Trackwell v. Trackwell
Decision Date | 20 December 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 84A01-0006-CV-192.,84A01-0006-CV-192. |
Citation | 740 N.E.2d 582 |
Parties | In re the Marriage of Dianne M. TRACKWELL, Appellant-Respondent, v. Allan D. TRACKWELL, Appellee-Petitioner. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Teri M. Lorenz, Hunt, Hassler & Lorenz, Terre Haute, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Dennis H. Stark, Fleschner, Fleschner, Stark, Tanoos & Newlin, Terre Haute, Indiana, Attorney for Appellee.
Appellant-respondent Dianne M. Trackwell ("Wife") appeals from the trial court's dissolution of her marriage to appellee-petitioner Allan D. Trackwell ("Husband"). We reverse and remand.
Wife presents a single issue for review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in selecting the date of Husband and Wife's physical separation for purposes of valuing their marital assets.
Husband and Wife were married on June 1, 1985, without a prenuptial agreement. At the time of the marriage, both parties were employed at Columbia House and had individual pension and employee investment fund ("EIF") accounts through their employment. Husband and Wife had no children during their marriage and physically separated in November 1995. Husband filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage on March 11, 1999. After a final hearing on May 1, 2000, the trial court entered a dissolution decree on May 12, 2000. In dividing the marital estate, the trial court found November 1995 to be a "just and reasonable" date for valuing the assets and declared each party to be the owner of his or her respective pension and EIF account. The court found that from the date of marriage to November 1995, Husband's pension and EIF accounts had increased in value by $132,183.51 and $85,199.32 respectively. During that same period, Wife's pension and EIF accounts had increased in value by $23,469.20 and $21,382.83 respectively. To equalize the parties' estate, the trial court ordered Husband to transfer $58,988.72 from his EIF account to Wife's EIF account. Wife now appeals.
At Wife's request, the trial court entered special findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). We therefore employ a two-tiered standard of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the factual findings and then determine whether those findings support the judgment. See Bertholet v. Bertholet, 725 N.E.2d 487, 495 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). "On review, we do not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous." Id. (citing T.R. 52(A)). Id. at 495 (citations omitted).
More specifically, the trial court has broad discretion in determining the value of property in a dissolution action, and we will disturb its valuation only for an abuse of this discretion. See id. at 497. "We will reverse the trial court's decision as to a valuation date only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court." Reese v. Reese, 671 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Ind. Ct.App.1996),trans. denied. As the party challenging the trial court's property division, Wife must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court complied with the statutory guidelines. See Bertholet, 725 N.E.2d at 494.
(2) setting the property or parts of the property over to one (1) of the spouses and requiring either spouse to pay an amount, either in gross or in installments, that is just and proper.
Indiana Code Section 31-9-2-46 defines "final separation" as "the date of filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage under [Indiana Code Section] XX-XX-X-X," unless the parties were in the process of obtaining or had obtained a legal separation when the dissolution petition was filed.2 Here, the parties did not obtain a legal separation but instead initiated a physical separation in November 1995. "The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable." IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5.
Husband and Wife do not dispute that their pension and EIF accounts are marital assets subject to division and valuation by the trial court or that the trial court properly divided the marital assets. See Hurst v. Hurst, 676 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ind. Ct.App.1997) ( . Their sole disagreement concerns the date that the court should have selected in valuing the accounts.3 We agree with Wife that the trial court abused its discretion in not selecting a date between the dissolution petition filing date and the final hearing date. See Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind.1996) ("This court has made clear that the trial court has discretion when valuing the marital assets to set any date between the date of filing the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing." (citing Eyler v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1986)); Bertholet, 725 N.E.2d at 497 ; Knotts v. Knotts, 693 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing Quillen), trans. denied; Hiser v. Hiser, 692 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) ("For purposes of choosing a date upon which to value marital assets, the trial court may select any date between the date of filing the petition for dissolution and the date of the final hearing." (citing Staller v. Staller, 570 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (Ind.Ct.App.1991)); Reese, 671 N.E.2d at 191 ( ; In re Marriage of Sloss, 526 N.E.2d 1036, 1038-39 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988) ( .
The cases on which Husband relies4 address the date of the division of marital assets, rather than the date of their valuation, and are thus inapplicable to the case at bar.5 See Grimes v. Grimes, 722 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (), trans. denied; In re Marriage of Duke, 549 N.E.2d 1096, 1098 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) ( )() .6
The trial court in the instant case abused its discretion in selecting the date of the parties' physical separation for purposes of valuing the marital assets. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to select a date "between the date of filing the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing" for valuing the marital assets, including the parties' pension and EIF accounts. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 102.
Reversed and remanded.
2. In such a case, "final separation" "means the date that the petition for legal separation was filed[.]" See IND.CODE § 31-9-2-46.
3. Wife alleges that "[h]ad the court equally divided the marital estate, determined as of the date of final separation, [Wife] would have received at least $86,306 more in assets than those allocated to her by the trial court." Appellant's Brief at 13.
4. We note that an opinion cited by Husband in his appellate brief, Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau,...
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