Town of Stonewood v. Bell
| Decision Date | 07 October 1980 |
| Docket Number | 14700,Nos. 14654,s. 14654 |
| Citation | 165 W.Va. 653,270 S.E.2d 787 |
| Parties | The TOWN OF STONEWOOD a Municipal Corporation v. Russell BELL and Dora Bell. The TOWN OF BARRACKVILLE, a Municipal Corporation v. Joseph GRIFFIN, Judy Flowers Griffin, Ruth Flowers. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. "The enactment of a zoning ordinance of a municipality being a legislative function, all reasonable presumptions should be indulged in favor of its validity." Syl. pt. 3, G-M Realty v. City of Wheeling, 46 W.Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1971).
2. The legislature did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in granting to municipalities the authority to regulate, with or without a comprehensive zoning plan, the placement of mobile homes within municipalities.
3. "If most of the factors necessary to the decision of a zoning case have both positive and negative aspects, it would appear that these matters are fairly debatable, and in such case the court will not overrule the city authorities in the exercise of their legislative function." Syl. pt. 4 Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W.Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966).
4. Where the complaining party has failed to show that a municipal ordinance, properly adopted, is arbitrary or unreasonable, this Court will not overrule city authorities in the exercise of their legislative function.
Paul Mones, Clarksburg, for appellants.
Jones, Williams, West & Jones and John S. Kaull, Clarksburg, for appellee.
Kenneth P. Simons, Fairmont, for appellants.
J. Scott Tharp, Fairmont, for appellee.
For the purposes of decision, this Court has consolidated two cases here on writs of error. Each case raises the issue of the constitutionality of municipal ordinances regulating the placement of mobile homes. 1 Both cases also question the constitutionality of W.Va.Code § 8-12- 5(30) 2 which enables municipalities to adopt ordinances prohibiting the placement of mobile homes in certain residential areas with or without a comprehensive zoning plan.
In August of 1979 the town of Barrackville adopted an ordinance entitled "An Ordinance Prohibiting House Trailers and Mobile Homes within Certain Areas and Requiring Permission for the Placing of House Trailers and Mobile Homes Within the Municipality." This ordinance, known as ordinance No. 9, was adopted pursuant to the authority delegated by W.Va.Code § 8-12-5(30). Basically, the ordinance prohibits the placement of mobile homes or house trailers in any residential area other than an existing and recognized trailer court.
The Town of Stonewood adopted a similar ordinance in October of 1971. That ordinance was also adopted pursuant to W.Va.Code § 8-12-5(30). The Stonewood ordinance was twice amended, once to provide certain penalties for its violation and once to effectively prohibit the development of any more mobile home parks in that community. Both the Barrackville and Stonewood ordinances have "grandfather" clauses which allow mobile homes placed outside of the trailer courts before the adoption of the ordinances to remain there.
In June of 1977, the appellants Russell and Dora Bell placed a mobile on lots lying within the town limits of Stonewood. Two months later Stonewood, through its legal counsel, notified the Bells that the placement of their mobile home violated the aforementioned ordinance and requested that the mobile home be removed. 3 The Bells refused to remove the mobile home. Stonewood brought this action in the Circuit Court of Harrison County seeking a permanent injunction.
In April of 1979, the appellant, Ruth Flowers and her daughter and son-in-law, Judy and Joseph Griffin, also appellants here, appeared before the Barrackville town council and requested permission to locate a mobile home on property owned by them. They sought this use under section three of Ordinance No. 9 which provides a procedure for obtaining permission from the town council to place a mobile home outside a trailer court. The town council denied the appellants' request. Despite this denial, Ruth Flowers moved her mobile home from a trailer court to the property owned by her daughter and son-in-law. Subsequently, Barrackville brought an action in the Circuit Court of Marion County praying for the removal of the home.
