Town of Plainville v. Town of Milford

• Decision Date: 21 January 1935
• Citation: 119 Conn. 380,177 A. 138
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF PLAINVILLE v. TOWN OF MILFORD.

177 A. 138

119 Conn. 380

TOWN OF PLAINVILLE v. TOWN OF MILFORD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 21, 1935

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Hartford County; Thomas J Molloy, Judge.

Action by the Town of Plainville against the Town of Milford to recover the expense of support of a pauper brought to the court of common pleas for Hartford county and tried to the court. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Cyril F. Gaffney and Bernard F. Gaffney, both of New Britain, for appellant.

Omar W. Platt, of Milford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and JENNINGS JJ.

HAINES, Judge.

The plaintiff town seeks to recover $377.35 from the defendant for the care of Harry Rose-Turner from August 19, 1932, to June 9, 1934, upon the allegation that he had a settlement in Milford during that period, denying its own responsibility because of the provisions of General Statutes, § 1686: " No inhabitant of any town in this state shall gain a legal settlement in any other town, unless he shall have been admitted in the manner prescribed in section 1684; or unless he shall have resided, subject to the provisions of this chapter, four years continuously in such town, and shall have maintained himself and family during the whole of said period without becoming chargeable to such town."

The uncontested portions of the findings show that Harry was the illegitimate child of Mary Rose, and that she was born in Milford December 29, 1879. Her parents were residents and had a settlement in that town on that date and until their deaths in 1929 and 1930. She lived continuously in Milford until the early part of 1899, when she began work in New Haven, living in a boarding house there and returning frequently at week-ends to her home in Milford. After becoming twenty-one years of age, she continued to live and work in New Haven under the conditions stated until Harry was born in a hospital in Hartford, about three and one-half years, and thereafter until January 3 or 4, 1905, when she married and went with her husband to live in Seattle, dying there January 17, 1911.

By reason of the fact that her parents had a legal settlement in Milford, Mary, at her birth, derived from her father the same settlement. Her father never changed his settlement, and her derivative settlement therefore remained in Milford during her minority.

At common law, the place of birth was held to be, prima facie the place of settlement. 48 Cor. Jur. p. 450, § 41. In this state, however, it has been decided that the child takes by derivation the settlement of the father if the child is legitimate and of the mother if it is illegitimate. Thus the place of birth may or may not be the place of settlement depending upon the circumstances. So, if the parent changes his settlement during the minority of the child, his new settlement becomes the child's settlement by derivation. Town of Windham v. Town of Lebanon, 51 Conn. 319; Town of New Haven v. Town of Huntington, 22 Conn. 25; Town of Bethlem v. Town of Roxbury, 20 Conn. 298; Town of Oxford v. Town of Bethany, 19 Conn. 229; Town of New Haven v. Town of Newtown, 12 Conn. 165; Inhabitants of Town of Guilford v. Inhabitants of Town of Oxford, 9 Conn. 321. Since Mary was but three and a half years past her majority when Harry was born, she had not fulfilled in any event the statutory requirement of four years residence to effect a change of settlement. Her settlement and, by derivation, the settlement of Harry, therefore, at his birth, was Milford.

The defendant claims that, having continued to work under the conditions stated for more than six months after the birth of Harry, Mary had acquired a settlement in New Haven, and that the settlement of Harry in 1905 was thus New Haven also. Whether this stay had the legal effect of abandoning her Milford settlement and giving her a new settlement in New Haven depends upon the circumstances disclosed by the finding. It appears that she went to New Haven to work just before she was twenty-one years of age, and lived in a boarding house during the whole period of employment. It is also found that she went to her " home" at week-ends, frequently. The finding is not sufficiently specific to warrant a definite conclusion as to whether she acquired a settlement in New Haven or not. We pass that question as not necessary to answer, in our view of this case.

