Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, Inc.
| Citation | 806 P.2d 281 |
| Decision Date | 19 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | 89-181,Nos. 89-180,s. 89-180 |
| Parties | The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Delmar H. Landen; Jean Landen; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Thomas R. Burns; Barbara A. Burns; County of Platte, State of Wyoming; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; Cheryl Wilhelm; and Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Appellees (Defendants). BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; and Cheryl Wilhelm, Appellants (Defendants), v. The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Kim D. Cannon and Anthony T. Wendtland, Sheridan, for Bellis Farms, Inc., et al.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
In this eminent domain appeal, the principal issue is whether the district court correctly applied W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii) of the "Wyoming Eminent Domain Act." 1
The town of Wheatland decided to extend the runway of its local airport. The project required the town to acquire from several landowners acreage that was mostly irrigated and nonirrigated farmland. In August 1988, the town ended its attempt to negotiate a purchase price and instead initiated condemnation proceedings. 2 Following a hearing 3 the district court ruled, inter alia, that the town failed to establish The town raises three issues:
that the project was planned or located in a manner that would be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. The district court also denied the landowners' application for attorney fees.
A. Did the district court judge improperly substitute his judgment for that of a legislative body by failing to grant the request of plaintiff's complaint?
B. Are the findings of the trial court judge supported by evidence?
C. Are defendants entitled to recover their litigation expenses?
The landowners raise two issues:
1. Was the town of Wheatland required to prove the requirements set forth in Wyo.Stat. § 1-26-504(a) in this case by a preponderance of evidence?
2. Is the Trial Court's determination that the Wheatland airport extension proposal did not meet the mandatory requirements of Wyo.Stat. § 1-26-504(a)(ii) (June 1988 Repl.) supported by substantial evidence?
In their cross-appeal, the landowners raise an additional issue:
1. Was the trial court statutorily required to award Bellis Farms, et al. their reasonable attorney's fees?
We affirm.
The town claims that the district court misapplied W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii) and for support cites Johnson County Board of County Commissioners v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549 (Wyo.1987). We disagree. The Atter case turned on the public necessity requirement found in W.S. 1-26-504(a)(i) and, therefore, did not reach the additional greatest public good/least private injury requirement found in W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii).
The role of the district court was discussed in Atter. In an eminent domain proceeding, the district court reviews the condemnor's actions vis-a-vis the three statutory requirements found in W.S. 1-26-504(a). To comply with W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii), the town 4 needs to present evidence that it has planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 5 The district court then reviews the evidence and decides whether the town has met its burden. Once W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii) has been complied with and the landowners still wish to contest the action, the burden shifts to them to show that the condemnor acted in bad faith or abused its discretion as to that particular determination. Atter, 734 P.2d at 553.
In this instance, the district court found that the town had presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that it planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 6 The district court, in a letter to counsel, addressed what the town needed to do to comply with W.S. 1-26-504(a):
In my ruling, I did not intend to hold that the property in question could not be condemned. I intended to say that the condemnation procedures instituted by the town of Wheatland were deficient and inadequate, and that there was a failure of proof. This is not to say that the town cannot condemn this land, if they follow the correct procedures and make the required proofs.
The above letter does not reflect a district court's "substituting its judgment" for that of elected officials; rather, it reflects a district court's reviewing the evidence and applying a clear legislative directive to the facts. 7 The district court, over the course of a two-day hearing, heard testimony from twenty-six witnesses and reviewed over seventy exhibits before making its decision.
The district court reviewed the evidence and found that the proposed condemnation would "substantially interfere with the existing irrigation system upon which the farm land adjacent to the proposed condemnation is dependent and cause other private harm * * *." The district court detailed in extensive findings the various types of private injury the project would cause if the condemnation went forward as planned: impairment of irrigation, impairment of prime agriculture land, and excessive private damage due to the location of the new road. The district court concluded that 520 acres of irrigated farm land would suffer "substantial private harm" from the condemnation. See State Etc. v. Standley Brothers, 215 Mont. 475, 699 P.2d 60 (Mont.1985).
Sun Ridge Development v. City of Cheyenne, Inc., 787 P.2d 583, 589 (Wyo.1990) (quoting Smithco Engineering, Inc. v. International Fabricators, Inc., 775 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo.1989)).
We hold there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling that the town failed to locate or plan the project "in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."
The condemnor must also comply with W.S. 1-26-504(a)(i) and present evidence that the public interest and necessity require the project. The district court, in applying this section, appears to have balanced the minimal increase in safety, if the project was completed, against other factors and found this minimal increase insufficient to satisfy the public interest/necessity requirement.
The language of W.S. 1-26-504(a)(i) does not permit the district court to balance the competing interests. Once the town presents evidence that the project will increase safety, it has met its burden as to that particular determination. The burden then shifts to those opposing the condemnation to present evidence of bad faith or abuse of discretion. See Atter, 734 P.2d at 553.
The town has filed a second condemnation action involving essentially the same parties and issues. Therefore, if this case goes before the district court a second time, it should review the evidence and determine whether the town has shown that the project will increase the safety of the airport. Once the town has established that the project will increase safety and the landowners are not able to demonstrate that the town acted improperly, the court should next review whether the evidence demonstrates that the town has planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and least private injury.
Finally, we address whether the landowners are entitled to attorney fees. In its amended judgment, the district court denied the landowners' application for attorney fees, but ruled that they were entitled to recover their costs incurred in defending against the condemnation. In their cross-appeal, the landowners claim that W.S. 16-7-116 (Oct.1982 Repl.) entitles them to recover their reasonable attorney fees. 8 The landowners argue that under the statute a final judgment in their favor entitles them to recover their litigation expenses.
In a Nebraska case involving essentially the same statutory framework, landowners attempted to recover their attorney fees under a state statute. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court's order did not prevent a later condemnation of the land. Sorensen v. Lower Niobrara Natural Resources District, 215 Neb. 681, 340 N.W.2d 164 (1983). The court noted that if the condemnor has the right to reinstitute the proceedings, there is no final judgment, and denied the landowners their attorney fees. In other words, attorney fees are allowable only when the "final judgment prevents the agency from acquiring the property by any condemnation proceeding or the agency abandons all attempts to acquire the property by condemnation." Id., 215 Neb. at 686, 340 N.W.2d at 167.
We agree with the Nebraska court's resolution. Here, the district court has not issued a final judgment that the land can never be acquired by condemnation. The district court has instead ruled that the land may be condemned if the town properly follows the requirements set out in W.S. 1-26-504(a). The town has not abandoned the condemnation; instead, it has filed a second action. Thus, we affirm the district court's ruling denying the landowners their attorney fees.
In initial analysis, my strongest disagreement with the decision of the majority arises from this court's basic misunderstanding and misapplication of the separation of powers concept. See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo.1990), Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting and Wyo. Const. art. 2....
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