Trafton v. City of Woodbury

• Citation: 799 F.Supp.2d 417
• Decision Date: 29 June 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09–4106 (NLH).
• Parties: Joanne TRAFTON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WOODBURY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

799 F.Supp.2d 417

Joanne TRAFTON, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF WOODBURY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09–4106 (NLH).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

June 29, 2011.

Anthony F. DiMento, Elkind & DiMento, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Plaintiff Joanne Trafton.

Allan E. Richardson, Linda A. Galella, Richardson & Galella, Woodbury, NJ, for Defendants City of Woodbury, City of Woodbury Police Department and Officer Harold Holmstrom.

OPINION

HILLMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Joanne Trafton, alleges Defendants City of Woodbury, City of Woodbury Police Department and Officer Harold Holmstrom violated her federal and state civil rights when Officer Holmstrom falsely arrested and injured her. In response to Plaintiff's claims, Defendants move for summary judgment. For the reasons expressed below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 18] is granted in part and denied in part.

I. JURISDICTION

Plaintiff has alleged several federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under the New Jersey Constitution and common law. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. BACKGROUND

On the morning of July 5, 2007, Plaintiff, Joanne Trafton, deposited camera film at CVS Pharmacy (hereinafter “CVS”) in Woodbury, New Jersey. During development of the film, an employee of CVS noticed it contained several images (hereinafter “pictures” or “photographs”) of two adolescent minors posing with various weaponry, including several guns and a crossbow. This prompted the employee to notify his manager who, subsequently, phoned the Woodbury police. An officer, not a party to this proceeding, arrived and examined the photographs. Although he took no immediate action regarding the pictures, he requested that CVS notify him if someone attempted to retrieve the photographs.

Later that afternoon Plaintiff returned to CVS to pickup the pictures. She approached the photo development processing counter and told an employee her name. The employee then went to an office and notified the Woodbury police. The officer that initially handled the matter was unavailable and Defendant Harold Holmstrom (hereinafter “Holmstrom”), a patrolman with the Woodbury Police Department, was dispatched. When he arrived at CVS, an employee handed Defendant Holmstrom the pictures.¹ Shortly thereafter, Defendant Holmstrom approached Plaintiff and asked whether she had seen the photographs. Plaintiff responded she had not and that she could not wait to view them. A discussion then ensued among Defendant Holmstrom, Plaintiff and a female CVS employee concerning the nature of the firearms in the photographs. Plaintiff contended she had not taken the pictures and that the guns were not real but rather were her son's paintball and BB guns.² In an effort to demonstrate his perception that the guns were real, Defendant Holmstrom remarked, “I'd shoot him [Plaintiff's son]. I'm serious if he pulled that out [referring to a gun].” Doc. 18–5, Exhibit F. Plaintiff ignored this comment and expressed disbelief that CVS called the police because of the content of the photographs.

As Defendant Holmstrom and Plaintiff viewed the photographs, a CVS employee explained the rationale for calling the police. The discussion then focused on a picture of Plaintiff's son holding a crossbow. In reference to this photograph, Defendant Holmstrom remarked that possession of a crossbow is illegal in New Jersey. Plaintiff replied that her husband had a permit for the weapon. Defendant Holmstrom ignored this response and reiterated that crossbows are illegal in New Jersey.

At this point in the conversation, Plaintiff exhibited some hostility. She exclaimed “this is ridiculous,” to which Defendant Holmstrom replied, “this is ridiculous” that “you have this going on.” Id. Plaintiff then stated “what, my husband shoots guns all the time.” Id. In response, Defendant Holmstrom asked Plaintiff if “this is proper behavior,” and Plaintiff replied “they are taking pictures of each other, what is the big deal.” Id. The hostility between Plaintiff and Defendant Holmstrom continued to grow. Plaintiff again exclaimed “you are ridiculous” and told Defendant Holmstrom to “step away from me.” Id. Defendant Holmstrom then requested Plaintiff's name and she replied “no.” Id. In response, Defendant Holmstrom stated he would call DYFS.

The order of the events that occurred shortly before and immediately after Defendant Holmstrom threatened to call DYFS is both exceedingly critical and disputed. ³ Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, for purposes of this Motion, the recordings indicate that Plaintiff “backed” away from Defendant Holmstrom in an effort to secure personal space, not as an attempt to leave CVS.⁴ In her effort to acquire personal space, Plaintiff walked several feet to the photo checkout counter and stopped. At the photo checkout counter Defendant Holmstrom again requested identification. Plaintiff refused, indicating it was not in her possession. Defendant Holmstrom then requested Plaintiff's name. Following her refusal to disclose her name, Defendant Holmstrom informed Plaintiff he would arrest her for hindrance. In response, Plaintiff stated “that is fine, arrest me.” Doc. 18–5, Exhibit F. Defendant Holmstrom again reiterated that she would be arrested for hindrance, to which Plaintiff again replied “arrest me.” Id. Defendant Holmstrom then told Plaintiff to put her hands behind her back. Plaintiff refused to comply and attempted to leave CVS.⁵

Defendant Holmstrom physically prevented Plaintiff from leaving CVS and reiterated that she was under arrest. In the process of preventing Plaintiff from leaving, she somehow fell to the floor and a short struggle ensued. Throughout this profanity laced struggle, Plaintiff maintained an extremely hostile attitude toward Defendant Holmstrom and yelled several times for him to “get away from me.” ⁶ Id. Plaintiff was eventually subdued and handcuffed. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff exclaimed that Defendant Holmstrom was “hurting my hands.” Id. Defendant Holmstrom ignored this comment and told Plaintiff to “relax.” Id. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff again proceeded to verbally chastize Defendant Holmstrom.⁷ This behavior occurred in CVS and continued for essentially the entirety of the approximate three minute drive from CVS to the Woodbury Police station.⁸ Intermixed within Plaintiff's hostile and derogatory commentary were various claims that her hands hurt.⁹ Defendant Holmstrom ignored these claims.

Upon Plaintiff's arrival at the Woodbury police station, Defendant Holmstrom handcuffed her to a chair. Although Plaintiff was only handcuffed for a five to ten minute period, her request for removal of the handcuffs was ignored. In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff opined that the officers, including Defendant Holmstrom, ignored her five statements concerning her wrist pain and never checked the placement of the handcuffs. Eventually the handcuffs were removed and Plaintiff was charged with three offenses, (1) obstructing the administration of law, in violation of NJSA 2C:29–1, (2) disorderly conduct, in violation of NJSA 2C:33–2(a) and (3) resisting arrest, in violation of NJSA 2C:29–2.

On July 16, 2007, Plaintiff received treatment for pain in her right wrist at the Orthopaedics at Woodbury. After several visits over the course of two years, Plaintiff's treating physician concluded that her injury was permanent and that her continued pain was related to the handcuff incident with Defendant Holmstrom. The only relief available to Plaintiff is an injection, every six months, in her wrist.

On April 16, 2008, Plaintiff pled guilty in the Gloucester County Municipal Court.¹⁰ On July 1, 2009, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Gloucester County. On August 12, 2009, Defendants removed this action to federal court. Approximately one year later, on September 29, 2010, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes entry of summary judgment.

III. DISCUSSIONA. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party's evidence “is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A party opposing...