Town of Southington v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations
| Decision Date | 28 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 13494,13494 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | TOWN OF SOUTHINGTON v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS et al. |
Donald W. Strickland, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
Joseph M. Celentano, Asst. Counsel, with whom was Barbara J. Collins, for appellees (defendants).
George C. Hastings, Cynthia J. Bates and Daniel F. Sullivan, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.
Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the state board of labor relations erred in deciding that the positions of tax assessor, building official, town planner, tax collector and youth counselor in the town of Southington were not department heads within the meaning of General Statutes § 7-467, Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503, and therefore were not excluded from collective bargaining with the town. We concur with the decision of the board and conclude that the Superior Court did not err in dismissing the town's appeal from the board's decision.
The background of this case is as follows. On September 12, 1983, the defendant union, Local 818 of Council 4, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, 1 filed with the defendant state board of labor relations (board) a petition seeking to represent all supervisory employees who worked for the town of Southington. On March 12, 1984, the board issued an order of election for union representation that included fourteen supervisory positions in the town, among them the five positions disputed in this case. The town challenged the eligibility of ten of the fourteen employees, claiming that they were "department heads," who were prohibited from bargaining collectively under the Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq. 2 The election was held on April 10, 1984, and the town again challenged the ballots of certain town officials, including the disputed five positions. The challenged ballots were sealed pending a determination by the board. Hearings on the town's objections and challenges were held by the board. In its decision (number 2451) issued on December 26, 1985, the board determined that the positions of sewer superintendent and superintendent of highways were "department heads" within the meaning of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503 (codified as General Statutes § 7-467) 3 and therefore were excluded from the collective bargaining unit, but found that the remaining challenged positions, including the five disputed positions, were not "department heads" and thus were properly within the collective bargaining unit. Thereafter, the challenged ballots were opened and the board determined that a majority of the town's eligible supervisory employees had voted in favor of union representation. Subsequently, on January 9, 1986, the board issued another decision (number 2451-A) certifying the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the supervisors in the town.
On January 29, 1986, the union demanded that the town negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for all of the employees in the supervisors' bargaining unit. At the first bargaining session, the town refused to bargain with the union over the five disputed positions. The union then filed an unfair labor practice charge against the town, with the board, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-470(a)(4), for its refusal to bargain. On June 4, 1986, the board issued decision No. 2498 ordering the town to bargain with the union over the disputed positions. On June 26, 1986, the town appealed that decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. The trial court defined the sole issue as whether the board's decision was rendered in accordance with the definition of "department head" contained in General Statutes § 7-467(4). In affirming the board's decision and dismissing the town's appeal, the court stated that it gave "great deference" to the board's construction of the statute. The town then appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.
It is particularly useful in this case to summarize the board's comprehensive and scholarly decision No. 2451. The term "department head" was not defined under MERA until the passage of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503, which became effective on October 1, 1983. During the period from 1978 to 1983, the board attempted to fashion a reasonable definition of "department head" on a case-by-case basis. In deciding whether a person was a "department head," the board had developed several guiding principles, among them: (1) the word "department" as used in MERA is a term of art referring to the largest divisions of government; (2) a person claimed to be excluded as a "department head" must exercise supervision over a substantial number of employees; (3) if a town charter identifies a division of government as a department, the board will consider that identification, but not be bound by it; and (4) the exception is to be narrowly construed.
The board's decision took note of four changes from existing practice contained in Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503. First, under the act, provisions of local charters or of special acts became irrelevant to the determination of whether a division of government constitutes a "department." Second, to qualify as a "department head" under the act, a person must be directly accountable to the board of selectmen or to the chief executive officer of a town. Third, the act substituted a new test for supervisory control that, instead of looking to the number of supervised employees, required that a department head must have "substantial supervisory control of a permanent nature over other municipal employees." The board stated that it had not before required that, to be a department head, an individual have a degree of supervisory control greater than that of non-department head supervisors. In view of the new act, however, the board decided that to be a department head, one must do more than merely meet the definition of supervisor, one must actually have substantial supervisory control. Finally, the board analyzed the impact of the change from its definition of a "department" as being one of the largest divisions of government to being, under the act, a "major functional division" of government. The board decided that: (1) this is an expansion of its prior definition of a "department"; (2) the concept of "major functional division" must be considered within the context of the particular municipality in question; (3) what might be a "major functional division" in a small town, may not be a "major functional division" in a large city; (4) whether a division is major must be determined in view of objective factors such as the division's budget, staff size, and control over the use of municipal resources; and (5) it is inappropriate for the board to base its decision upon its own notions of what, in relative terms, is a more or less important function of local government. The board rejected the town's argument that the local subjective view of the importance of a function should control. It found that view relevant, but only as reflected through the objective factors described above.
The board then listed the following criteria for determining whether a person is a "department head" under the act: The board ruled that each of these questions must be answered in the affirmative for a person to meet the definition of "department head" under the act.
Applying these criteria, the board found two positions that the town had challenged to be "department heads": the sewer superintendent and the superintendent of highways. Neither position is involved in this appeal. With respect to the five disputed positions, the board found that they were not in charge of "major functional divisions" of the town. Therefore, none of the five was a "department head" and all could be included in a bargaining unit of supervisors. Specifically, the board found the following concerning each of the five positions: (1) tax assessor; three other employees; comparatively small budget; (2) building official; four other employees; comparatively small budget; (3) town planner; two other employees; budget of $69,000; (4) tax collector; four other employees; comparatively small budget; and (5) youth counselor; three other employees; comparatively small budget. Finally, the board noted that with regard to the employees holding the first four of these positions, although each performed functions that concerned considerable municipal resources, none of them controlled the use to which those resources were put. The board then ordered the challenged ballots opened. As a result of the board's decision, out of the ten ballots cast, what had been a vote of three in favor of representation and zero against, became a vote of eight in favor of representation, two void ballots, and zero opposed to representation. It was this vote in favor of representation that precipitated this litigation.
After being ordered by the board to bargain with the union over the disputed positions, the town appealed to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 4-183. In upholding the...
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