Trafamczak v. Anys
Decision Date | 05 April 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 18.,18. |
Citation | 31 N.W.2d 832,320 Mich. 653 |
Parties | TRAFAMCZAK v. ANYS. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Gogebic County; Thomas J. Landers, judge.
Action for injuries sustained in truck accident by Mike Trafamczak against William Anys. From the judgment, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Before the Entire Bench.
Ivan D. Wright, of Ironwood, for defendant and appellant.
William G. Cloon, of Ironwood (S. W. Patek, of Ironwood, of counsel), for plaintiff and appellee.
This case results from an automobile accident occurring about 3:30 in the morning of February 22, 1942. Plaintiff and one Walter Glaser were riding in a truck owned and driven by defendant. Approximately four miles south of the village of Watersmeet in Gogebic county, the vehicle left the traveled portion of the highway, comint to a stop in the ditch on the left side of the road. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries, and instituted the present suit to recover damages therefor. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor in the sum of $5,314.50. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and he has appealed.
It is the claim of defendant that the evidence in the case did not justify the finding of the jury that defendant was guilty of negligence constituting the proximate cause of the accident. At the conclusion of plaintiff's proofs a motion for a directed verdict was made by defendant and was denied by the trial court. It was renewed at the conclusion of the case with like result. If, as plaintiff claimed on the trial, the accident happened because defendant fell asleep while driving, negligence on the latter's part was thereby established. Devlin v. Morse, 254 Mich. 113, 235 NW. 812;Perkins v. Roberts, 272 Mich. 545, 262 N.W. 305. No claim is made that such conduct constituted gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct. If, on the other hand, defendant's version as to what occurred is correct, the conclusion is fully justified that he was not keeping a reasonable and proper outlook. The night was clear, and no claim is made that defendant's vision was in any way obstructed. Neither is there any proof that the truck left the highway because of coming in contact with any obstruction, or that it skidded because of a slippery condition of the surface of the road. Defendant, called for cross-examination by the plaintiff, testified that the accident happened on a gradual curve, that his windshield was clear, and that he did not go to sleep before the accident. The following excerpt from his examination by his own counsel indicates his theory as to what occurred:
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Except as indicated by the testimony quoted, defendant offered no explanation as to the cause of his truck leaving the highway. It is apparent that he was not watching the road immediately prior to the accident. His own testimony fully justified such conclusion. It is true that an inference of negligence may not be drawn from the mere fact that an accident occurred. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not obtain in this State. Watrous v. Conor, 266 Mich. 397, 254 N.W. 143;Weissert v. City of Escanaba, 298 Mich. 443, 299 N.W. 139;Ionia School District v. Dadd, 308 Mich. 220, 13 N.W.2d 268, However, proper inferences may be drawn from the facts disclosing the manner in which the accident has taken place. Heppenstall Steel Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 242 Mich. 464, 219 N.W. 717;Hazen v. Rockefeller, 303 Mich. 536, 6 N.W.2d 770. The testimony of the defendant, above quoted, is consistent with that of his witness, Glaser, who was riding in the car at the time of the accident. According to the latter, he was watching the oil gauge and was carring on a conversation with defendant with reference to it immediately prior to the accident.
It is a logical conclusion from the evidence that defendant was not keeping a proper outlook. It was his duty to observe the road and not permit his attention to be distracted by some matter that did not constitute a hazard to the operation of his car. No claim is made that an examination of the oil gauge, or any discussion concerning it, was imperative at the time. Nevertheless, defendant, according to his own admission, permitted his observation to be diverted from the road for several seconds while the car was proceeding a distance of approximately 200 feet. Under the circumstances, this did not constitute due care. In Wineman v. Carter, 212 Minn. 298, 4 N.W.2d 83, it was said (syllabus by the court):
‘A normal boy in his sixteenth year held guilty of negligence as matter of law in so driving an automobile that it collided with another parked on the street, the collision being the result of his inattention while picking up a lighted cigarette which he had just dropped.'
Likewise in Sheehan v. Foster, 80 Cal. App. 56, 251 P. 235, it was held that defendant had not exercised ordinary care and diligence for the safety of the plaintiff because, while driving 12 to 15 miles an hour, he neglected to watch the road while endeavoring to pick up the ignition key that had fallen to the floor of the car. See, also, Orme v. Farmer, 268 Mich. 425, 256 N.W. 470;Breckenridge v. Arms, 279 Mich. 384, 272 N.W. 716;Dreyer v. Otter Tail Power Co., 205 Minn. 286, 285 N.W. 707,287 N.W. 13;Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85 P.2d 732, 120 A.L.R. 1507. Whether defendant's failure to observe the highway before him was due to his falling asleep, or to the reason suggested in his own testimony, the conclusion cannot be avoided that he failed to observe the duty resting on him. His claim that the evidence did not establish negligence on his part is without merit.
Error is predicated on the admission, over defendant's objections, of the testimony of a deputy sheriff of the county, who was a witness in plaintiff's behalf. Said witness had in his possession the report that he had taken from the defendant, following the accident, under the provisions of 1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 4722, as last amended by Pub.Acts 1939, No. 318, Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 4722, Stat.Ann. 1947 Cum.Supp. § 9.1590. Under the specific terms of said statute, a report so made is not ‘available for use in any court action.’ The...
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