Town of Smithfield v. Fanning
| Decision Date | 07 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-08-A,90-08-A |
| Citation | 602 A.2d 939 |
| Parties | TOWN OF SMITHFIELD v. Daniel P. FANNING, Director of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation and the State of Rhode Island. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before us on an appeal by the town of Smithfield (town) and also by a proposed intervenor, Washington Highway Development, Inc. (Washington), from a judgment entered in the Superior Court denying the prayers of a complaint for injunctive relief filed by the town against Daniel P. Fanning, director of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (director). 1 We affirm. The facts and travel of the case insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.
According to the findings of the trial justice, the director made plans to construct a storage facility for salt compounds used in salting highways during icy weather at the intersection of Route 116 and Route 7 in the town of Smithfield. This is a semirural area that has been zoned for industrial purposes. However, under the town zoning ordinances there are no permitted uses. Consequently in each instance every person who seeks to construct a building or facility in that area must ask for a special exception. It is undisputed that no such application was made by the director.
The town concedes that the director began studying the need for a salt storage facility in this area during the year 1985. Consultants were hired to do design work, and the director consulted and coordinated the planning process with the Department of Environmental Management. Adjacent property owners were notified; notice was sent to the town and to the town engineer. There is some question concerning whether the notice to the town indicated that the proposed facility would be used for salt storage.
In 1988 a report was issued, and the director notified the town engineer of the intention to build a salt storage facility at the parcel of real estate in question, which was already owned by the state. On December 29, 1988, the town council executive coordinator advised the director or his subordinates that the town objected to the placement of the salt storage facility at the proposed location. As a result of this objection, meetings were held in January and March 1989 in which the representatives of the director consulted with representatives of the town. The director contends that all suggestions offered by the town concerning the design of the structure were incorporated. It is the position of the town that the director should have submitted these plans as would any other applicant to the zoning board of review for a special exception. The director contends that the town did not make mention of its position concerning the necessity of applying to its zoning board during the 1989 meeting. Believing that sufficient consultations had taken place, the director solicited bids for the project, awarded a contract, and began work.
It was only as site work began on November 7 or 8, 1989, that the town forcefully renewed its objection by issuing a stop-work order through its engineer. The reason given for the stop-work order was that the director had not obtained a permit and was in violation of the town's soil erosion ordinance. On that same date a cease-and-desist order was issued by the town zoning-enforcement officer for violation of the zoning ordinance.
Following the issuance of these orders, negotiations took place between representatives of the director and the town. The director contends that his representatives met all the concerns of the town except one. The director refused to subject any future changes in the proposed facility to the town's zoning officials. The director took the position that he should not be wholly subservient to the town's ordinances and that there was at least a qualified immunity from such ordinances on the part of a state agency.
This disagreement resulted in the filing by the town of a complaint in the Superior Court seeking that the construction of the proposed facility be enjoined. The complaint alleged inter alia that the director had not applied for or obtained permission from the zoning board and that also the director was in violation of the town's soil erosion ordinance. The town also alleged that the director was in violation of G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) chapter 20 of title 10 which governs violations of environmental quality standards.
A temporary restraining order was issued, and thereafter a hearing was held by the trial justice on the town's petition for preliminary injunction. At the close of the hearing the parties stipulated that the hearing on preliminary injunction might be combined with and considered as a final hearing on the merits of the case. The trial justice engaged in a balancing process in accordance with the principles enunciated in Blackstone Park Improvement Association v. State Board of Standards and Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233 (R.I.1982), and determined that the director had consulted with the town and made reasonable efforts to resolve the points of disagreement save the one element of agreeing to subservience to the town's ordinances. He said that the interest of the traveling public on the highways within the town "was heavily in favor of the state as opposed to the local community." He found no evidence at all of any violation of environmental quality standards.
At the outset of the trial of the case, the trial justice had declined to permit Washington, the owner of adjacent property, to intervene in the action on the ground that the intervenor lacked standing to intervene as of right and, as a discretionary matter, he determined that the intervenor would unduly broaden the scope of the litigation brought by the town. He felt that Washington's proposed action included common law claims as well as the statutory claims made by the town. This appeal has ensued.
In support of its appeal the town raises a number of issues that will be considered in the order in which they are set forth in the town's brief. Washington's contention will be considered separately.
The essential argument made by the town is that the trial justice erred in conducting the balancing process during the course of the hearing in the Superior Court. The town contends that the trial justice should have required the director to submit to the procedures required by the town's zoning ordinances prior to determining whether the director should be immune from that process. It is undisputed that in Blackstone Park Improvement Association, this court engaged in a balancing process in determining whether the state might expand a rehabilitation facility at the Donley Center in a residential neighborhood. The contending parties read the case differently concerning whether in future cases a state agency should be required to submit to municipal ordinance procedures prior to raising the issue of immunity or, put another way, to submit the issue of immunity initially to the municipal zoning board. The director contends that this question need not be answered in this case since the town literally invited the trial justice to perform the balancing test himself. In making this argument, the director quotes a statement made by the town's special solicitor at the outset of the hearing before the trial justice. This statement is set forth below.
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