Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. v. Moll

• Decision Date: 05 October 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. 81-2103,s. 81-2103
• Citation: 438 So.2d 192
• Parties: TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY, LIMITED, a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Betty J. MOLL, as personal Representative of the Estates of Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll, deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased, Appellee/Cross Appellant. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC., a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Betty J. MOLL, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll, deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased, Appellee/Cross Appellant. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES COMPANY LIMITED, a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Betty J. MOLL, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll, deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased, Appellee/Cross Appellant. TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY, LIMITED, Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Incorporated and Toyota Motor Sales Company, Limited, Appellants, v. Betty J. MOLL, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll, deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased, Appellee. to 81-2105, 82-532.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 192

438 So.2d 192

TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY, LIMITED, a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Betty J. MOLL, as personal Representative of the Estates of

Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll,

deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased,

Appellee/Cross Appellant.

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC., a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Betty J. MOLL, as Personal Representative of the Estates of

Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll,

deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased,

Appellee/Cross Appellant.

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES COMPANY LIMITED, a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Betty J. MOLL, as Personal Representative of the Estates of

Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll,

deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased,

Appellee/Cross Appellant.

TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY, LIMITED, Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Incorporated and Toyota Motor Sales Company, Limited, Appellants, v. Betty J. MOLL, as Personal Representative of the Estates of

Wendy Jane Moll, deceased, Pamela May Moll,

deceased and Denise Ann Moll, deceased, Appellee.

Nos. 81-2103 to 81-2105, 82-532.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Oct. 5, 1983.

T. Rumberger, James A. Edwards of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell & Cabaniss, Orlando, Jay M. Smyser, Chicago, Ill., for appellants/cross appellees.

Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin, Miami, Jack Marcus, Simons & Schlesinger, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee/cross appellant.

HURLEY, Judge.

This appeal arises from a products liability case based on the allegation that the fuel tank system in the 1973 Toyota Corona was defectively designed. The jury found for the plaintiff. Toyota appeals, contending that the trial court erred on a critical evidentiary matter and, also, by allowing the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury. We disagree with both contentions and affirm.

The facts of the collision are not in substantial dispute. On the afternoon of June 16, 1979, the driver of a 1977 Mercury Cougar lost control of her car on a rain-slick portion of Interstate-95. The Mercury spun 180 degrees and came to rest sideways across I-95. At that instant, three young sisters, Wendy, Pamela and Denise Moll, were also proceeding north on I-95 in their 1973 Toyota Corona. ¹ They saw the Mercury and managed to stop either a short distance away or after lightly touching the Mercury's bumper. No one was seriously injured. Moments later, however, the Toyota was struck in the left rear by a 1969 Oldsmobile traveling between twenty-eight and forty miles per hour. The impact caused the Toyota's fuel system to rupture; the vehicle became an inferno. Tragically, the doors jammed and the three Moll sisters were burned to death.

Mrs. Betty Moll, the girls' mother and personal representative, instituted suit against Toyota in its corporate forms as manufacturer, exporter from Japan and importer into the United States. The complaint alleged that the girls' deaths were caused by the defective design of the fuel system and, therefore, each corporate defendant was liable under theories of negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability. The jury found for the plaintiff and returned a verdict against the manufacturer in the sum of $2,004,886 compensatory damages and $3,000,000 punitive damages.

Toyota has raised several points on appeal but, in our view, only two merit extended discussion. The first involves Toyota's claim that the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by excluding two films from evidence. Both films depicted crash-tests on selected 1973 automobiles. The trial court permitted the plaintiff to show a portion of one film which demonstrated the effect of a rear-end collision on a stationary 1973 Toyota Corona. The court, however, denied the defendant's request to show the remainder of the film which depicted similar tests on other makes and models. On appeal, Toyota argues that the trial court's rulings effectively prevented it from proving its state of the art defense, i.e., that the '73 Corona was as safe as the technology of the time permitted and that it conformed to accepted standards within the industry.

At the outset, we note that the record fails to support Toyota's contention. In fact, the record is replete with evidence of industry custom and it is simply inaccurate to suggest that the two contested rulings precluded the establishment of a state of the art defense. Moreover, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the two films. As a preliminary matter, Toyota failed to demonstrate that the various vehicles depicted in the films contained design features which were representative of, or customary in the industry. ² Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, 351 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (Letts, J., dissenting). More important, however, is the rule that a trial court possesses broad discretion over the admissibility of evidence which will inject collateral issues into the trial. Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal.App.3d 902, 90 Cal.Rptr. 305 (3d DCA 1970) is "on all fours" with the case at bar. There, General Motors, in an effort to support its state of the art defense, attempted to introduce evidence of the design of fuel containment systems in numerous vehicles other than the one in suit. As happened here, the California trial court permitted proof of industry design practices, but refused to permit the defendant to go into the designs of specific automobiles. The trial court voiced concern that if the evidence were permitted, the trial would go on forever. The district court of appeal affirmed, holding that the evidence's time consuming factor had to be weighed against its probative value. The same is true here. The proffered evidence had the potential of diverting the case onto time-consuming tangents. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the remainder of the films. Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886 (1932).

Next, Toyota contends that the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages. Again, we disagree. Punitive damages may be imposed when the defendant's "actions or inactions amount to willfulness, wantonness, maliciousness, recklessness, oppression, or outrageous conduct." Detroit Marine Engineering, Inc. v. Maloy, 419 So.2d 687, 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). See also Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see...