Fort Frye Teachers Ass'n, OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2642,96-2642
• Citation: 692 N.E.2d 140,81 Ohio St.3d 392
• Parties: , 124 Ed. Law Rep. 684, 1998 SERB 4-35 FORT FRYE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, OEA/NEA, et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 392

81 Ohio St.3d 392

692 N.E.2d 140, 124 Ed. Law Rep. 684, 1998 SERB 4-35

FORT FRYE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, OEA/NEA, et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees.

No. 96-2642.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 13, 1998.

Decided April 22, 1998.

Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Mark A. Foley, Susan Hayest Kozlowski and William J. Steele, Columbus, for appellees and cross-appellants.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Peter M. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant and cross-appellee State Employment Relations Board.

Whalen & Compton Co., L.P.A., G. Frederick Compton, Jr., R. Brent Minney and Craig A. Robinson, Akron, for appellant and cross-appellee Fort Frye Local School District Board of Education.

FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., Justice.

Appellee Michael Rauch was employed by the appellant Fort Frye Local School District Board of Education ("School Board") as a high school industrial arts teacher under two separate one-year limited teaching contracts from 1986 until 1988. While so employed, Rauch was a member of the appellee Fort Frye Teachers' Association ("Union"), the exclusive bargaining representative for the certificated staff.

In 1987, the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School Board was up for renegotiation. Dissatisfied with the School Board's final offer, the Union decided to strike on October 19, 1987. Rauch was a stanch supporter and served as a co-captain of the picket line during the strike.

On November 2, 1987, the School Board reopened the schools with replacement substitute teachers and Fort Frye teachers who crossed the picket line. On November 16, 1987, an agreement was reached on terms which closely approximated the final offer of the School Board before the strike began. The Union felt it had lost. Many striking teachers believed that the teachers who crossed the picket line caused this defeat. To show their solidarity, several striking teachers informally agreed to ostracize the nonstriking teachers by refusing to socialize with them upon their return to work.

In addition to the ostracism, the School Board also received several reports of unprofessional conduct on the part of Rauch. Specifically, it was alleged that Rauch had harassed several teachers and two students. Nonstriking teachers and community members called for the non-renewal of Rauch's contract. After receiving these complaints, the School Board's superintendent notified Rauch that he was recommending that the School Board non-renew Rauch's contract for the following year due to his attitude and conduct.¹ On April 21, 1988, the School Board accepted the superintendent's recommendation and declined to renew Rauch's limited teaching contract upon its termination at the end of the 1987-1988 school year.

On April 22, 1988, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge ("ULP") against the School Board with appellant State Employment Relations Board ("SERB") on Rauch's behalf. The Union alleged that the School Board non-renewed the employment contract of Rauch in retaliation for engaging in activities protected under R.C. Chapter 4117.

SERB found probable cause to believe a ULP had occurred and a complaint was issued against the School Board. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, a SERB hearing officer found a ULP. SERB disagreed with its hearing officer's recommendation and entered judgment in the School Board's favor. On July 22, 1991, appellees appealed to the common pleas court. In addition, on August 20, 1991, Rauch filed a complaint in federal court against the School Board, alleging a violation of his constitutional right of freedom of association.

On July 30, 1992, a federal jury returned a general verdict in Rauch's favor. The school board filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied. The school board then appealed, but later dismissed its appeal in July 1993.

Meanwhile, the state action proceeded. On January 12, 1993, the common pleas court affirmed SERB's decision. Appellees appealed. The court of appeals did not address the merits of the appeal. Instead, it reversed and remanded the case to SERB for a consideration of this court's decision in State Emp. Relations Bd. v. Adena Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 485, 613 N.E.2d 605, which held that R.C. Chapter 4117 mandates the application of the "in part" test in order to determine the motivation of an employer charged with a ULP.²

SERB ordered the parties to submit additional briefs addressing the "in part" standard. In their additional brief, appellees argued that the School Board was collaterally estopped by the federal jury verdict from contesting the ssue of its motivation under the Adena standard.

SERB rejected the appellees' argument, applied the Adena standard, and again failed to find a ULP. Upon appeal, the common pleas court agreed. However, the court of appeals reversed and remanded. The court agreed with appellees' position and held that upon remand, the school board is collaterally estopped by the jury verdict in federal court from contesting the issue of its motivation with regard to alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4117.

The cause is now before us pursuant to the allowance of discretionary appeals and a cross-appeal.

The issue presented in this case is twofold. First, we must decide whether the School Board is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating the issue of its motivation in nonrenewing Rauch's limited teaching contract. Second, we must determine whether the application of collateral estoppel infringes upon SERB's exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether unfair labor practices have occurred. Because we find that collateral estoppel applies and that this decision does not invade SERB's exclusive jurisdiction, we affirm the court of appeals and remand the matter to SERB for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It has long been held that the legal doctrine of res judicata consists of two related concepts--claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226, 228. Although not at issue here, the claim preclusion concept holds that a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. Id. at syllabus.

The doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, holds that a fact or a point that was actually and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different. Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299, 27 O.O. 240, 52 N.E.2d 67, paragraph three of the syllabus; Trautwein v. Sorgenfrei (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 493, 12 O.O.3d 403, 391 N.E.2d 326, syllabus; Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978, paragraph one of the syllabus. While the merger and bar aspects of res judicata have the effect of precluding the relitigation of the same cause of action, the collateral estoppel aspect precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action that was based on a different cause of action. Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 112, 49 O.O.2d 435, 437-438, 254 N.E.2d 10, 13. "In short, under the rule of collateral estoppel, even where the cause of action is different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior suit may nevertheless affect the outcome of the second suit." Id. at 112, 49 O.O.2d at 438, 254 N.E.2d at 13.

Appellants contend that certain collateral estoppel requirements were not met. First, we note that there is no disagreement that the federal district court is a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the School Board contends that the prior ³ federal action did not involve the same parties or their privies because SERB was not a party to the federal lawsuit. We reject this argument.

In determining whether there is privity of parties, "a court must look behind the nominal parties to the substance of the cause to determine the real parties in interest." Trautwein, 58 Ohio St.2d at 501, 12 O.O.3d at 407, 391 N.E.2d at 331. That is, we must consider which party estoppel is being asserted against.

In both the state and federal action, Rauch and the School Board have been adversaries. SERB, however, has played a unique role. SERB is the administrative agency responsible for deciding public-sector labor relations disputes pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117. Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 170, 572 N.E.2d 87, 90. Thus, in accordance with R.C. Chapter 4117, and depending upon the posture of the case, SERB has aligned itself with both Rauch and the School Board. ⁴ Since SERB's authority is limited to state administrative claims, SERB could not be a party to a federal action alleging a federal constitutional violation. However, the fact that SERB was not involved in the federal action is immaterial. The real parties in interest (Rauch and the School Board) have remained the same. These are the parties whose interests were implicated by the federal action and the ULP charge. Thus, the party against whom estoppel is sought (the School Board) was a party to the prior action.

The more difficult question is whether the same facts used to support the civil rights violation are the same facts to sustain a ULP charge. If the same evidence would sustain both issues, then the two issues are the same for purposes of applying collateral estoppel. Norwood, 142 Ohio...