Townsend v. STATE OF OKL. EX REL. MILITARY DEPT., No. CIV-90-383-P.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. CIV-90-383-P.
• Citation: 760 F. Supp. 884
• Parties: Maxine Gonzales TOWNSEND, Plaintiff, v. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA MILITARY DEPARTMENT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

760 F. Supp. 884

Maxine Gonzales TOWNSEND, Plaintiff, v. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA MILITARY DEPARTMENT, Defendant.

No. CIV-90-383-P.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

March 12, 1991.

John B. Estes and Kevin L. Miller, Stipe, Gossett, Stipe, Harper, Estes, McCune & Parks, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff.

Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen. of Oklahoma, and Sharon K. Oroke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING DEFENDANT LEAVE TO CORRECT ERROR IN CAPTION

PHILLIPS, District Judge.

In this Title VII action, the plaintiff, Maxine Gonzales Townsend ("Townsend"), claims that the Oklahoma Military Department ("OMD") rejected her application for a job as a shop foreman because she is a woman. In a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), the State of Oklahoma ("the state") has urged the Court to dismiss the action: (1) because Townsend has failed to satisfy a statutory condition precedent to suing a governmental entity; (2) because Townsend has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted; (3) because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction; and (4) because of insufficient process.¹

As a statutory condition precedent to a Title VII lawsuit against a governmental agency, a plaintiff is required to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general. The requirement is subject to equitable doctrines including waiver, estoppel, or modification. The Court is waiving the requirement because the attorney general has refused to issue the letter despite Townsend's diligent attempt to comply with the statute.

I. STANDARDS FOR DISMISSALS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)

The dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a harsh remedy that a court should grant rarely. A court should grant a motion to dismiss only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim. Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 386 (10th Cir. 1976). In the context of a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the challenged pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and all reasonable inferences therefrom, and may disregard all conclusory allegations. Id.; see generally Gilbreath v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 526 F.Supp. 657, 659 (W.D.Okla.1980) (motions to strike are not favored by the courts). Leave to amend pleadings shall be given freely when justice so requires. Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a). Appellate courts urge caution regarding motions to dismiss; the Tenth Circuit has expressed a strong predisposition by the judicial system to resolve cases on the merits. E.g., Hancock v. City of Okla. City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395-96 (10th Cir.1988); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520-21 n. 7 (10th Cir.1988).

II. FAILURE TO SATISFY CONDITION OF 2000e-5(f)(1)

The Justice Department has refused to give Townsend the right-to-sue letter that she would need in order to comply strictly with a statutory requirement for bringing a Title VII claim against a governmental entity. Townsend obtained a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC").² After the state moved to dismiss the lawsuit, Townsend sought unsuccessfully to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general.³ An assistant attorney general notified Townsend's counsel that under federal regulations the EEOC rather than the Justice Department must issue any right-to-sue letter in the case.⁴ In summary, the regulations prevent Townsend from obtaining a letter that the statute requires her to obtain in order to pursue her claim in federal court.⁵

A. Requirement of Attorney General's Right-to-Sue Letter

Obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general is a statutory condition precedent to pursuing a Title VII claim against a governmental agency. Under the interpretation that the Tenth Circuit has adopted, the language of § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general before bringing a claim against a government agency.⁶ Courts have construed the procedural requirement as a condition precedent to filing a claim against a governmental agency, not as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction.⁷ As a result, a federal court is not without jurisdiction if the plaintiff has not been able to obtain the appropriate right-to-sue letter. A Title VII plaintiff who cannot satisfy the requirement may avoid dismissal by establishing one of the available equitable doctrines. Thames v. Oklahoma Historical Soc'y, 646 F.Supp. 13, 16 (W.D.Okla.1985), aff'd per curiam, 809 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.1987).

By failing to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general, Townsend has not satisfied one of the conditions precedent to bringing a Title VII claim against a state agency.

