Town of Miami Springs v. Scoville

• Citation: 81 So.2d 188
• Parties: TOWN OF MIAMI SPRINGS et al., Appellants, v. C. E. SCOVILLE, d/b/a Ed's Sunoco Service Station, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 15 June 1955
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

Page 188

81 So.2d 188

TOWN OF MIAMI SPRINGS et al., Appellants, v. C. E. SCOVILLE, d/b/a Ed's Sunoco Service Station, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.

June 15, 1955.

Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for appellants.

Ralph F. Miles, Hialeah, Evans, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston & Simmons and Thos. McE. Johnston, Miami, for appellee.

ROBERTS, Justice.

The question here is on the validity of an ordinance of the Town of Miami Springs regulating the size and location of signs displayed by gasoline filling stations to advertise the price of their products and services. As to petroleum products, the ordinance required the price sign to be not larger than 12 inches in height and 12 inches in width and to be posted on the dispensing equipment 'and in no other place about the premises.' As to a price sign for services, the requirement was the same as to size, and the requirement as to location was 'not less than 15 feet from any public sidewalk.' The lower court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional, and the Town has appealed.

This court has not heretofore been called upon to determine the validity of an ordinance regulating this particular type of price sign. In the final decree appealed from, the able Chancellor discussed the decisions of courts of other states and adopted the view of those courts which hold that such an ordinance is an unconstitutional restraint on the use and enjoyment of one's business and property. His opinion, after stating the facts, reads as follows:

'This is not a novel controversy. Cases similar in material features have been passed upon by courts of a number of states, even similar to restrictions as to size of price signs for gasoline stations to the exact figures of 12 by 12 , and as to location on the pumps, in some cases.

'First, however, it is necessary to consider the only authority cited by the counsel for the Town, which is Merritt v. Peters, Fla., 1953, 65 So.2d 861, 862. There, in an area zoned for limited business, including motels, the County Commissioners, as a zoning regulation under an enabling zoning statute, adopted a regulation to the effect that motel signs should not exceed 40 square feet. That would allow a sign over 6 feet high and 6 feet wide, or 8 by 5 feet.

'The party who complained there had erected such a sign more than four times the size of the 40 square feet allowed.

'Against his complaint that the regulation was arbitrary and unreasonably (the Court agreed there was no factor of health, safety or morals involved, and there was no question of fraud or deceit), the Court said 'but we disagree * * * that the restriction cannot be sustained on aesthetic grounds alone'.

'Thus, Merritt v. Peters, supra, was materially different. It prevented name or advertising signs of excessive size, for aesthetic reasons only, in an area of somewhat limited zoning. No question was involved as to the authorized size name signs being inadequate or ineffective. No question of limitation of location on the property was involved. There was no question of the regulation causing loss of revenue, nor was there any showing or contention that the plaintiff was so situated that the regulation, as to him, was designed to and had the effect of aiding his competitor to his loss.

'In the present case, the plaintiff has a Sunoco Service Station. His product is different and unique in that he sells only one grade of gasoline, which is high test gas, at one price, being the equal of the price of 'regular' gas as sold by his competitors. The other companies, almost without exception, sell two grades of gas. Regular gas and a 'High Test gas'. Those companies price the high test at several cents per gallon above the price for Regular gas.

'The plaintiff established that after the Town began to enforce the ordinance against him, and he changed from using the larger sign, on the corner or edge of his property, and relied only on 12 by 12 signs on his pumps, his ability to properly advertise his lower High Test gas price was seriously affected, and he suffered a substantial drop in his business and earnings. In the case of this plaintiff, he not only argues for technical injuries through unconstitutional restrictions on the free business use of his property, but he shows real and substantial loss and injury.

'The portions of the ordinance which the plaintiff challenged are not shown to bear reasonable relation to any public health, safety or morals. Certainly restricting gas price signs to one foot square, and retiring them to an inner part of the property was not done for aesthetic purposes, when one considers and observes the large avertising signs which flourish in the area in all businesses, including gas service stations. There is attached at this point and made a part of this decree a photograph which was filed in evidence. This picture shows plaintiff's service station; the size signs as to price of gas and their locations at the corner of the property which the restrictions of the ordinance would prohibit; the ineffectiveness of the smaller signs on the pump; and, incidentally, the unrestricted large advertising signs above the station and on adjoining businesses.

