Tracewell v. Sanborn, 40556.
| Decision Date | 21 October 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 40556.,40556. |
| Citation | 232 N.W. 724,210 Iowa 1324 |
| Parties | TRACEWELL v. SANBORN ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; O. A. Wakefield, Judge.
Action to recover the amount of certain rent due from one Luscombe to plaintiff, which it is contended the defendant bank agreed to pay. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant bank appeals.
Affirmed.Pitkin, Hess & Bowes, of Sioux City, for appellant.
C. M. Walter, of Sioux City, for W. L. Sanborn.
Strong & Seff, of Sioux City, for appellee.
W. L. Sanborn appeals in the title of said cause, but as the issues were finally joined no relief was sought as against him.
[1] Appellee's cause of action is predicated upon the theory that he was the owner of certain land which he leased to one Luscombe for a cash rental. The appellant bank had a chattel mortgage upon Luscombe's property to secure an indebtedness which Luscombe owed to said bank. It appears from the evidence that Luscombe sold grain raised on said premises to the Sanborn Elevator Company and that said company gave Luscombe checks for the purchase price of said grain drawn on the appellant bank. Said checks aggregated about $500 in excess of the rent then due. Luscombe delivered said checks to the bank, and it is contended by the appellee that at said time Luscombe informed the officer of the bank in charge of said matter that the rent of the premises which he had occupied had not been paid and that he informed said officer of the amount of said rent and that said officer then promised to take care of or pay the same, and that thereupon Luscombe left said checks with said bank. The officer of the bank denied the conversation as claimed by Luscombe, and contended that the amount of said checks was indorsed upon Luscombe's indebtedness to the said bank with Luscombe's consent.
Appellant contends that the court erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict. The evidence clearly presented a disputed question of fact which the court properly submitted to the jury for their determination. The court did not err in overruling the motion for a directed verdict.
[2] II. Appellant contends that the alleged agreement is within the Statute of Frauds (Code 1927, § 11285), in that it was at most a mere promise on the part of the bank to answer for the debt of Luscombe. Under the facts as claimed by appellee, the Statute of Frauds is not available to the appellant. Under appellee's contention, and which he offered evidence to support, the promise of the...
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