Town of Mount Washington v. Cook

• Decision Date: 11 October 1934
• Citation: 288 Mass. 67
• Parties: TOWN OF MOUNT WASHINGTON v. FREDERIC W. COOK. FRANK H. WRIGHT v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

288 Mass. 67

TOWN OF MOUNT WASHINGTON v. FREDERIC W. COOK. FRANK H. WRIGHT v. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

October 11, 1934

October 5, 9, 1934.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., CROSBY, PIERCE FIELD, & DONAHUE, JJ.

Constitutional Law Referendum.

Ten voters signed and filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth a document in which they stated that they petitioned "for a referendum on a" certain law "and ask for the repeal of the said law, the same being an emergency law. This petition is filed under the provisions of the

Constitution of Massachusetts as set forth in the

Articles of Amendment XLVIII relating to The Referendum III section 4."

The Secretary thereupon furnished blanks for subsequent signers which contained a copy of the document signed by the first ten voters together with their names and residences, followed by the requisite description of the emergency law, and, with appropriate headings for names and residences, space for the subsequent signers. Ten thousand voters signed such blanks. Held, that the blanks signed by the ten thousand voters sufficiently completed the petition of the ten within the requirements of "The Referendum" "III. Referendum Petitions," Section 4 of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, although the blanks did not contain in terms a statement that the ten thousand were

"protesting against such law." The meaning of the words in "III. Referendum Petitions" Section 2 of art.

48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, that a law, "the operation of which is restricted to a particular town, city or other political division or to particular districts or localities of the commonwealth," is a matter which is excluded from the operation of a referendum petition, is that such a restriction must be specified in the law itself in terms which expressly or by fair implication are geographically descriptive of territorial divisions of the Commonwealth.

A law which is general in its operation throughout the Commonwealth but which may by local option be suspended in territorial divisions is not such an excluded matter.

St. 1934, c.

275, is not such an excluded matter, but is subject to referendum under said Section 4.

TWO PETITIONS filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Berkshire on September 28, 1934, for writs of mandamus.

The petitions were heard by Lummus, J., who ordered them dismissed as a matter of law and reported the cases for determination by the full court.

F. H. Wright & H.

N. Joyner, for the petitioners.

E. T. Simoneau, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.

RUGG, C.J. These are petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the respondent not to submit St. 1934, c. 275, on referendum at the approaching State election. That statute regulates the use of traps for the capture of fur-bearing animals and, by its preamble, was declared to be an emergency law.

I. It is contended that the referendum petition signed by the requisite number of qualified voters and duly filed with the respondent has not been completed as required by "The Referendum" "III. Referendum Petitions," Section 4 of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The contention is based on the words of that section as applied to the undisputed facts. The words of that section pertinent to the present controversy are these: "A referendum petition may ask for the repeal of an emergency law . . . . Such petition shall first be signed by ten qualified voters of the commonwealth, and shall then be filed with the secretary of the commonwealth . . . . The secretary of the commonwealth shall provide blanks for the use of subsequent signers, and shall print at the top of each blank a description of the proposed law as such description will appear on the ballot together with the names and residences of the first ten signers. If such petition filed as aforesaid is completed by filing with the secretary of the commonwealth . . . the signatures of not less than ten thousand qualified voters of the commonwealth protesting against such law and asking for a referendum thereon, then the secretary of the commonwealth shall submit such law to the people at the next state election . . . ." The section thus prescribes that the "referendum petition" to be filed by the first ten voters "may ask for the repeal of an emergency law," while the completing petition must be signed by not less than ten thousand voters "protesting against such law and asking for a referendum thereon."

The undisputed facts are that the initial referendum petition signed by the ten voters states that they "petition for a referendum on a law," being St. 1934, c. 275, "and ask for the repeal of the said law, the same being an emergency law. This petition is filed under the provisions of the Constitution of Massachusetts as set forth in the Articles of Amendment XLVIII relating to The Referendum III section 4." The blanks provided by the Secretary of the Commonwealth for the subsequent signers respecting the referendum contained a copy of the petition signed by the first ten voters together with their names and residences, followed by the requisite description of the emergency law. Then, with appropriate headings for names and residences, were blanks for the subsequent signers. (Although not printed in the record, a sample blank was presented at the argument by agreement of all counsel.) The ten thousand voters signing the completing petition, therefore, signed the same petition as the first ten voters. They signed nothing which contained the precise words "protesting against such law." They simply indorsed by their signatures the form signed by the first ten voters petitioning for a referendum on the specified law and asking for its repeal pursuant to Section 4 of "III. Referendum Petitions" of art. 48 of the Amendments.

The exact question is whether those voters, attempting by their signatures to complete the petition for a referendum, subscribed a petition conforming to the requirements of the amendment. An amendment to the Constitution is an important and solemn instrument. It commonly is a statement of general principles. There is considerable of detail about art. 48. It nevertheless must be construed as a part of the Constitution. Rules established for the interpretation of the Constitution in general must be followed. Art. 48 was framed with great care. All its words must be presumed to have been chosen advisedly. They must be given their ordinary meaning, and construed to accomplish a reasonable result. Mere words are not to be placed above the plain purpose to be achieved. The aim of all interpretation is to give effect to the dominating idea of the instrument. Statements in the Constitution and its Amendments must be given effect in consonance with the end they are designed to accomplish. Attorney General v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564 , 573, 576. Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91 , 99. In Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 582 , 589, respecting another part of art. 48 of the Amendments, it was said that its provisions "are mandatory and not simply directory. They are highly important. There must be compliance with them." In United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, at page 731, occurs this statement: "The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition."

The voters who affixed their signatures to the completing petition here assailed expressed a definite intention. Indubitably they petitioned for a referendum on the statute and asked for its repeal. They stated that their petition was filed under the provisions of art. 48 of the Amendments, "The Referendum III section 4." Thus they attempted to incorporate by reference the essential provisions of that section so far as it affected them and their procedure. Their petition did not contain the words prescribed by that section that they were "protesting against such law." It is contended that the omission of those words is fatal to the petition. The point is difficult. It would have been much better if the completing petition had followed in its phraseology the words of the Amendment to the Constitution.

There is a distinction between the requirements of "III. Referendum Petitions" in Section 3 respecting a...