Townsend v. Stancil
| Decision Date | 07 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5:12-HC-2086-BO,5:12-HC-2086-BO |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | ANTHONY TOWNSEND, Petitioner, v. RENOICE STANCIL, Respondent. |
Anthony Townsend ("petitioner"), a state prisoner, petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, Renoice Stancil, is before the court with a motion for summary judgment to which petitioner responded. The matter is ripe for determination.
On December 18, 2009, after a jury trial in the Cumberland County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of one count of first-degree rape, three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, and one count of attempted first-degree sexual offense. Pet., Question 1-5. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive terms of 240 to 297 months' imprisonment and 125 to 159 months' imprisonment. Id. at Question 3. Jack Carter represented petitioner at trial. Id. at Question 16.
Petitioner appealed as of right through counsel Geoffrey W. Hosford to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Id. On December 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals entered an unpublished opinion finding no error in petitioner's criminal judgments. State v. Townsend, 706 S.E.2d 841, 2010 WL 5421427 (Dec. 21, 2010) (No. COA10-477).
On September 6, 2011, in the North Carolina Superior Court, petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus and, in the alternative, a motion for appropriate relief (MAR). Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J, Ex. 5. To the extent petitioner's September 6, 2011 filing sought habeas relief, the court denied relief on September 7, 2011. Id., Ex. 6. To the extent petitioner's September 6, 2011 filing sought relief as a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), the court denied relief on September 23, 2011. Id., Ex. 7.
On or about September 27, 2011, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the Superior Court's order denying his September 6, 2011, filing to the extent it sought relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus. Id., Ex. 8. On October 3, 2011, the motion to reconsider was denied by the court. Id., Ex. 9.
On October 25, 2011, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Supreme Court seeking review of the orders denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus and denying his motion to reconsider. Id., Ex. 10. On December 8, 2011, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Townsend, 365 N.C. 370, 719 S.E.2d 36 (Dec. 8, 2011) (No. 458P11).
On December 12, 2011, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Court of Appeals seeking review of the order denying his Alternative MAR. Id., Ex. 12 and Ex. 13. On December 30, 2011, the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. Id., Ex. 14.
On February 1, 2012, petitioner filed a second MAR in the North Carolina Superior Court. Id., Ex. 15. On February 23, 2012, the Superior Court denied petitioner's February 1, 2012, MAR. Id., Ex. 16.
Petitioner also filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Supreme Court to review a prior order of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. State v. Townsend, 722 S.E.2d 603 (N.C. Mar. 8, 2012) (No. 458P11-2). On March 8, 2012, the North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed petitioner's certiorari petition filed therein. State v. Townsend, 722 S.E.2d 603 (N.C. Mar. 8, 2012) (No.458P11-2). Id.
On March 16, 2012, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Court of Appeals seeking review of the February 23, 2012, order denying his MAR. Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., Ex. 17 and 18. On March 30, 2012, the North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's March 16, 2012 certiorari petition. Id., Ex. 19.
Petitioner submitted this 28 U.S. § 2254 petition on March 28, 2012.
Petitioner asserts three issues in his petition: (1) due process violations from the State's failure to present sufficient evidence to support the crimes for which petitioner was charged and convicted, and Confrontation Clause violations from the denial of petitioner's right to cross-examine witness Benita Townsend; (2) defective indictments; and (3) constitutionally defective statutes N.C.G.S. §§ 14-27.4(a)(1) and 14-27.2(a)(1).
Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record taken as a whole, no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 325 (1986). Once themoving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, but "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis removed) (quotation omitted). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
A federal court cannot grant habeas relief in cases where a state court considered a claim on its merits unless (1) the state-court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) the state-court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it either "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law" or "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite" to the Supreme Court's result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. at 407; see Hardy v. Cross, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 490, 493-94 (2011) (per curiam); Bobby v. Dixon, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 26, 29-31(2011) (per curiam); Cavazos v. Smith, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4-8 (2011) (per curiam); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, __, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010).
[Section 2254(d)] does not require that a state court cite to federal law in order for a federal court to determine whether the state court decision is an objectively reasonable one, nor does it require a federal habeas court to offer an independent opinion as to whether it believes, based upon its own reading of the controlling Supreme Court precedents, that the [petitioner's] constitutional rights were violated during the state court proceedings.
Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Moreover, a state court's factual determination is presumed correct, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010).
Congress intended the AEDPA standard to be difficult to meet. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). "Section 2254(d) is part of the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 787. In order to prevail in an action brought under section 2254(d), a petitioner must show that "there was no reasonable basis to deny relief." Id. at 784; DeCastro v. Branker, 642 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-6640, 2011 WL 4528510 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2011).
a. Issue One: Due process violations from the State's failure to present sufficient evidence to support the crimes for which petitioner was charged and convicted, and Confrontation Clause violations for the denial of petitioner's right to cross-examine witness Benita Townsend
As argued by respondent, this claim is more easily analyzed if broken into two subsections for discussion of 1) the due process claim and 2) the Confrontation Clause claim.
As for the due process sufficiency of evidence issue, petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The state court records do not reveal that he subsequently raised this claim in his petition for discretionary review.1
A habeas petitioner in state custody generally must exhaust state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Furthermore, a federal habeas court may not review unexhausted claims that would be treated as procedurally barred by state courts-absent cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004); Clagett v. Angelone, 209 F.3d 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2000); Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). This exhaustion requirement "reduces friction between the state and federal court systems by avoiding the unseemliness] of a federal district court's overturning a state court conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in the first instance." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the Supreme Court instructs that, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any...
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