State v. Doe

• Decision Date: 06 February 1962
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jane DOE. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 271

178 A.2d 271

149 Conn. 216

STATE of Connecticut v. Jane DOE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 6, 1962.

Ernest H. Halstedt, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Albert L. Coles, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

William I. Mark, Meridian, for defendant.

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.

BALDWIN, Chief Justice.

This action has been reserved for the advice of this court upon facts agreed upon and set forth hereinafter. At the request of the parties, the trial court allowed the defendant to use a fictitious name and the cause to be docketed as State of Connecticut v. Jane Doe. See General Statutes, § 52-89; Practice Book, § 199; Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 59, 156 A.2d 508.

The defendant came from Rutland, Vermont, to Hartford, Connecticut, in January, 1961. Her parents reside in Rutland. From the time of her birth on September 14, 1939, until she came to Hartford, she had never resided in this state. On March 9, 1961, she applied for, and since that date has been receiving, welfare assistance from the city of Hartford. On March 13, 1961, the welfare authorities of Hartford, acting pursuant to General Statutes, § 17-273a (formerly § 17-269), requested the state welfare commissioner to return her to Vermont, where the welfare authorities in Rutland have conceded that she has a 'settlement.' See Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 33 § 701 (Sup.1961). They have authorized her return, but she is unwilling to go. When the defendant applied for welfare assistance, General Statutes § 17-273a provided that when any person who belongs to another state comes to reside in this state and becomes chargeable or makes application for aid or is admitted to a state humane institution as an indigent person or pauper or otherwise, the proper municipal officials shall notify the state welfare commissioner. If he finds that the person belongs to another state, he may return him to the other state at the expense of the state of Connecticut, or he may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction, and the court 'shall issue a warrant' to a proper officer to transport the person to the place whence he came to this state, or to the place of his former residence at the discretion of the commissioner. The expense of executing the warrant is to be paid by the state. The questions upon which our advice is sought are whether this statute violates the federal and state constitutions. ¹

This is a case of first impression in this state. In Harrison v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 724 729, 43 A. 190 (1899), this court held that under the statute (Rev.1888, § 3303) which is presently § 17-284 a pauper could be removed from one town to another within the state at the instance of the selectmen of the town to which he was being removed. See Backus v. Dudley, 3 Conn. 568, 573. Interstate removal of paupers has been considered by courts in other states, but not under legislation like that presently in force in Connecticut. Matter of Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 28 N.E.2d 895 (dissenting opinion); Chirillo v. Lehman, 38 F.Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 312 U.S. 662, 61 S.Ct. 741, 85 L.Ed. 1108; State v. Lange, 148 Kan. 614, 618, 83 P.2d 653; Knowles' Case, 8 Me. 71, 73; Hilborn v. Briggs, 58 N.D. 612, 616, 226 N.W. 737; Overseers of Poor of Limestone Tp. v. Overseers of Poor of Chillisquaque, 87 Pa. 294; Settlement of Indigent Persons, 20 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 94, 95; Overseers of Poor of Georgia v. Overseers of Poor of Grand Isle, 1 Vt. 464, 467.

The result we reach in the case at bar requires further proceedings and makes it desirable and necessary to review the history of § 17-273a ² and its relation to other legislation dealing with the treatment of indigent persons. The support of persons unable to maintain themselves has, historically, been considered primarily a matter of local concern. Legislation relating to the settlement and care of the poor has evolved through the years from an origin in early colonial days. See 3 Col.Rec. 300 (1678-1689); Town of Plainville v. Town of Milford, 119 Conn. 380, 386, 177 A. 138. In January, 1961, when the defendant came to Hartford, General Statutes, § 17-273 provided that all persons 'who have not estate sufficient for their support, and have no relatives of sufficient ability who are obliged by law to support them, shall be provided for and supported at the expense of the town where they belong.' To 'belong' to a particular town, a person had to be a settled inhabitant thereof. Connecticut Hospital for the Insane v. Brookfield, 69 Conn. 1, 4, 36 A. 1017; Columbia v. Williams, 3 Conn. 467, 471. In March, 1961, when the defendant applied to the city of Hartford for aid, General Statutes, § 17-263 provided that a nonresident who came to reside in any town in this state could not gain a settlement there unless he had continuously resided in the town four years next preceding the time he claimed to be an inhabitant and had maintained himself during that whole period without expense to the town or the state. Other qualifications were prescribed which are not pertinent to this case. To gain a 'settlement,' a person had to acquire a residence in a town of a character that would entitle him, in case he became a pauper, to support at the expense of the town. Town of Washington v. Town of Warren, 123 Conn. 268, 271, 193 A. 751; Town of Chaplin v. Town of Bloomfield, 92 Conn. 395, 396, 103 A. 118. Many of the states have statutes of similar import. See, for example, Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 33 § 701 (Sup.1961). Because the defendant had not gained a settlement in Hartford, her application for welfare assistance in March, 1961, came within the provisions of General Statutes, § 17-292 and § 17-285. These statutes provided for partial reimbursement by the state to the town supplying support and, in case the recipient had a settlement in another town in the state, for further reimbursement by that town.