B. Entitlement to Equitable Relief

Townsend has asked the Court to waive the statutory requirement because, despite her diligent efforts to comply with the letter of the statute, the attorney general has refused to issue to her a right-to-sue letter.⁸ The state has argued that Townsend's reasons for requesting equitable relief from the requirement are insufficient.

By applying the equitable doctrines, a court may avoid dismissing a Title VII plaintiff's suit against a governmental entity for failure to obtain an appropriate right-to-sue letter.⁹ Relief from the requirement may be possible under equitable doctrines including waiver, modification, and estoppel.¹⁰ While the Tenth Circuit has not yet provided specific guidance for applying the equitable doctrines to § 2000e-5(f)(1), other courts have waived the requirement in cases in which a plaintiff has attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a letter from the attorney general.¹¹

Townsend has presented a persuasive argument that the Court should waive the requirement because she has complied with the statute except for a condition that is beyond her control. The EEOC processed and denied Townsend's complaint. The EEOC issued to Townsend a right-to-sue letter. In addition, Townsend has taken the futile step of requesting a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general; the effort was a waste of time, and needlessly has delayed the litigation for nearly a year. Townsend is entitled to equitable relief because she has complied with the statute except for one condition, obtaining a letter from the attorney general that no longer is obtainable in cases such as hers.¹² Townsend should not be penalized merely because the attorney general routinely refuses to issue right-to-sue letters.¹³

III. FAULTY PLEADING AND SERVICE CONTENTIONS

The state contends that the complaint should be dismissed because Townsend neither has clearly identified the defendant nor properly has served a defendant. The state argues that because the action is not an ex relatione suit as indicated in the caption, the complaint does not clearly identify a defendant. The state contends that the erroneous caption makes it unclear whether Townsend is suing the OMD or the state or both.¹⁴ In response, Townsend explains that the OMD is the defendant.¹⁵ The state has not explained in detail its insufficient process contention.¹⁶

The error in the caption is not a fatal defect. In general, the allegations in the body of a complaint, not the names in a caption, determine the parties to a lawsuit. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir.1985) (caption not controlling in determining parties). As the state argues correctly, the suit is not an ex relatione action. Based upon Townsend's statement to the Court that the OMD is the defendant, the caption arguably is misleading. However, the body of the complaint adequately identifies the OMD as the defendant.¹⁷ The state has not cited any authority to support its theory that the Court should dismiss the complaint because of a defective caption; the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the decisional law follows a contrary philosophy. However, as a clerical matter, the plaintiff should amend the caption to identify clearly the defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

As a result of the attorney general's refusal to issue a right-to-sue letter, Townsend is entitled to equitable relief from the statutory condition that she obtain such a letter. Townsend has demonstrated that she made a diligent effort to comply with the letter of the statute. The current federal regulations that prevent Townsend from obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general are beyond her control.

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), the Court is granting Townsend leave to correct the caption. Any amendment to the caption shall be filed promptly, and no later than March 22, 1991.

The motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 A brief procedural history of the motion and case: Townsend filed the complaint on Mar. 8, 1990; the state filed a motion to dismiss on Apr. 9, 1990; Townsend on Apr. 23, 1990, filed a request to have the case placed on administrative closing; the Court on Apr. 24, 1990, placed the case on administrative closing; at the state's request, the Court on Feb. 5, 1991, vacated the administrative closing; the state on Feb. 8, 1991, amended the pending motion to dismiss; on Feb. 25, 1991, Townsend filed a response to the motion to dismiss.

2 Complaint para. 6. Although Townsend has not filed a copy of the letter, the Court has viewed the allegation in the complaint as true for purposes of the motion.

3 At the plaintiff's request, and without objection, the Court placed the case on administrative closing in order to enable Townsend to attempt to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general. In the application for an administrative closing, Townsend's attorney explained:

Since the filing of the state's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's counsel has been in contact with the local office for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and has been advised by Richard Henson, supervisor for the EEOC, that...