Towns Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cotton State Exp., Inc.
| Citation | 266 Ala. 131,94 So.2d 402 |
| Decision Date | 21 March 1957 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 926 |
| Parties | TOWNS TRUCK LINES, Inc., v. COTTON STATE EXPRESS, Inc., et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
D. H. Markstein, Jr., and John W. Cooper, Birmingham, for appellant.
Maurice F. Bishop, Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Ormond Somerville and Daniel J. Meador, Birmingham, for appellees.
This is a declaratory judgment suit brought by appellees (several Alabama motor carriers) in the circuit court of Jefferson County, in equity, against appellant, Towns Truck Lines, Inc., seeking an interpretation of an order of the Alabama Public Service Commission granting to appellant certain operating rights. The trial court rendered a decree construing the order in accordance with appellees' insistence. Towns brings this appeal from that decree.
Involved here in certificate of public convenience and necessity number 633 issued to Towns on January 30, 1943. The provision with which we are concerned reads as follows:
As we see it, the determinative questions presented on this appeal are as follows:
I. Should the radii prescribed in the certificate be measured from (a) the centers of the designated cities, or (b) from the city limits of said cities, or (c) the outer limits of their police jurisdictions?
II. If a part of the police jurisdiction or city limits of another city lies within the prescribed radius, however it is measured, does Towns thereby have authority under the certificate to serve all of said city, including that part which lies beyond the prescribed radius?
The answers to these questions must come from ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase 'within a radius of' as used in the certificate. The trial court, in rendering its decree, wrote an opinion which seems to us to be a clear statement of the case and which is in accord with our views. We quote the following from that opinion and adopt it as part of the opinion of this court:
'No oral testimony whatever has been heard. The evidence submitted has consisted entirely of documentary exhibits and stipulations of the parties. The several complainants appear to have a sufficient community of interest in the subject matter, as distinguished from questions purely of law and fact, to justify rendition, at their joint suit, of a declaratory decree in the premises, and there appears to be a bona fide justiciable controversy subsisting between such several complainants on the one hand and the respondent carrier on the other.
'The primary question is the interpretation of a portion of that certain certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity designated as No. 633, embraced within the report and order of the Alabama Public Commission dated January 30, 1943, under its docket number 8088, which certificate, as subsequently amended from time to time, is presently held by the respondent. The only portion in question reads as follows:
"It Is Therefore Ordered By The Commission, That Motor Carrier Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity No. 633 be, and it is hereby issued to M. J. (Bob) Towns, doing business as Towns Truck Lines authorizing operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle in the transportation of certain commodities over regular and/or irregular routes under provisions of the Alabama Motor Carrier Act of 1939, between certain points and within a radius of miles as described in Appendix 'A' attached hereto and made a part hereof.'
'Appendix 'A' incorporated within this order, insofar as is involved in the present controversy, reads as follows:
* * *
* * *
'A certificate of public convenience and necessity such as the present one is a kind of public franchise, and the courts have held that such franchises are to be construed in favor of the public. This usually means that the construction is rather strict as against the recipient of the grant. The phrase 'within a radius of' has been variously interpreted by the appellate courts of other states in connection with construction of municipal ordinances, covenants restrictive of competition in employment contracts, etc. It may have been that, on the original 'grandfather' application, which resulted in the present certificate which has now come to be held by this respondent, the commission might have intended that the applicant be authorized to serve all points and places lying within a peripheral belt, ten miles in width, adjacently surrounding the corporate limits of the municipalities specifically named in the order granting the certificate. But the Court can only construe, it cannot reform, the certificate. Of interest, though not controlling, is the commission's order in Docket 13257 dated April 20, 1953, (Ex. 6) showing that it could find no general commodity authority between Gadsden and Birmingham under its certificate. Theretofore, it had apparently taken a contrary view by assuming, in its order of December 11, 1951, (Docket No. 11,390) that the radius was to be measured from the police jurisdiction of Oneonta. But if such had been the intention, it would seem that the administrative body would have employed the phrase 'within a distance of', rather than utilizing the term 'radius', which has a well-known and precise geometrical meaning. These orders are made in the exercise of a quasijudicial power, and partake somewhat of the nature of a formal judgment rendered within the administrative expertise of the public agency. A greater degree of precision attends the terms employed than is present in contracts between individuals. 'Loose and metaphorical' meanings ought not to be attributed to such terms.
'Most dictionary definitions of the word 'radius', in the sense most appropriate here, carry the conception of 'a circular area or boundary'. Taking the situation of the city of Birmingham as example, an outward projection of its corporate limits for a uniform distance of ten miles would not result in even a roughly circular configuration. A glance at a large scale map of Birmingham reveals that its southwestern and northern boundaries contain sectors marked by frequent and deep irregularities, and readily suggests the uncertainty, confusion, and controversy which would probably ensue if the inward end of the 'radius' had to be fixed at some given point along such a boundary.
'If the term is used in its more exact sense, it would make it practically feasible for carriers and other parties interested to ascertain in most instances the territorial limits of authorization with fair accuracy by the use of a reliable highway map, a scale, and a draftsman's compass. If, on the other hand, the exact city limits are to be taken as fixing the inward endpoint of the radius, considerable engineering work would be necessary to establish the exterior boundaries of the peripheral belt. Considerations of clarity, definiteness, and practical ascertainability would seem to better comport with the interpretation of the term here adopted.
'In the court's opinion, the language used in this order is expressive of an intention to authorize service within, and only within, a circle having a diameter of twenty miles, in the case of the Birmingham area, and a circle having a diameter of fifty miles in the case of the Oneonta area, the center of each such circle to be found at the point which is the geographical center of each of said cities, ascertained by inward measurement from the corporate boundaries thereof as they existed at the date of the issuance of the certificate. But it would also seem to be a fair construction to say that, when service of a named municipality is authorized, it is contemplated that that city be served as a governmental, economic, and geographical unit, in its entirety, whether or not its boundary should expand, contract, or alter over a period of years subsequent to the grant of the certificate, and even though such boundary should come to exceed the circumference of the surrounding circle originally prescribed.
'However, it cannot be fairly said that it was contemplated that the outermost limits of large territorial authorizations should be susceptible of being...
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