At its 1961 session, the General Assembly amended General Statutes, §§ 17-273 and 17-292 and repealed §§ 17-263 and 17-285. Public Acts 1961, No. 425, § 1; id., Nos. 321, 425, § 3, 517 § 122; id., No. 425, § 6; ibid. Effective October 1, 1961 (see General Statutes, § 2-32), § 17-273 provides that the town shall furnish support to each person who resides in the town or, having no residence, becomes in need of aid there, if he cannot support himself and has no relatives able and obliged by law to support him. Section 17-292 allows the town to apply for and receive reimbursement from the state for 50 percent of the expenditures of the town for general assistance--in lieu of all other payments by way of reimbursement for relief expenditures. The net effect of the changes in the statutory law has been to place the ultimate obligation for furnishing support to an indigent person, with the right of partial reimbursement from the state, on the particular town where he resides or, having no residence, becomes in need of support, rather than on the town, if any, in which he had a settlement in this state. When the defendant began receiving assistance from the city of Hartford in March, 1961, the respective obligations of the town and the state were defined by sections which, as shown above, have since been repealed or amended.

The power of removal from the state conferred by General Statutes § 17-273a has been claimed by Connecticut since long before the adoption of the federal constitution. Statutes, 1715, pp. 59-60; id., 1750, pp. 99-101; id., 1784, pp. 102-104; see Mandelker, 'Exclusion and Removal Legislation,' 1956 Wis.L.Rev. 57. Section 17-273a took substantially its present form as early as 1796. Statutes, 1796, p. 240. Several states presently have similar statutory provisions. ³ The states have not been unmindful of the problems raised by persons who have a regular place of abode in one state but journey with their families across state lines and seek welfare relief in another state. It was a simple thing in colonial days to provide that transients be ordered out of the colony under penalty of being whipped if they returned. See Statutes, 1715, p. 60. That kind of treatment, made necessary, perhaps, by the dangers and primitive conditions of those times, is revolting to modern sensibilities. Some states have retained statutes requiring bonds from, or imposing penalties by way of fines upon, persons who bring paupers into the state. ⁴ Section 17-273a imposes no penalties. It does not prevent an indigent person from coming into this state and it does not make it a criminal offense to bring him here. It is not an exclusion statute like the California statute (Cal.Welfare & Institutions Code, § 2615 [1937]) which was held unconstitutional in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119.

In 1933, the General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing the making of reciprocal agreements with other states regarding the interstate transportation of poor and indigent persons. Cum.Sup.1933, § 475b; as amended, Cum.Sup.1935, § 667c. This was the origin of what is presently § 17-293, which authorizes the welfare commissioner to enter into reciprocal agreements with other states for the interstate transportation of poor and indigent persons. At its session in 1961, the General Assembly enacted the Interstate Compact on Welfare Services Act, further implementing § 17-293. General Statutes, §§ 17-21a-17-21d. California, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont and Virginia, as well as Connecticut, have legislation authorizing agreements with other states for the interstate transportation of indigent persons. ⁵ The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a Uniform Transfer of Dependents Act as long ago as 1935. 9C U.L.A. 216-219 & Ann.Cum.Sup. Some of the states have dealt in a cooperative and comprehensive manner with an interstate problem which is within the power of the states to solve without...