Tracie F. v. Francisco D.
Decision Date | 21 September 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 15–CA–224.,15–CA–224. |
Citation | 174 So.3d 781 |
Parties | TRACIE F. v. FRANCISCO D. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Tracie F., In Proper Person/Appellee–2nd Appellant.
Nancy K. Durant, Attorney at Law, Metairie, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
Laura J. Todaro, Attorney at Law, Kenner, LA, for Intervenor/Appellant.
Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, HANS J. LILJEBERG, ROBERT M. MURPHY and STEPHEN J. WINDHORST.
Appellants, mother and maternal grandmother, complain of a trial court judgment awarding sole custody to the father, which is silent as to the mother and grandmother's visitation rights beyond a transition period. While this appeal has been pending, the mother and maternal grandmother filed applications for supervisory writs complaining of subsequent trial court judgments addressing visitation. We have referred those writ applications to the merits of this appeal and address those issues herein.
In this case, the child's father filed an action to modify a final, stipulated judgment awarding joint custody of the child to the maternal grandmother and the father, with the grandmother designated domiciliary, and granting visitation to the mother and father, the mother's specific and limited, the father's “reasonable.” Following a trial, the trial court granted the father's petition, awarding the father sole custody of the child. The court's judgment was silent on the issue of mother and grandmother visitation upon execution of the judgment.1 The trial court subsequently denied the maternal grandmother visitation and awarded the mother limited, supervised visitation.
For the reasons fully discussed below, we find that the trial court committed two errors of law which materially affected the outcome of this case and implicated the substantive rights of the child, the grandmother, and the mother. First, the trial court committed an error of law when it placed the burden of proof upon the nonmoving grandparent to show that substantial harm would result if sole custody of the child was granted to the moving parent.2 Second, the trial court committed an error of law in awarding limited, supervised visitation to Tracie when it failed to make a “best interest” analysis or finding as required by La. C.C. art. 136.
As a matter of first impression, we adopt the standard enunciated by the Louisiana Second Circuit in Jones v. Coleman.3 We find that the burden of proof in this modification action is upon the father, the parent seeking modification. First, we find the parent must prove, pursuant to the dual tests articulated in La. C.C. art. 133, that he has been rehabilitated of the parental unfitness or abandonment by reason of which he relinquished some part of his child's custody to a nonparent, thereby eliminating the “substantial harm” threat to the child which existed when the stipulated judgment was signed. Second, if the parent proves that he has been rehabilitated, then the parent must prove that the adequate and stable environment in which the child has lived with the nonparent as a result of the stipulated judgment has materially changed. In the absence of such a change, the parent's claim to modify the nonparent's custody of the child shall fail. Jones v. Coleman, 44,543 (La.App. 2 Cir.7/15/09); 18 So.3d 153. If the parent bears the initial burden of proof and passes the dual test articulated in La. C.C. art. 133, the parent must then prove that the child's best interest is in the custody of the parent. In any custody proceeding, the child's best interest is predominant.
Having found that the trial court committed two errors of law which affected the outcome in this case and implicated the substantive rights of the parties and the child, we vacate the trial court's January 27, 2015 judgment awarding sole custody to the father and reinstate the July 14, 2013 stipulated judgment awarding joint custody to the father and grandmother, with the grandmother designated as the domiciliary parent as well as the subsequent judgment concerning the parents' child support obligations and the father's visitation schedule. Further, we vacate the trial court's July 8, 2015 visitation judgment. We remand this matter to the district court.
Francisco (“Francisco”) and Tracie (“Tracie”) are the biological parents of David, who was born on May 29, 2006.4 On November 17, 2006, Tracie petitioned the court for sole custody of David. Thereafter, on January 7, 2007, the parents consented to joint custody with Tracie being domiciliary parent. Reasonable visitation was reserved to Francisco. Francisco also agreed to pay Tracie $400.00 per month in child support and to maintain David's health insurance.
On May 28, 2013, the maternal grandmother, Kathy B., and biological father, Francisco, filed a petition seeking a change of custody to joint temporary custody of David, with Kathy being designated as domiciliary parent, reserving to the mother, Tracie, reasonable visitation in Kathy's home and visitation outside Kathy's home only upon compliance with specific conditions. The petition also prayed that Francisco's child support obligation cease upon the custody change.
In this petition, Kathy and Francisco alleged, pertinently:
In July, 2013, Kathy, Tracie, and Francisco agreed to a stipulated judgment awarding custody of David to Kathy, jointly with Francisco, with Kathy designated as the domiciliary parent.5 The judgment granted Tracie specific visitation, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, conditioned upon certain terms, including the termination of Tracie's relationship with her boyfriend and Tracie's abstinence from alcohol or drug use evidenced by random drug testing. The judgment awarded Francisco unspecified reasonable visitation. Francisco approved the judgment by signature, pro se6 .
On March 24, 2014, Francisco filed a petition to annul the stipulated judgment. Tracie and Kathy were named defendants. Francisco prayed for sole custody of the child with reasonable visitation to the mother and the maternal grandmother. The father's original petition alleged in relevant part:
On August 7, 2014, Francisco filed an amended rule alleging that since the rendition of the July 14, 2013 Stipulated Judgment, circumstances have changed to such a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ferrand v. Ferrand
...concern for the best interest of the child as well as the parent's concomitant rights and responsibilities." Tracie F. v. Francisco D. , 174 So.3d 781, 796 (La.App. 9/21/15) ; See also McCormic v. Rider , 27 So.3d 277, 279 (La. 2/12/10). Louisiana Civil Code Article 133 governs a custody di......
-
Kinnett v. Kinnett
...physical, and emotional well-being to control the outcome of many cases involving children. See, e.g. , Tracie F. v. Francisco D. , 15-224 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/21/15), 174 So.3d 781, 794. However, if a child's interest in developing and preserving this all-important and unique relationship—wh......
-
In re C.A.C.
...v. Rider , 2009-2584 (La. 2/12/10), 27 So.3d 277, 279.22 McCormic v. Rider , supra, 27 So.3d at 280.23 Tracie F. v. Francisco D ., 15-224 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/21/15), 174 So.3d 781, 812, reh'g denied (Oct. 6, 2015), writ granted , 2015-1812 (La. 11/16/15), 184 So.3d 20, and aff'd but criticiz......
-
Tracie F. v. Francisco D.
...to show that the environment provided by Kathy as the current domiciliary parent had "materially changed." Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 15–224 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/21/15), 174 So.3d 781. Therefore, the appellate court's majority reinstated the "stipulated judgment awarding joint custody to Kathy......