'This Court holds that there is no sufficient reason or basis in fact or law to justify the restrictions in question as an exercise of police power.

'The cases which have dealt with this question bear that out. Massachusetts cases, and some decisions in New York are to the contrary, but the weight of authority holds such restrictions to be unconstitutional.

'The Massachusetts case, Slome v. Godl(e)y, 1939, (304) Mass. (187), 23 N.E.2d 133, presumed that fraud on the public would be avoided. Other jurisdictions refused to follow that state's case. They find no basis for assumption of fraud, but on the contrary reason that a larger sign, stating the price for the product, will tend to prevent fraud.

'The Massachusetts court was influenced also by the fact that the restrictions as to size and location of gas price signs was by an act of the legislature of that state, from which the court found or assumed supporting legislative policy, which it felt it should uphold.

'In a Massachusetts case, which followed the first one, Merit Oil Co. v. Directors, etc., (319) Mass. (301), 65 N.E.2d 529, at page 532, the Court referred to a situation where the dealer sold one grade of gas, a feature which was not present in that case, but is present in the case at bar. The intimation was clear in that case that the court in Massachusetts would hold otherwise on facts such as there are in this case.

'About the same time the Slome case was decided in Massachusetts, similar restrictions were held unconstitutional by the courts of New Jersey and Connecticut in Regal Oil Co. v. State, 123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A.2d 495, and State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A.2d 192.

'This New Jersey case, Regal Oil Co. v. State, supra (123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A.2d 498), was almost exactly in point on the principal facts which appear in this case. There, a state law required price signs to be placed on the pump and prohibited display of such signs on any other portion of the property. Under that act regulations were made for such signs to be no larger than 8 by 10 . The statute and regulation was violated by a service station operator posting a larger price sign, elsewhere on his property, facing the highway. His arrest and prosecution was the basis for the Court's consideration of the question. The operator was an independent retail dealer, and just as in the present case, he was able to undersell the large company retail outlets which were his competitors because he sold only one grade of motor fuel at a lower price than comparable grades as sold by his competitors. The Court recognized his right and necessity to advertise the price of his product. That Court's discussion of the matter and its decision appears so important on this question that the following lengthy quotation is included from the New Jersey case:

"Prosecutor's (defendant below) proof is that the regulation sign on the pump or other dispensing equipment is 'entirely insufficient' for that purpose; that it 'completely destroys' the independent gasoline dealer's opportunity 'to present his gasoline and his price (therefor) to the public' and that provisions of the challenged legislation 'are essentially punitive and aimed solely at independent gasoline distributors and retailers.' Prosecutor's proofs further are that the use of such signs as exemplified by exhibits P-2 and P-3 are 'indispensable' to it in the counduct of its business; and that the 'one thing' it must have 'to stay in business' is the right to display adequately sized price signs to attract the approaching and passing motorists. approaching and passing motorists.

"Respondent's (the State) justification that it prevents ruinous price wars between dealers which it is claimed unstabilized the industry and that it further prevented fraud and misrepresentation in one form or another.

"It is interesting to observe in passing, for whatever value, if any, it may have, that respondent's proofs in support of its claims come from representatives of associations whose membership consists of those who in the vast majority sell the motor fuel of the major oil companies. But be that as it may, the proofs disclose that there was no price war between the spring of 1938 and 1939. But assuming that there had been tense competition between dealers in the industry, we fail to see its relevency. In the absence of a valid agreement to the contrary, or the violation of any valid public law, we know of nothing which makes or should make dealers in the sale of motor fuels any more immune from tense competition than other merchantmen.

"Nor do we discern any merit in the claim that subdivision (c), section 201 of the act of 1939 (N.J.S.A. 56:6-2(c)) can be supported upon the...