Townsend v. Pub. Storage Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1:13-cv-01600 |
| Parties | NADINE TOWNSEND, Plaintiff, v. PUBLIC STORAGE INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
NADINE TOWNSEND
Plaintiff pro se
The Clerk has sent this pro se Complaint together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis and motion for appointment of counsel to the Court for review.1 (Dkt. Nos. 1-3.)Plaintiff Nadine Townsend has commenced this action against Defendant Public Storage Inc., alleging jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq.; 28 U.S.C. § 1343; 15 U.S.C. § 2001, et. seq.; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501 and 1961. For the reasons that follow, I grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2), deny her motion for appointment of counsel, and recommend the sua sponte dismissal of her Complaint with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 1.)
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay " the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, I find that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is granted.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about January 29, 1999, she entered into an agreement with Defendant to store her van at Defendant's storage facility in Dallas, Texas for a period of one year. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 3.) At the time, Plaintiff was planning on moving to California with her mother. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff informed Defendant that she and her nearly seventy year old mother were both disabled, and that being forced to come back to Dallas to move the van would be difficult and would create financial hardship and perhaps further injury, pain, and suffering. Id. Plaintiff was assured that the van would be fine in space P017 for as long as she needed the space. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff moved the van into the space on or about January 29, 1999. Id. at ¶ 6.
When or about May 29, 1999, Plaintiff received a phone call from Defendant informing her that she would have to move the van immediately, she was completely devastated because moving it would be a costly endeavor. Id. When Plaintiff reminded Defendant of the parties' agreement, she was told that the van had to be moved because she was late with her payments. Id. at ¶ 7. When Plaintiff checked her receipts, she discovered she was not late in making payments. Id.
Plaintiff called a representative of Defendant at the Dallas facility on or about June 8, 1999 and pressed her for answers as to why they were being forced to move the van and weretold that government officials were there pressing them to get Plaintiff's van out. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff was told that the space where the van was being stored was not for vehicles, and when Plaintiff asked that it be moved, she was told there were no more spaces available. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff contacted business associates and friends in Dallas to check to see if spaces were available and was told that there were spaces. Id. at ¶ 10. She then called Defendant's headquarters and let them know that Defendant was violating the agreement it had with her to store the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 11. She told headquarters that having to move the van would create an unnecessary hardship for two disabled women. Plaintiff told the woman at headquarters with whom she spoke that Defendant's actions were "a violation of [their] rights and in violation of free trade an act of deprivation and obstruction." Id. at ¶ 12.
On or about June 16, 1999, Defendant contacted Plaintiff for the final time and offered to transfer the van to a place where it could be kept. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff claims that it was the first time Defendants put anything in writing and has alleged that the letter from Defendant essentially said for about the sixth time, pay us and get out. Id. at ¶ 15.
Even when a plaintiff meets the financial criteria for in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must look to see whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325(1989). "An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although extreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and the parties have had an opportunity to respond, Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ().
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Id. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, "the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 836 (1994) (citation omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S.at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the pleadings must be read liberally and construed to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed "without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
According to the Complaint, Defendant's corporate address is in the State of California and the storage area from which she was told to remove her van was in Dallas, Texas. (Dkt. No.1 at 2.) The sole connection between New York and Plaintiff's claim is that she is presently a resident of Albany, New York. Plaintiff attempts to tie her conspiracy claim to New York by alleging that the City of Troy, New York issued her up to ten parking tickets during the weeks her mother was dying. Id. at 4. That allegation, however, bears no relationship whatsoever to her claim against Defendant regarding the storage of her van in Dallas, Texas in 1999 or her conclusory claims of conspiracy. See also Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 182 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 846 (2013) ().
Although Plaintiff now resides in New York, the venue statute does not refer to where a plaintiff resides. The statute refers to the district where the defendants reside if they all reside in the same state in which the district is located, or to a district where a substantial part of the acts or omissions that form the basis for the complaint occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (b)(2). The dispute over the storage of Plaintiff's van occurred in Texas and spilled over into California to some extent when Plaintiff, then apparently residing in California, contacted Defend...
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