious which seeks relief of one kind against one defendant, and another on different grounds against another defendant.

6. When one general right is claimed by a bill in equity, a demurrer for multifariousness will not hold, though the defendants have separate and distinct rights.

7. Action under Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act by town against three other towns seeking to establish right to recover under P. L. 3923 for support of pauper from one of defendant towns where he last resided for three years supporting himself and family could not be supported on the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable discovery to enable its rights to be determined, since the facts as to the pauper's residence were as open to one party as to the others.

8. In such action, held that there was misjoinder of the defendants, since the controversies between the plaintiff and each of the defendant towns were separate and distinct and could not be joined.

ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT by town against three other towns seeking to establish right to recover under P. L. 3923 for support of pauper from one of defendant towns. The defendants severally demurred claiming misjoinder of defendants and on other grounds. Heard on declaration and demurrers at the June Term, 1936, Bennington County, Cleary, J., presiding. Demurrers overruled. The defendants severally excepted and the cause was passed to Supreme Court before final judgment. The opinion states the case.

Judgment reversed, demurrers sustained and petition adjudged insufficient; judgment for the defendants to recover their costs.

Herbert G. Barber for the defendant, Town of Townshend.

Bolles & Bolles for the defendant, Town of Westminster.

O B. Hughes for the defendant, Town of Londonderry.

Blackmer & Jones for the plaintiff.

Present POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, SHERBURNE and BUTTLES, JJ.

OPINION

SHERBURNE

This is an action for a declaratory judgment under the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act chapter 68 of the Public Laws, whereby the plaintiff seeks to establish that Carl Woodard, a poor person in need of assistance for himself and family, last resided in one of defendant towns for the space of three consecutive years, supporting himself and family, so as to cast upon such town the duty to reimburse the plaintiff for sums expended and to be expended for the relief of Woodard and his family, pursuant to the provisions of P. L. 3923.

This statute, so far as material here, reads: "If a person is poor and in need of assistance for himself or family, the overseer of the poor of a town shall relieve such person or his family, when application for such assistance is made. If he has not resided * * * in such town for three years, supporting himself and family, and is not of sufficient ability to provide such assistance, the town so furnishing the same may recover the expense thereof in an action of contract, on this statute, from the town where he last resided for the space of three years, supporting himself and family."

The defendants severally demurred. The demurrers were each overruled subject to exception, and the cause has been brought here before final judgment.

The petition sets forth that Woodard and his family came to plaintiff town upon August 16, 1934, and came to want upon December 18, 1934, and were assisted by the plaintiff, which thereupon, on that date, mailed formal notice to defendant town of Westminster of Woodard's condition, and upon January 17, 1935, mailed a similar notice to defendant town of Townshend; that more than sixty days have elapsed since each of said notices; and that the defendant towns of Westminster and Townshend have each stated to the plaintiff that Woodard's residence for poor purposes is in the other town. The petition further alleges that Woodard has never resided in plaintiff town for three years, supporting himself and family, but that he so resided in the town of Westminster from 1919 to 1922, and from 1926 to 1929, and in the town of Townshend from 1911 to 1916, and from 1918 to 1919; that he was born in the town of Londonderry on August 3, 1890, and became emancipated in 1907, and resided in that town, supporting himself and family, for more than three years continuously during the period from 1907 to 1911. The real purport of the petition is that the plaintiff is uncertain in which town the pauper last resided for the space of three years, supporting himself and family.

Several questions are raised by the demurrers, but we need only consider one, that of a misjoinder of the defendants. The plaintiff admits that there is no joint liability and that only one town can be liable for the support of the pauper, but insists that there is only one single problem of where the pauper last resided for three years, supporting himself and family, and that the uniform act requires that all interested parties be joined.

As the plaintiff has an adequate remedy in an action of contract under P. L. 3923 against any one of the defendants, the sole apparent reason for this proceeding is to enable the plaintiff to allege liability against each defendant in the alternative, so that the question of which defendant is liable may be tried in one action instead of putting the plaintiff to the trouble of suing, first one, and then, if not successful against that one, the next, and so on, with the possible hazards of having to bring three separate suits and of failing in all three suits because of different views taken by the triers of fact in the different suits. Such a recourse is permitted in certain situations by statute or rule in Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, England, and some of the Canadian provinces. A few other states may permit such a joinder of defendants in certain situations. See notes in 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 640; 41 A.L.R. 1223. The question to be determined is whether under the facts of this case the defendants may be joined by virtue of the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act.

P. L. 1599, so far as material here, reads: "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration." P. L. 1600 reads: "This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered." P. L. 1603 directs that it "shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." Under the last provision, decisions of the highest courts of other states are, speaking generally, precedents by which we are more or less imperatively bound in cases where similar questions are presented. AEtna Chemical Co. v. Spaulding & Kimball Co., 98 Vt. 51, 59, 126 A. 582; Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 300, 172 A. 625.

An action under the statute is equitable in its nature. Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W. 838; Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206. And it is governed by applicable, established rules of pleading. Newsum v. Interstate Realty Co., 152 Tenn. 302, 278 S.W. 56.

At common law, in order that there may be a joinder of defendants, there must be a joint obligation ( Cunningham v. Town of Orange et al., 74 Vt. 115, 52 A. 269), or joint liability on the part of such defendants (Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty Corp. et al., 97 Vt. 336, 123 A. 192). In equity, however, there may be a joinder of defendants where there is a community of interest in questions of law and fact. Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty Corp. et al., supra. Only under such a situation can there be a joinder of defendants under this act according to established rules of pleading.

We have held that a bill in equity is multifarious which seeks relief of one kind against one defendant, and another on different grounds against the other defendant Tullar v. Baxter et al., 59 Vt. 467, 476, 8 A. 493; and that a demurrer for multifariousness holds only when the plaintiff claims several matters of different natures. When one general right is claimed by the bill, though the defendants have separate and...