Town v. Washburn

• Decision Date: 01 January 1869
• Citation: 14 Minn. 199
• Parties: JOHN J. TOWN v. C. C. WASHBURN and others.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 199

14 Minn. 199

JOHN J. TOWN

v. C. C. WASHBURN and others.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court, Hennepin county, overruling demurrers to the complaint.

Action on an indorsement of a promissory note by the firm of D. Morrison & Co., composed of the defendants Morrison and C. C. and E. B. Washburn. The action was not brought till nearly nine years after the defendants' liability on the indorsement accrued. The complaint alleged that the Washburns had been absent from and residing out of the state more than six years immediately prior to the commencement of the action. Demurrers on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action were interposed by the defendants C. C. and E. B. Washburn, and the defendant Morrison.

Cornell & Bradley, for appellants.

Wilson & McNair, for respondent.

WILSON, C. J.

We are of the opinion that the order appealed from should be affirmed. Denny v. Smith, 18 N. Y. 567, decided under a statute substantially the same as ours, is in point, and we are satisfied with the reasoning and conclusion of the judge who delivered the opinion of the majority of the court in that case. See, also, Didier v. Davison, 2 Barb. Ch. 477-487; Fannin v. Anderson, 7 Q. B. 811. Our statute is in these words:

Section 3, c. 66, Gen. St. "Actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action accrues, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute."

Sec. 15. "If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the times herein limited after his return to the state; and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from and resides out of the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action."

We must give to the words of the statute their natural and obvious meaning, and this constitutes the law as a shield to the defendant Morrison against this action, he having been within the jurisdiction of the court for more than six years before suit brought, and after the cause of action accrued; but not to the other defendants, who have not been six years within the jurisdiction of the court.

To use the language of the court of appeals of New York in the case above cited, "it appears to have been the manifest intention of the legislature to subject any debtor during a period of six years after the accruing of a debt to the reach of civil process at the suit of his debtor." The argument that Morrison may be compelled to contribute, and therefore be practically...