Town of Whitestown v. Rural Perry Twp. Landowners

• Decision Date: 29 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 29A05–1409–MI–437.,29A05–1409–MI–437.
• Citation: 40 N.E.3d 916
• Parties: TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, Indiana, Appellant–Respondent, v. RURAL PERRY TOWNSHIP LANDOWNERS, Appellees–Petitioners.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

40 N.E.3d 916

TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, Indiana, Appellant–Respondent

v.RURAL PERRY TOWNSHIP LANDOWNERS, Appellees–Petitioners.

No. 29A05–1409–MI–437.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed July 29, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 2015.

Stephen C. Unger, Curtis T. Jones, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Kent M. Frandsen, Parr Richey Obremskey Frandsen & Patterson LLP, Lebanon, IN, Attorney for Appellees.

BAILEY

, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In 2013, the Town of Whitestown (“Whitestown”) adopted an ordinance annexing unincorporated portions of Perry Township adjacent to the town. Rural Perry Township landowners (“the Remonstrators”) filed a petition to defeat the annexation. The trial court found that the Remonstrators had satisfied statutory conditions required to defeat the annexation and ordered that the annexation not occur. Whitestown now appeals.

[2] We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Whitestown.

Issues

[3] Whitestown presents three issues for our review. We restate these as two issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred when it found that Whitestown had not satisfied the requirements of Indiana Code subsection 36–4–3–13(c); and

II. Whether the trial court erred when it found that Remonstrators proved the elements of subsection 36–4–3–13(e)(2)(B), concerning the financial impact of annexation.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] During the events associated with this case, Whitestown has been one of the fastest-growing municipalities in Indiana. Located in Boone County, Whitestown grew through annexation to encompass portions of several unincorporated townships, including Perry Township. Whitestown's growth has been aided by its presence along the corridor for Interstate 65 (“I–65”), and Whitestown has actively encouraged businesses to locate their operations within the town. From a population of 471 in the 2000 United States Census, Whitestown's population reached 2,860 in the 2010 Census. At the time of trial in this case, Whitestown's planners estimated that the town's population was around 4,500, and would reach nearly 14,000 by 2022. Tr. at 228–29, 233.

[5] On March 26, 2013, Whitestown adopted Ordinance 2012–22 (“the Ordinance”), whereby the town annexed to itself 28 parcels of land encompassing a total of 621.87 acres in an unincorporated portion of Perry Township adjacent to Whitestown (“the Annexation Area”). Ex. W–001. Prior to adopting the Ordinance, Whitestown had acquired from one of the eventual Remonstrators a parcel of land in unincorporated Perry Township. The parcel was on the western end of the Annexation Area, and was to be the site for a new Waste Water Treatment Plant (“WWTP” or “the Plant”), which was to provide service for Whitestown. A new water main line was to be run to the Plant along County Road 750 South, which ran through the northern end of the Annexation Area. There was a possibility that the Remonstrators would be offered access to Whitestown's water service for a yet-to-be-determined connection fee. Connection would not be compulsory, however, and construction of the Plant was set to commence and would proceed without regard to the result of the Remonstrators' challenge to the Ordinance.

[6] The Annexation Area itself was zoned as agricultural land under the Boone County Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. Single family homes, a historic school structure, and a cemetery were scattered throughout the area. None of the plots in the Annexation Area had water service from Whitestown, and most properties used on-site septic systems for sanitation. Police service was provided by the Boone County Sheriff's Department, and fire service was provided by a volunteer fire department. Whitestown's police and fire services occasionally assisted with police- and fire-related incidents in the Annexation Area, but did so only on an occasional, voluntary basis. The Boone County Highway Department provided road and highway maintenance for roads running through the Annexation Area.

[7] Property tax rates in Whitestown displayed a marked and consistent upward trend, whereas rates for unincorporated portions of Perry Township showed year-over-year declines. Annexation into Whitestown would result in the addition of municipal property taxes assessed upon the Remonstrators' property beyond those already assessed by the township and other taxing authorities. Property tax rates for real property incorporated in Whitestown ranged from between 64.1% (in 2008) and 94.2% (in 2012) higher than the rates assessed for unincorporated land in Perry Township. The difference in municipal taxes for other municipality/township comparisons in Boone County for the 2012 tax year averaged 33%, ranging from an 18% rate difference in Zionsville as compared to Eagle Township, to a 45% rate difference in Lebanon as compared to Center Township. To address these issues, the Annexation Ordinance included provisions delaying the effective date of the annexation for three years after the final enactment of the annexation, and abating property tax for the parcels in the Annexation Area for a period of ten years after that.

