Townes v. State

• Decision Date: 13 June 2014
• Docket Number: CR-10-1892
• Parties: Tawuan Townes v. State of Alabama
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Tawuan Townes v. State of Alabama

CR-10-1892

ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014

REL: June 13, 2014

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

Appeal from Houston Circuit Court

(CC-08-1656)

WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Tawuan Townes appeals his conviction for capital murder and his sentence of death. Townes was convicted of murder made capital for intentionally killing Christopher Woods during the course of a burglary. See § 13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975. The jury, by a vote of 10-2, recommended that Townes be sentenced to death. The circuit court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Townes to death.

Townes had plans to rob Woods, a known drug dealer. Woods lived in a house in Dothan with his girlfriend, India Starks. On November 13, 2008, Townes and Cornelius Benton drove to Woods's house. Townes was armed with a .22 caliber rifle, and Benton was armed with a .380 caliber pistol belonging to Townes's brother. Townes and Benton wore dark clothing and obscured their faces to conceal their identities. Townes was also wearing a toboggan cap.

Around 2 p.m., Starks heard Townes and Benton bang on the door, and, as Woods looked outside, they kicked the door in and entered the house. Woods said, "Please don't do this. ... Man, don't do this. Please don't do this." (R. 437.) Woods backed away and sat in a chair, at which point the men "told him to shut up and just tell [us] where it's at." (R. 437.) As Woods begged for his life and Starks's life, Benton repeatedly hit him in the face to force Woods to give them money. Townes shot Woods in the chest with the .22 caliber rifle and Benton continued to hit Woods. Benton then shotWoods in the leg, after which he resumed hitting Woods in the face and demanding money. Starks heard Woods screaming and begging, "Man, don't do this." (R. 450.)

After Woods was shot the second time, Starks ran to a neighbor's house to telephone emergency 911. As Starks was escaping, one of the men asked, "Where you going, bitch?" (R. 451.) While Starks was on the telephone with emergency 911, she saw the two men leave. Starks went back to Woods's house to attend to Woods. According to Starks, the room where the attack occurred was ransacked, Woods was slumped over in the chair, and her cellular telephone was missing. Woods died as a result of the bullet wound to the chest.

When Townes was arrested, he was in possession of the SIM card from Starks's cellular telephone.¹ After Townes was arrested, he gave a statement to police. In his statement, Townes admitted that he and Benton went to Woods's house to rob him because Townes needed money. Townes, however, adamantly denied intending to kill Woods. Townes stated thathe intended to scare Woods when he shot the .22 caliber rifle and that the rifle used only "little bullets." (C. 500.)

Townes's defense at trial centered on his alleged lack of intent to kill. In his opening statement, defense counsel argued that Townes had fired the gun to scare Woods but that there was "[n]o specific intent to kill." (R. 397.) To counter Townes's defense, the State asked numerous witnesses "what part of your body tells you to pull the trigger," to which the witnesses responded, "[y]our brain." (R. 536.) Through these questions, the State sought to raise the inference that, because Townes's brain controlled his pulling the trigger of the gun, the fact that Townes pulled the trigger of the gun established that he intended to kill Woods.

During closing arguments, defense counsel again argued that Townes shot Woods to scare him. According to defense counsel, Townes intended to rob a drug dealer who, because of his occupation, would not call the police to report a robbery. Defense counsel then argued that Woods refused to give Townes and Benton money, so Townes fired a shot to scare him. Defense counsel argued that Townes did not have the intent tokill; therefore, he was guilty of felony murder as opposed to capital murder.

In response, the State argued:

"[Defense counsel] says [the State] can't prove intent. Well, once again, just -- it's simple. What part of your body tells you to pull the trigger? It's the brain."

(R. 786.)

After closing arguments, the circuit court instructed the jury on the elements of capital murder. Regarding specific intent, the court instructed the jury as follows:

"A specific intent to kill is an essential ingredient of capital murder as charged in this indictment, and may be inferred from the character of an assault, the use of a deadly weapon, or other attendant circumstances. Such intent must be inferred if the act was done deliberately and death was reasonably to be apprehended or expected as a natural and probable consequence of the act. But the facts upon which such inference is drawn must be proved so clearly as to leave no reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury that on the occasion complained of, the defendant intended to kill Christopher Woods."

(R. 824.) After the circuit court gave the jury its instructions, the jury convicted Townes of murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a burglary.

On appeal, Townes argues, among other things, that the circuit court's jury instructions regarding intent erroneouslycreated a mandatory presumption on the issue of specific intent to kill, which alleviated the State's burden to prove Townes's specific intent. Specifically, Townes argues that the instruction that "intent must be inferred if the act was done deliberately and death was reasonably to be apprehended or expected as a natural and probable consequence of the act," id., created a mandatory presumption on the issue of specific intent, relieved the State of its burden to prove intent, and violated Townes's right to due process. Townes did not raise this argument below; therefore, this issue will be reviewed for plain error only. Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.

Rule 45A states:

"In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the appellant."

The Alabama Supreme Court has explained:

"'"Plain error is defined as error that has 'adversely affected the substantial right of the appellant.' The standard of review in reviewing a claim under the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard usedin reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court or on appeal. As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985), the plain-error doctrine applies only if the error is 'particularly egregious' and if it 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' SeeEx parte Price, 725 So. 2d 1063 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S. Ct. 1809, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1999)."'

"Ex parte Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 935-36 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121-22 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999))."

Ex parte Billups, 86 So. 3d 1079, 1083-84 (Ala. 2010).

Further, it is well settled that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 'protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.'" Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276, 1334 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). Thus, in a prosecution for capital murder, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. See Heard v.State, 999 So. 2d 992, 1005 (Ala. 2007) ("[A] defendant must have the intent to kill in order to be found guilty of a capital offense."); Ex parte Woodall, 730 So. 2d 652, 657 (Ala. 1998) ("No defendant can be found guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill ...." (citing Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 662 (Ala. 1981) and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982))); § 13A-5-40(b), Ala. Code 1975.

"'In Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)], the Supreme Court [of the United States] held that [jury] instructions which a reasonable jury could interpret as an "irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent" violate a defendant's due process rights.' Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517, 99 S. Ct. at 2455-56." Blackmon v. State, 7 So. 3d 397, 435 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Hart v. State, 612 So. 2d 520, 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)). According to the Supreme Court, the principle that a defendant cannot, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, be convicted unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime "prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond areasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985) (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-24).

"'The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to [a jury instruction relating to presumptions] is to determine the nature of the presumption it describes.'" Francis, 471 U.S. at 313-14 (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514). Specifically, this "[C]ourt must determine whether the challenged portion of the instruction creates a mandatory presumption or merely a permissive inference." Francis, 471 U.S. at 313-14 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States has...