Town School Dist. of Town of St. Johnsbury v. Town School Dist. of Town of Topsham

• Decision Date: 01 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 273,273
• Citation: 122 Vt. 268,169 A.2d 352
• Parties: TOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the TOWN OF ST. JOHNSBURY v. TOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the TOWN OF TOPSHAM.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 352

169 A.2d 352

122 Vt. 268

TOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the TOWN OF ST. JOHNSBURY v. TOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the TOWN OF TOPSHAM.

No. 273.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

March 1, 1961.

Arthur L. Graves, St. Johnsbury, for plaintiff.

Wilson, Keyser & Otterman, Chelsea, for defendant.

Before HULBURD, C. J., and HOLDEN, SHANGRAW, BARNEY and SMITH, JJ.

BARNEY, Justice.

Elmer Black, a resident of the Town of Topsham, enrolled in St. Johnsbury Trade School in the second semester of the school year 1957-1958. This institution is a public secondary school offering a four year course comprising grades 9, 10, 11 and 12. At the time of his enrollment he was already in his twenty-first year and was listed as a legal voter of the Town of Topsham. He completed that semester and attended for the full school year 1958-1959. No question is raised concerning his scholastic qualifications to enter the school, nor is any claim made that he did not satisfactorily complete the courses prescribed while attending the school. The defendant, the Town School District of the Town of Topsham, attaches significance to the fact that Black, after satisfactorily completing elementary school in Topsham in June, 1953, remained at home and attended no school until the fall of 1954. At that time Black entered the U. S. Navy and served for three years. It was after his discharge that he enrolled in St. Johnsbury Trade School.

The plaintiff, the Town School District of the Town of St. Johnsbury, brought suit against the defendant to recover $500 tuition costs incurred by Black. With the facts agreed to, the defendant resisted payment on the sole ground that Elmer Black did not qualify as a legal pupil for which the defendant was required to pay tuition because he had attained the age of twenty-one prior to enrollment. The Caledonia Municipal Court awarded judgment for the full amount to the plaintiff, from which judgment defendant brings this appeal.

The duty of town school districts to provide secondary education is expressed in 16 V.S.A. § 793, subsections (a) and (b), in the following language:

'(a) Each town district shall maintain a high school or furnish secondary instruction, as hereinafter provided, for its advanced pupils at a high school or academy, to be selected by the parents or guardian of the pupil, within or without the state. The board of school directors may both maintain a high school and furnish secondary instruction elsewhere as herein provided as in the judgment (sic) of the board may best serve the interest of the pupils.

'(b) Each town district shall pay tuition per pupil per school year as billed, but not in excess of $325.00 unless authorized by a vote of the town school district, but in no case shall the tuition exceed the cost per pupil per year for the maintenance of such school for the previous year.'

Following the statute is 16 V.S.A. § 794, which provides as follows:

'An interested person may appeal to the board of education from the action of the board of school directors in regard to the tuition to be paid for advanced instruction or in regard to the school or academy a pupil may attend, and its decision shall be final. A person shall not be deprived of such instruction by reason of age.'

The plaintiff's position is that the last sentence of that section clearly makes the age of the student immaterial and authorizes recovery of the tuition costs.

Both plaintiff and defendant claim support for their positions under the statutory definition of 'legal pupil' in 16 V.S.A. § 1073:

'The words 'legal pupil' shall mean a child between the ages of six and eighteen years and a child who will become six years of age on or before January 1 next following the beginning of the school year, but a person who has become eighteen years of age shall not be deprived of public school advantages on account of age. Except as herein provided, a child who is not a legal pupil shall not be received into a public school, except a kindergarten, without the consent of the superintendent of such school; and a child under seven years of age shall not be received into a public school, except a kindergarten, after the beginning of the fall term without the consent of such superintendent.'

Each contends that the phrase '* * * but a person who has become eighteen years of age shall not be deprived of public school advantages on account of age.' is expressive of legislative policy sustaining its stand on the obligation to pay tuition.

The plaintiff argues that the statutory language is clear and declarative of a reasonable legislative intent, from which it follows that this Court is bound by the plain meaning of the literal wording of the statute.

The defendant, on the other hand, makes two points. First, it says that the statutes relating to primary and secondary education taken as a group are replete with inferences that they apply only to minors. Secondly, the defendant contends that an inference can be drawn from 16 V.S.A. § 1073 that age is no barrier to continuing secondary education provided the student passes his eighteenth birthday in the course of pursuing his secondary education.

The whole concern of statutory interpretation is the fulfillment of legislative intent. The definitive source of that intent is the statute itself, if the language of the enactment plainly sets it forth. Only when the objective of the legislation would be defeated by literal enforcement of statutory provisions can the Court, in construing a particular law, depart from the ordinary and usual meaning of the language used therein. Otherwise, enforcement must be according to the statute's obvious terms. Lewis v. Holden, 118 Vt. 59, 62, 99 A.2d 758.

The language used in the sections before the Court is certainly plain, and the purpose expressed clearly. In simple statements, both 16 V.S.A. § 794 and 16 V.S.A. § 1073 remove age as a barrier to the receipt of a public school education. Departure from such straight-forward expression requires a convincing demonstration that the legislative intent cannot properly be as literally rendered. It must be established that carrying out the precise wording of the statute either produces results which are manifestly unjust, absurd, unreasonable or unintended, or conflicts with other expressions of legislative intent on the subject which must be held paramount. For this reason, all acts relating to the same subject matter should be read in conjunction with it, as parts of one system. Carpenter's Adm'r v. Brown, 118 Vt. 148, 153, 102 A.2d 331.

In that connection, the defendant asserts that an examination of the associated education statutes reveals a legislative intent to limit public school advantages to minors. The statutes of concern here are all grouped in Title 16, captioned 'Education', of Vermont Statutes, Annotated, in Part 2, titled 'Public Schools', and comprising sections 791 through 1483.

However, it must be recognized that the bulk of school affairs quite naturally deal with minors, and something more than a mere reference to pupils as 'children' or an equivalent is required to overcome the plain language of 16 V.S.A. §§ 794 and 1073. This becomes clear when we examine the purposes of these various statutes.

16 V.S.A. §§ 1121, 1122, 1127 and 1128, which relate to the establishment of ages of compulsory school attendance and their enforcement, refer to the pupil concerned as 'child'. The compulsory school age does not reach beyond minority, so that the use of the word 'child' is in keeping with the legislative purpose. That purpose does not conflict with the stated intention not to restrict secondary school attendance on the basis of age.

Similarly, in other statutes such as 16 V.S.A. §§ 1075, 1384 and 1422 reference is had to the parent or guardian or person having control of a pupil, not with the intent of excluding those who had reached majority, but merely to designate where certain responsibilities lie where pupils are in fact minors.

This may also be the explanation for 16 V.S.A. § 793(a). In it appears the phrase '* * * a high school or academy, to be selected by the parents or guardian of the pupil * * *'. This occurs in the very statute establishing the duty to provide secondary education, and therefore merits close attention.

There is another familiar rule of construction declaring there is a presumption that all language is inserted in a statute advisedly, and effect must be given to each and every part of an act. Tower v. Tower, 120 Vt. 213, 226, 138 A.2d 602. Applying it here, it can be said that 16 V.S.A. § 793 supports an inference of minority inconsistent with the plain denial of age limitation in 16 V.S.A. § 794. It...