[8] On June 7, 2013, the Remonstrators filed their petition challenging the Ordinance.

[9] On March 17, 2014, Whitestown filed a written motion requesting that the trial court enter written findings and conclusions under Trial Rule 52

.

[10] The case proceeded to a bench trial on March 18, 19, and 20, 2014. After the trial, the parties provided the trial court with proposed findings and conclusions.

[11] On August 27, 2014, the trial court adopted the Remonstrators' proposed findings and conclusions and entered judgment, finding the Ordinance invalid and blocking Whitestown's annexation of the Annexation Area. The trial court found that Whitestown had not satisfied the statutory requirement of proving that the subdivision of the territory to be annexed was satisfied, see I.C. § 36–4–3–13(b)(2)

; and that Whitestown had not carried the burden of proof as to its need for future use of the Annexation Area. See I.C. § 36–4–3–13(c)(2). Accordingly, the court concluded that the annexation ordinance was invalid. The trial court also found, as a separate basis for defeating the annexation, that the Remonstrators had carried their burden of proof as to Subsection 36–4–3–13(e), which afforded a separate avenue to challenge annexation ordinances.

[12] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[13] In its appeal, Whitestown challenges a judgment presented in the form of written findings and conclusions, entered by the trial court upon Whitestown's written motion. See Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)

. Our standard of review in these cases is well settled.

Upon appellate review, a judgment under Trial Rule 52

may be reversed only when clearly erroneous, that is, “when the judgment is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the findings.” Nelson v. Marchand, 691 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Findings are clearly erroneous when there is no evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence to support the findings, and we review only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom that are favorable to the judgment without reweighing evidence or reassessing the credibility of witnesses. Id. We owe no deference to a trial court, however, on matters of law, reviewing these de novo.

Briles v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 858 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).

Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Jones, 953 N.E.2d 608, 614 (Ind.Ct.App.2011)

, trans. denied.

[14] We may affirm the trial court's judgment on any legal theory, so long as the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous and support the theory adopted. Estate of Kappel v. Kappel, 979 N.E.2d 642, 652 (Ind.Ct.App.2012)

. Findings are only clearly erroneous when our review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. at 651 (citing Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 535–36 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. ) “The purpose of special findings is to provide the parties and the reviewing court with the theory upon which the trial judge decided the case in order that the right of review for error may be effectively preserved.” Carmichael v. Siegel, 670 N.E.2d 890, 891 (Ind.1996)

.

[15] Here, the trial court adopted verbatim the Remonstrators' proposed findings and conclusions, a matter Whitestown draws to our attention.

As our supreme court has observed, the practice of accepting verbatim a party's proposed findings of fact “weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court.” Cook v. Whitsell–Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 273 n. 1 (Ind.2003)

(citing Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708–09 (Ind.2001) ). However, as the court also noted, verbatim reproductions of a party's submissions are not uncommon, as “[t]he trial courts of this state are faced with an enormous volume of cases and few have the law clerks and other resources that would be available in a more perfect world to help craft more elegant trial court findings and legal reasoning.” Prowell, 741 N.E.2d at 708. The need to keep the docket moving is properly a high priority for our trial bench. Id. at 709. For this reason, the practice of adopting a party's proposed findings is not prohibited. Id. Thus, although we by no means encourage the wholesale adoption of a party's proposed findings and conclusions, the critical inquiry is whether such findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous. See

Saylor v. State, 765 N.E.2d 535, 565 (Ind.2002) (citing Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind.1998) ).

In re Marriage of Nickels, 834 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)

.

[16] Whitestown challenges both the trial court's findings of fact and its conclusions from those findings. The bulk of Whitestown's argument, however, centers upon the trial court's interpretation of statutory language and whether the court afforded proper deference to the town's decisions. As we noted above, we review ...