Harry was passed from one to another, and finally found a home with Mrs. Turner when he was five years old. When he was seven, he went with her and her husband to their new home in Plainville. She obviously became his foster mother. He took her name of Turner, though he was never legally adopted, and he lived in Plainville for fourteen years continuously until he was twenty-one years of age. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that his own mother had abandoned him, and she never returned. It does not appear that she ever paid any further attention to him.

Ordinarily, a child is emancipated at majority. 48 Cor. Jur. p. 408, § 119, and note 34. But the desertion of a minor by his parent may also emancipate him. Thompson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 104 F. 845. Emancipation occurs when a person once under the power and control of another is rendered free. 1 Bouv. Law. Dict. (3d Rev.) p. 1004. A minor is emancipated if placed in a new relation inconsistent with the former relation as part of his parent's family. Town of Tunbridge v. Town of Eden, 39 Vt. 17; Town of Sherburne v. Town of Hartland, 37 Vt. 528; Wells v. Westhaven, 5 Vt. 322. Where the parent has absolutely renounced by agreement or implication all care and control of the child, he is emancipated. Inhabitants of Lowell v. Newport, 68 Me. 78; Inhabitants of Oldtown v. Falmouth, 40 Me. 106, 108; Clay v. Shirley, 65 N.H. 644, 23 A. 531; Town of South Burlington v. Cambridge, 77 Vt. 289, 59 A. 1013; 1 Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th Ed.) p. 897, § 807 et seq. An unemancipated child is presumed to be still under the control of his parent, and cannot acquire a settlement in his own right. 48 Cor. Jur. p. 452, § 47; Inhabitants of Huntington v. Inhabitants of Oxford, 4 Day, 189. The circumstances force the conclusion that Harry was emancipated when his mother deserted him in 1905, with the result that he continued to retain the settlement which she had when she abandoned him, unless he acquired another for himself 48 Cor. Jur. p. 453, note 25, and cases cited.

The question is then presented whether, after being emancipated while he had the settlement of his mother, he could acquire a new settlement during his minority. Our own statute, section 1686, provides for the acquisition of a settlement by any " inhabitant," and there is no disqualification as regards minors. Harry was legally an " inhabitant" during his minority. Town of Canton v. Simsbury, 54 Conn. 86, 88, 6 A. 183. " It has been generally held that a minor *** may, if emancipated, acquire a settlement in his own right under statutes providing for the acquisition of settlements by ‘ all persons,’ ‘ any resident,’ or ‘ any person,’ etc., without any express disqualifications as regards minors." 48 Cor. Jur. p. 453, § 49, and decisions cited.

Although this precise question has not heretofore been decided in this state, the principle of emancipation was recognized in an early case, Town of Torrington v. Town of Norwich, 21 Conn. 543, 549, wherein it is said: " There is no doubt that a minor may, in certain cases, contract a relation or obligation, which is inconsistent with, and will therefore, supersede or suspend, his subordinate relation to his parents, and thus prevent him, while such subordinate relation is so superseded or suspended, from deriving or following a settlement subsequently acquired by such parents. This would be on the ground that he was emancipated, as it is termed, from the parents, before the acquisition of such settlement, and therefore, that its derivation by the child from the parent is prevented or delayed, by the destruction or suspension of the subordinate relation of the former to the latter, on which the derivation of the settlement by the child is founded." See, also, 48 Cor. Jur. p. 484, § 119, note 32.

The origin of our statutory provisions concerning settlement is found in an act of the general court passed in 1667 upon complaint to the court that " divers persons have thrust themselves into the severall Plantations of this Colony, to the unjust disturbance of the same," and the act provided a penalty to be imposed upon any person abiding in a plantation after he had been warned to depart. 2 Colonial Records, p. 66. A further provision in 1682 was directed against the importation into a town of transients, servants, or tenants, " such persons often proveing vicious and burthensome and chargeable" to the town. Security was required from the person who entertained or hired them, to protect the plantation against being burdened or charged on their account. Provision was also made for the removal of transients to the place from whence they came unless they produced a certificate that they were persons of good behavior and free to remove to any place where they might best advantage themselves. 3 Colonial Records, p. 111. In the Revision of 1702 the...