Townsend v. Richland County

• Decision Date: 08 May 1939
• Docket Number: 14875.
• Citation: 2 S.E.2d 777,190 S.C. 270
• Parties: TOWNSEND v. RICHLAND COUNTY et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

2 S.E.2d 777

190 S.C. 270

TOWNSEND v. RICHLAND COUNTY et al.

No. 14875.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 8, 1939

J Q. Marshall, of Columbia, for appellant.

Wm Elliott, Jr., of Columbia, for respondents.

FISHBURNE Justice.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff, a former master in equity for Richland County, to recover fees alleged to be due him under the general law. He alleges that he was deprived of such fees by reason of an Act of the General Assembly which provides for the payment of salaries in lieu of fees to certain officers of Richland County. Acts 1932, Page 1178 Act No. 646 .

The relevant portion of the Act reads as follows: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina: Commencing April 1, 1932, all public officers of Richland County shall be paid a salary in lieu of fees as follows, to wit: *** Master in Equity, $4,500.00 ***. The salaries hereinabove provided to be in lieu of all fees of whatever nature or description."

The appellant contends that the statute is special legislation and is in conflict with Section 34, Article III of the Constitution, which, after inhibiting special legislation in certain enumerated cases, provides that (subsection 9), "In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."

The appeal is from the judgment of the lower Court holding the Act to be constitutional.

Appellant does not claim that any other constitutional provision is violated, but argues that it is clear that a general law providing a salary for the office of master with state-wide effect, might have been passed. The Act, of course, can be sustained only upon the theory that a general law cannot be made applicable.

The definite limitations fixed by the Constitution show an intention to circumscribe legislative action, but not to take it away. Some room, it must be conceded, is left by the Constitution for the exercise of the legislative judgment in determining when and where a general law can be made applicable. Probably no authority will deny that the Legislature has a sound discretion to decide the question in the first instance, and that the courts should not interfere to set aside a statute unless the legislative discretion has been clearly and palpably abused. Accordingly, whenever the issue arises, due consideration is given the determination of the law-making branch of the government that a special law is necessary. Sirrine v. State, 132 S.C. 241, 128 S.E. 172; Gillespie v. Blackwell, 164 S.C. 115, 161 S.E. 869. The ultimate decision, however, rests with the Court. Gillespie v. Blackwell, supra.

That the Act before us embodies special legislation is conceded, but that is not conclusive. The language of the Constitution which prohibits a special law where a general law can be made applicable, plainly implies that there are or may be cases where a special Act will best meet the exigencies of a particular case, and in no wise be promotive of those evils which result from a general and indiscriminate resort to local and special legislation.

The rule of law is, that an investigation like this, concerning the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature, begins with the presumption that the Act is valid. All doubts or uncertainties arising, either from the language of the Constitution or of the Act, must be resolved in favor of the validity of the Act, and the Court will assume to declare it void only in case of a clear conflict with the Constitution. The duty of the Court is to so construe Acts of the Legislature as to uphold their constitutionality and validity if it can reasonably be done, and if their construction is doubtful the doubt will be resolved in favor of the law. State v. Broad River Power Co., 177 S.C. 240, 181 S.E. 41; Crawford v. Johnston, 177 S.C. 399, 181 S.E. 476; Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481; Thomas v. Macklen, 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539.

The lower Court held, upon an agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, that the Act was special legislation, but special legislation not prohibited by the Constitution, because a general law could not be made applicable with reference to the compensation of all masters.

Heretofore, in considering whether certain special laws violated the constitutional provision under discussion, we have had occasion to point out that the question was largely foreclosed in those cases by reason of the fact that the Legislature itself had settled the question by actually passing an applicable general law Salley v. McCoy, 182 S.C. 249, 189 S.E. 196; Gillespie v. Blackwell, supra.

But this is not the case with reference to the office of master. No general law fixing a salary has been enacted. By reference to Section 3678, 1932 Code, it will be noted that the statute creating the office of master was itself a special Act establishing the office in only twenty-one of the forty-six counties of the State. Dean v. Spartanburg County, 59 S.C. 110, 37 S.E. 226.

The lower Court, we think, has very correctly and convincingly stated the case for the constitutionality of the statute. Agreeing in its view, as we do, we quote from the decree:

"The Legislature, it appears, fully realized the fact that the need for the office of master in the various counties in which it should be created varies according to the peculiar circumstances existing in the respective counties, and in order to accommodate the office to these varying needs, found it expedient to create the office with correspondingly varying features, such as difference in method of appointment, or election, length of term for which chosen deprivation of right to engage in the practice of law, permission to practice under prescribed or limited conditions, method and amount of compensation, and as to how the office shall be conducted, whether in single capacity or in conjunction with some other office.

"Therefore, we cannot escape the conclusion that the Legislature when it created the office of Master fully realized that in order to effectuate its full purpose special enactments to accommodate local and varying needs would necessarily have to be made, and had in mind circumstances similar to the one now before the Court.

"The statute under which masters' offices were created was a special Act of the Legislature (Code 1932, Sections 3678-3706). It only affects certain counties in creating the office of masters, these being only twenty-one in number. In twenty of these counties only one master is provided for. Yet a special provision is made for Charleston County in creating two masters.

"Various provisions are made for the appointment of such masters. For instance, in most of the counties the master shall be appointed by the Governor on advice and consent of the Senate, but in Dorchester County he is appointed upon the recommendation of the senator from said county. In Orangeburg County the master shall perform the duties of Judge of Probate in case of vacancy; but in no other county. It is provided that 'In the counties of Berkeley and Dorchester the masters shall attend at their respective court houses at least twice in each week for the transaction of business.'

"Later the statute was amended so as to provide for the election every four years of a master in Kershaw County. Likewise the office of master for Newberry County was abolished in 1923 and his duties devolved upon the Judge of Probate.

"The statute was amended in 1923 so as to create an office of master in Allendale County, the duties, however, being imposed upon the Judge of Probate. In 1931, the statute was again amended so as to establish a master's office for Dillon County by election every two years. Likewise for Horry County with a special provision for his fees to be 'fixed specially by the presiding judge of the circuit for Horry County,' etc. Various other masters' offices have been created and abolished.

"By amendment, special provisions were made for masters in Greenville and Greenwood Counties. In some counties they may practice law; in some they cannot. Some can practice in only civil cases; some...