Town School District of Maidstone v. Clarence H. Dempsey

• Decision Date: 06 October 1931
• Citation: 156 A. 387,103 Vt. 481
• Parties: TOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MAIDSTONE v. CLARENCE H. DEMPSEY ET AL
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

156 A. 387

103 Vt. 481

TOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MAIDSTONE v. CLARENCE H. DEMPSEY ET AL

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 6, 1931

May Term, 1931.

Schools and School Districts---Jurisdiction of Commissioner of Education on Appeal from Decision of School Directors as to Transportation of Pupils---Acts 1925, No. 34, 1, 2 and 5---Basis of Decision of Commissioner and Rights of Appellant---Status of Judgment by Commissioner of Education Having Jurisdiction of Parties, but Not of Subject-matter---Question of Jurisdiction of Subject-matter Available on Certiorari---Sufficiency of Allegations of Petition To Present Question of Jurisdiction of Subject-matter.

1. In passing upon appeals from decision of board of school directors as to furnishing transportation for pupils residing at least one and a half miles from school, under provisions of Acts of 1925, No. 34, 1, 2, and 5, commissioner of education acts in judicial or quasi judicial capacity, and in disposing of those matters is governed by same rule prescribed by statute for guidance of school directors, and may order such transportation, total or partial, as in his opinion is reasonable and necessary.

2. In deciding appeals from decision of board of school directors as to transportation of pupils, commissioner of education may not act arbitrarily, but action must be based on knowledge of surrounding circumstances.

3. On appeal from decision of board of school directors to commissioner of education, appellant is entitled to have subject-matter thereof heard, upon due notice, and determined upon proof submitted at such hearing, and fact that statute fails to provide for notice does not obviate necessity for giving one.

4. Jurisdiction of commissioner of education on appeal from decision of board of school directors as to transportation of pupils is limited to claims for present or future transportation, his powers in this respect being no greater than such board.

5. Although commissioner of education, on appeal from decision of board of school directors as to transportation for pupils had jurisdiction of parties, his order or Judgment goes for naught, where he lacked jurisdiction of subject-matter.

6. Where commissioner of education lacked jurisdiction of subject-matter on appeal from decision of board of school directors as to transportation for pupils, that question of jurisdiction was not raised before him did not preclude raising such question on certiorari.

7. Allegations of petition for certiorari to effect that commissioner of education had no authority or Jurisdiction to hear and determine appeal from decision of board of school directors as to claims for transportation of pupils that had accrued before they were presented to such board, and that he had no authority or jurisdiction to hear and determine actions of law between parties, held sufficiently to present question of commissioner's lack of jurisdiction of subject-matter.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI preferred to Supreme Court Essex County. Answers were filed by all defendants and motions to quash petition were filed by defendants Stevens and O'Maro. Heard on motions to quash. The opinion states the facts.

Petition sustained, issuance of writ ordered, and the proceedings being certified to this Court, ordered that the order and judgment of the commissioner of education be vacated, and that further prosecution of the suits of Stevens and O'Maro against the petitioner be perpetually enjoined. Let the judgment be certified to the commissioner of education to be forwarded to the judge of the Essex County municipal court as the law directs.

Porter Witters & Longmore and Bernard Jacobs (of Lancaster, N.H.) for the plaintiff.

Searles & Graves for the defendants.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, and THOMPSON, JJ.

OPINION

SLACK

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment and order of the commissioner of education. In fact the petition embraces two separate and distinct judgments and orders, one in favor of the defendant Stevens and the other in favor of the defendant O'Maro; but since they stand substantially alike and have been considered together thus far, we so treat them. Each of the defendants filed an answer to the petition, and Stevens and O'Maro filed a motion to quash it. The questions raised by the motion are the only ones before us.

The petition alleges in substance that both Stevens and O'Maro are residents of the plaintiff school district, and had children of school age who attended school in Groveton, New Hampshire, for a period of fifty weeks beginning in September, 1927, and ending December 14, 1928; that such children were not sent to the Groveton school by reason of any arrangement or order of the school directors of the plaintiff, nor had such school directors made any contract or agreement with the parents of such children for their transportation to the Groveton school, or for compensation in lieu of such transportation; that on December 1, 1928, both Stevens and O'Maro made application to the school directors of the plaintiff for pay or compensation for transporting their children to the Groveton school during the period aforesaid; that thereupon the school directors undertook to compromise such claims and offered Stevens and O'Maro each, one hundred and fifty dollars in full settlement of their respective claims, which they refused; that at a meeting of the school directors held December 6, 1928, at which Stevens and O'Maro were present, the following action was taken respecting their claims, to quote from the record of that meeting: "In regard to the transportation which the claimants say began when the so-called Stevens school closed in September, 1927, and continued for fifty weeks until December 14, 1928, an offer was made to each party, Mrs. O'Maro and Glen Stevens, Sr., of $ 150. each in full to the above date. This offer was refused. The Board does not feel that it is legally bound to pay any transportation and does not hold the above offer open one instant after its refusal."

Both Stevens and O'Maro in their answers deny any attempt to compromise their claims by the school directors, and deny that the action evidenced by the record quoted was taken at the meeting of December 6, 1928, and allege that at that meeting the school directors voted to pay each of them, one hundred and fifty dollars.

Be that as it may, they admit that they took an appeal from the action of the school directors, whatever it was, to the commissioner of education, as is alleged in the petition.

The petition further alleges that such proceedings were thereafter had by and before the commissioner that on ...