The municipalities in both cases moved for summary judgment. As there is no issue of fact in either case, both trial courts properly granted the motions. In both cases, the trial courts found that the appellants placed mobile homes outside recognized trailer parks in violation of the ordinances and that both the ordinances and the enabling statute, W.Va.Code § 8-12-5(30), were constitutional. It is from these rulings that the appellants prosecute these writs of error.
Both appellants complain that the statute, W.Va.Code § 8-12-5(30), and the ordinances violate the substantive due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and the West Virginia Constitution's substantive due process provision. Additionally, the appellants contend that the statute and ordinances violate the equal protection provisions of both Constitutions. We find these contentions without merit and accordingly, affirm the judgment of the courts below.
As a touchstone into our inquiry concerning the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance and the underlying enabling statute, we must be mindful of the presumption of validity which attaches a legislative determinations concerning such matters. "The enactment of a zoning ordinance of a municipality being a legislative function, all reasonable presumptions should be indulged in favor of its validity." Syl. pt. 3, G-M Realty v. City of Wheeling, 150 W.Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966). As an exercise of the municipality's police power, an ordinance must bear a substantial relation to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people. Courts are not disposed to declare an ordinance invalid in whole or in part where it is fairly debatable as to whether the action of the municipality is arbitrary or unreasonable. Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W.Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243(1966).
In the instant case, the ordinances in question were adopted pursuant to W.Va.Code § 8-12-5(30) which enables municipalities to regulate trailer placement with or without a comprehensive zoning plan. Whether such ordinance may be adopted without a comprehensive zoning plan is a question which has been litigated in many other jurisdictions. The Massachusetts court in considering a similar situation held that since the enabling statute did not require a comprehensive zoning plan as a condition precedent to the exercise of the police power, a municipal ordinance restricting house trailers to licensed trailer parks was valid. Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960). In a leading case on mobile home zoning restrictions, Napierkowski v. Gloucester Twp., 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 489 (1959), the New Jersey Court ruled that an ordinance similar to the one before us was valid under the zoning power. The court there stated that it was satisfied that the municipality might regulate the placement of mobile homes under the general grant of police powers because such an ordinance was designed to promote the general health, safety and welfare of the community.
By allowing municipalities to regulate mobile homes without a comprehensive zoning plan, the legislature may well have realized the difficulties many West Virginia towns might have in adopting a comprehensive zoning plan under W.Va.Code § 8-24-1 et seq. Under those code sections a municipality must have a planning commission of not less than five nor more than fifteen individuals who hold regular meetings and who employ necessary personnel. The planning commission is charged with the duty of making and recommending a comprehensive plan with maps, plats, charts and the like. Such activities, of course, would require the employment of professionals skilled in land use planning. A review of the code provisions concerning zoning plans clearly discloses the problems a small municipality would have in administering such a comprehensive scheme. Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that the legislature did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in granting to municipalities the authority to regulate, with or without a comprehensive zoning plan, the placement of mobile homes within municipalities. 4
The second thrust of our inquiry poses the question of whether the ordinances adopted pursuant to W.Va.Code § 8-12-5(30) are a reasonable exercise of the authority granted to municipalities under that code section. We must again be mindful of our touchstone in these cases. "If most of the factors necessary to the decision of a zoning case have both positive and negative aspects, it would appear that these matters are fairly debatable, and in such case the court will not overrule the city authorities in the exercise of their legislative function." Syl. pt. 4 Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W.Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966). We must also remember that it is the duty of the appellants in these cases to overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to legislative acts. They may not simply show that there are negative effects flowing from the ordinance. Such a showing would merely place the ordinance within the parameters of our rule which prevents us from striking down a zoning ordinance when it is fairly debatable whether the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable. Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W.Va. 689, 141 S.E.2d 243 (1966). As was stated by the Minnesota court in State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972), "(t)he burden of proof is upon the appellant to show by clear and convincing proof that the relief he seeks would not result in any substantial detriment to the neighboring property improved in reliance on the validity of the ordinance." 195 N.W.2d at 184.
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