Trailer v. Schelm
| Decision Date | 12 December 1939 |
| Docket Number | 44932. |
| Citation | 288 N.W. 865,227 Iowa 780 |
| Parties | TRAILER v. SCHELM. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Cass County; R. E. Hines, Judge.
Action at law for damages sustained by bicycle rider in collision with illegally parked automobile. Opinion states the facts. From judgment for defendant on directed verdict, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Roscoe S. Jones, of Atlantic, and J. J. Hess, of Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Harry B. Swan, of Atlantic, and H. B. White, of Des Moines, for appellee.
On May 6, 1936, at about 8:30 p. m., Grant Trailer, Jr., then between fourteen and fifteen years of age, while riding a bicycle north on Walnut Street, a paved street in Atlantic Iowa, collided with the front end of a parked and unlighted automobile and sustained injuries consisting of facial cuts bruises and the loss of one of his eyes. On account thereof recovery was sought in his behalf from Clara Schelm, the owner of said automobile. The action was predicated upon the alleged negligence of said defendant in unlawfully parking the automobile with its left side, instead of its right side next to and parallel to the curb, and in so parking it without lights on a narrow street at a place where it was obscured from vision by reason of darkness. At the conclusion of all the evidence the trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant and judgment was entered accordingly. Hence this appeal.
Under the record the only reasons upon which the ruling of the trial court could have been based were those given by the court, to wit: that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and that the unlawful parking of defendant's automobile was not the proximate cause of the collision and injuries sustained by plaintiff. That defendant left her automobile after dark and without lights of any kind, parked upon Walnut Street with its left side next to and parallel to the east curb was indisputably established. Defendant herself so testified.
In determining whether or not such parking was the proximate cause of the accident, consideration should be given to certain statutes then in effect. Section 5056, Code of Iowa 1935, provided:
It may be here noted that by Section 4997 of the 1935 Code cities and towns were empowered to adopt ordinances permitting other methods of parking in certain areas. However, as to the location in controversy, no such action appears to have been taken by the City of Atlantic. Therefore, the provisions of Section 5056 would be effective.
Section 5045, Code of Iowa 1935, provided:
The foregoing section referred to the " period of from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise." Section 5044. The word " highway", as there employed, included city streets. Code of 1935, Subsection 5 of Section 4863.
Earlier statutory provisions relative to tail lights required them to be exhibited only while the motor vehicle was in motion. See Chapter 53, Acts 30th G.A.; Chapter 72, Acts 34th G.A.; City of Harlan v. Kraschel, 164 Iowa 667, 146 N.W. 463; Griffin v. McNeil, 198 Iowa 1359, 201 N.W. 78; Leete v. Hays, 211 Iowa 379, 233 N.W. 481.
The first statutory requirement for exhibiting tail lights upon motor vehicles parked after dark was contained in Section 5054 of the 1924 Code and applied only to motor vehicles parked upon highways outside of cities or towns. At that time Section 5044 of the 1924 Code referred to headlights of vehicles " in use", i. e. in motion. Section 5045 of the 1924 Code related to tail lights of such motor vehicle " when in use" . In 1929 Section 1, Chapter 25, Acts 43d G.A. added after the word " use" in Code Section 5045 the clause " or parked upon or immediately adjacent to the traveled portion of the highway" . It may be noted that Sections 5044-d1 and 5044-d2, Codes of 1931 and 1935 adopted by the 44th G.A. in 1931 (chapter 120, § 7) did not change the requirements for lights upon motor vehicles of the type here involved.
From the foregoing legislative history it is apparent that Section 5045 Code of 1935 did require the display of a red tail light upon the rear of an automobile parked upon a city street at night. Riley v. Guthrie, 218 Iowa 422, 255 N.W. 502.
Therefore, the automobile of appellee in the case at bar was parked in violation of Sections 5045 and 5056 of the 1935 Code. Those statutes required said car to face north, and at night to exhibit a red light upon its rear, or south end. Undoubtedly, a purpose of these provisions was the protection and warning of night traffic, and in this situation particularly north bound traffic which was required to travel on the right side of the street, in proximity to and in the direction faced by cars lawfully parked at the right-hand, or east, curb. Disobedience thereof would tend to expose such traffic to danger of collision during the hours of darkness, with unlighted parked cars.
So in the case at bar the unlawfully parked car failed to exhibit to plaintiff as he approached from the south the visible warning and indication of its location which the law then in effect required.
Defendant presents no legal excuse for the violation of these statutes. In the absence thereof she was guilty of negligence. Under the circumstances of this case it cannot be said as a matter of law that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the collision. That question was for the jury. Schwind v. Gibson, 220 Iowa 377, 260 N.W. 853.
In the foregoing discussion we have considered the failure to park the right side of the car next to the curb only as a factor in connection with the failure to obey the tail light statute. We do not hold that such reversed parking, under the factual situation here shown, would, in and of itself alone constitute a proximate cause of the collision. Nor do we intimate whether or not under other situations, such parking could independently constitute such proximate cause. Perhaps it should be said that the Motor Vehicle Code has since been repealed and statutes...
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