Townsend v. Hoffner, CASE NO. 2:13-CV-14187
| Decision Date | 01 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:13-CV-14187 |
| Parties | LORENZO TOWNSEND, Petitioner, v. BONITA HOFFNER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
LORENZO TOWNSEND, Petitioner,
v.
BONITA HOFFNER, Respondent.
CASE NO. 2:13-CV-14187
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
Date: July 1, 2014
Michigan prisoner Lorenzo Townsend ("Petitioner") has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state criminal convictions and sentences. Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim less than thirteen years old) following a jury trial in the Genesee County Circuit Court and was sentenced as a second habitual offender to concurrent terms of forty to sixty years of imprisonment in 1994. In his petition, he raises claims concerning the state court's probable cause determination and jurisdiction, the effectiveness of defense counsel, and his innocence.
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The matter is before the Court on Respondent's motion for summary judgment, which seeks dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas actions. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the petition is untimely, grants Respondent's motion for summary judgment, and dismisses the petition with prejudice. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Petitioner's convictions arise from his sexual assault of an eleven-year-old girl. Following a jury trial and the court's imposition of a sentence, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals. The court affirmed his convictions and sentences. People v. Townsend, No. 182313, 1996 WL 33348844 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied on November 25, 1997. People v. Townsend, 456 Mich. 895, 572 N.W.2d 7 (1997).
On November 23, 1998, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment with the state trial court, which was denied on March 25, 1999. See Dkt., Genesee Co. Cir Ct. No. 94-050843-FC. Petitioner did not appeal that decision.
On February 10, 2003, Petitioner filed a second motion for relief from judgment with the state trial court, which was denied on October 29, 2003. Id. As with the first
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motion for relief from judgment, Petitioner did not appeal.
On September 3, 2008, Petitioner filed a request for judicial notice with the state trial court, which the court treated as a third motion for relief from judgment and denied. Id. Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(1). People v. Townsend, No. 288453 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2009) (unpublished). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was similarly denied. People v. Townsend, 485 Mich. 862, 771 N.W.2d 767 (2009). The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied Petitioner's request for reconsideration. People v. Townsend, 485 Mich. 1013, 775 N.W.2d 758 (2009).1
Petitioner dated his federal habeas petition September 24, 2013.2 Respondent
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filed the instant motion for summary judgment on April 10, 2014. Petitioner filed a response to the motion on May 19, 2014.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs courts to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court assessing the appropriateness of summary judgment asks "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Amway Distribs. Benefits Ass'n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986)). To defeat a summary judgment motion, "the non-moving party must set forth specific facts sufficient to show that a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict in his favor." Sanders v. Freeman, 221 F.3d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 2000). The summary judgment rule applies to habeas actions. Redmond v. Jackson, 295 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section
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2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.").
Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, because Petitioner's habeas petition was filed after the April 24, 1996 effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). The AEDPA establishes a one-year period of limitations for habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging state court judgments. The statute provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In the absence of statutory or equitable tolling, a habeas petition filed outside the time period prescribed by § 2244(d)(1) must be dismissed. See, e.g., Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691, 694-95 (6th Cir. 2000) (dismissing case filed thirteen days after the limitations period expired).
In this case, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on direct review on November 25, 1997. Petitioner then had ninety days in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. See Rule 13(1), Supreme Court Rules; Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119-20, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) (stating that a conviction becomes final when "the time for filing a certiorari petition expires"). Because Petitioner did not file such a petition, his convictions became final and the one-year limitations period commenced when the ninety day period expired on February 23, 1998.
Petitioner filed his first motion for relief from judgment on November 23, 1998. At that point, 273 days (approximately nine months) of the one-year period
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had run. Because the one-year period excludes any time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or collateral review is pending, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the limitations period was tolled from November 23, 1998 until the trial court denied his motion on March 25, 1999. Since Petitioner did not appeal that decision, his post-conviction motion was no longer pending. As a result, the one-year period resumed running the next day and expired ninety-two days (roughly three months) later on June 25, 1999.
Petitioner's subsequent state court motions for relief from judgment filed in 2003 and 2008 (and other state actions filed after those dates) did not toll the limitations period because the one-year period had already expired. A motion for relief from judgment filed after the limitations period has lapsed "does not reset the date from which the one-year statute of limitations begins to run." Johnson v. Hendricks, 314 F.3d 159, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2002). A state court post-conviction motion that is filed...
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