Trafalgar Corp. v. Miami County Bd. of Com'Rs

• Decision Date: 03 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-3578.,06-3578.
• Citation: 519 F.3d 285
• Parties: TRAFALGAR CORPORATION; Bruce Geisinger; and Mark Geisinger, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MIAMI COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and Concord Township, Miami County, Ohio, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

519 F.3d 285

TRAFALGAR CORPORATION; Bruce Geisinger; and Mark Geisinger, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MIAMI COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and Concord Township, Miami County, Ohio, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-3578.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: September 10, 2007.

Decided and Filed: March 3, 2008.

ARGUED: Michael P. McNamee, McNamee & McNamee, Beavercreek, Ohio, for Appellants. Robert J. Surdyk, Surdyk Dowd & Turner, Dayton, Ohio, Steven G. LaForge, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Michael P. McNamee, Gregory B. O'Connor, McNamee & McNamee, Beavercreek, Ohio, for Appellants. Robert J. Surdyk, Kevin Lantz, Surdyk Dowd & Turner, Dayton, Ohio, Steven G. LaForge, Jeffrey A. Stankunas, Brandi L. Dorgan, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge.

Trafalgar Corporation sought a federal court determination of its constitutional takings and equal protection claims against the Miami County Board of Commissioners and Concord Township. The district court dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment finding that Trafalgar's claims were barred by principles of preclusion. For the following reasons we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

I

Trafalgar owns a fifty-acre tract of land located in Concord Township, Ohio. The property is zoned A-2 Agricultural, which would allow residential development so long as each lot has at least one hundred twenty-five feet of road frontage. Trafalgar successfully applied to the Board to re-zone the property to single-family residential in 1995, 1997, and every year from 1999 to 2004. Each time, however, a voter referendum vetoed the change.

Trafalgar sued the Board and the Township and exhaustively litigated its claims in state court prior to bringing an action in federal court. It filed its first complaint in June 1999 in the Miami County Court of Common Pleas seeking a declaratory judgment overturning the voter referendum statute for as-applied or facial unconstitutionality under the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Trafalgar alternatively sought just compensation for a regulatory taking of property by the state. The trial court rejected Trafalgar's challenge to the referendum statute and held that its takings claim was not cognizable in declaratory judgment but could be filed as a request for a writ of mandamus. Trafalgar appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case.

In May of 2002, Trafalgar filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Miami County for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel re-zoning of its land and to compel compensation for a taking of its property. Trafalgar asserted its right to compensation under both the Ohio and United States Constitutions. The state court of appeals first dismissed Concord Township as a party to the action on summary judgment. The court of appeals then proceeded to deny all of Trafalgar's claims, holding that its claim for re-zoning was precluded by the prior appeals court decision upholding the constitutionality of the referendum law and its claim for just compensation lacked merit. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court ruling, finding no merit in any takings claim by Trafalgar. State ex rel. Trafalgar Corp., v. Miami County Bd. of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St.3d 350, 819 N.E.2d 1040 (2004).

Having found no success in the state courts, Trafalgar filed suit in federal district court in March of 2005. That court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which requires federal courts to give prior state court judgments the same effect those judgments would be given in the courts of the rendering state, found all Trafalgar's claims barred by Ohio preclusion law, and dismissed the case on summary judgment. Trafalgar appealed to this Court arguing that its federal claims should not be precluded by the state court judgments. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. O'Neill v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 497 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir.2007).

II

The principles of preclusion operate to bar Trafalgar's claims under the Takings and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution. A federal court must give prior state court judgments the same effect those judgments would be given in the courts of the rendering state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The federal court must therefore apply the principles of preclusion from the rendering state to state court decisions. Hamilton's Bogarts, Inc., v. State of Michigan, 501 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir.2007).

Ohio state courts recognize both claim and issue preclusion. Fort Frye Teachers Ass'n, OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 692 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1998).

"[C]laim preclusion . . . holds that a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action."

Id. (citing Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226, 228 (1995)).

"The doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, holds that a fact or a point that was actually and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different."

Id. (citing Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943)).

Issue preclusion bars further litigation under the Takings clause. In its May...