Trans Shuttle v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COM'N, 03SA156.
| Decision Date | 03 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03SA156.,03SA156. |
| Citation | 89 P.3d 398 |
| Parties | TRANS SHUTTLE, INC.; Mo's Express, LLC, d/b/a Mo's Express; and Jejaw Gosha, individually and d/b/a Hallelujah Shuttle, Plaintiffs/Applicants-Appellants, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF the STATE of Colorado, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Hochstadt, Straw, Strauss & Silverman, P.C., Richard Strauss, Denver, Colorado, M. Andrew Andrade, Law Offices of M. Andrew Andrade, Greenwood Village, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Applicants-Appellants.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, David A. Beckett, Assistant Attorney General, Larry A. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Business and Licensing Section, Department of Law, Revenue/PUC Unit, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.
Petitioner-Appellants Trans Shuttle, Inc., and Mo's Express, LLC (collectively "appellants"),1 seek review of the district court's decision which upheld penalties assessed against appellants by the Public Utilities Commission ("PUC").2 The PUC determined that appellants had engaged in transporting persons in intrastate commerce without the prior issuance by the PUC of a certificate of public convenience and necessity ("CPCN"), as required by section 40-10-104(1), 11 C.R.S. (2003).
Appellants each hold a certificate issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration or its predecessor (collectively "FMCSA"). These certificates authorize appellants to provide passenger service over interstate routes. They also authorize intrastate passenger service under limited circumstances:
CONDITION: The carrier is authorized to provide intrastate passenger transportation service under this certificate only if the carrier also provides substantial regularly scheduled interstate passenger transportation service on the same route.
This language closely tracks the statutory language under which the certificate was granted. See 49 U.S.C. § 13902(b)(3) (2003).3
Appellants claim that because they hold these certificates, the PUC is without jurisdiction to assess penalties against them and that the PUC did not regularly pursue its authority in assessing the penalties. They also claim that the PUC engaged in improper rulemaking, that the district court imposed an improper standard of review, and that the PUC deprived appellants of their property without due process of law.4 Appellants presented no evidence at their respective penalty assessment hearings to dispute the allegations of the PUC. Instead, they relied solely on their FMCSA certificates, claiming that they were in compliance with these certificates.
We affirm. We hold that the PUC has jurisdiction to regulate providers of intrastate transportation services and that the PUC properly pursued its authority in this matter. The PUC is clearly empowered to assess fines against parties providing intrastate passenger service without a CPCN. The evidence in the record amply demonstrates that appellants were engaged in providing for-hire transportation services that were entirely intrastate in nature. Because appellants provided no evidence to the contrary, the district court correctly affirmed the PUC's penalty assessment.
We also hold that the PUC proceedings were adjudicatory in nature and not rulemaking, and appellants were not denied their property rights without due process of law. Because we have determined that the PUC had jurisdiction to assess penalties against appellants, we do not need to address appellants' claim that the district court applied an incorrect standard of review.5
On February 5, 2001, a PUC investigator spotted a Trans Shuttle vehicle6 on level 5 of Denver International Airport ("DIA").7 The investigator approached the vehicle and requested transportation to the Adam's Mark Hotel in Denver. The driver then transported the investigator to the Adam's Mark, whereupon the investigator paid a $17 fare and received a receipt. On March 17, 2001, the same investigator observed another Trans Shuttle vehicle on Level 5 of DIA. The investigator heard the driver announce that he was providing service to "Denver hotels downtown, door-to-door, and southeast." The investigator boarded the vehicle and was transported to the Adam's Mark. Again, the investigator paid a fare of $17 and received a receipt.
On April 4, 2001, the investigator observed two passengers disembark from a Trans Shuttle vehicle at the Adam's Mark. The passengers told the investigator that they had paid $17 each for transport from DIA to the Adam's Mark, and produced receipts indicating payment. The investigator did not ask the passengers how they had arrived at DIA.
The PUC issued a civil penalty assessment notice ("CPAN") against Trans Shuttle for providing intrastate passenger service without a CPCN,8 in violation of section 40-10-104(1). Prior to the hearing on this CPAN, Trans Shuttle filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings, arguing that the PUC lacked jurisdiction over it because it was operating in interstate, not intrastate, travel pursuant to the authority granted to it by an FMCSA certificate. Trans Shuttle claimed that the FMCSA had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Trans Shuttle was operating in violation of the FMCSA certificate.
The administrative law judge ("ALJ") assigned to the case denied the motion, finding that the PUC, as a threshold matter, did possess jurisdiction to determine whether a particular transportation service provided was interstate or intrastate in nature. The ALJ found that the mere fact that Trans Shuttle possessed a FMCSA certificate did not deprive the PUC of the power to enforce the provisions of Title 40. To hold otherwise, the ALJ declared, would render the relevant provisions of Title 40 meaningless for all transportation service providers who happened to hold an FMCSA certificate, because the PUC would have no jurisdiction to ever determine if that provider was engaging in purely intrastate commerce. The ALJ determined that Trans Shuttle's argument presented an affirmative defense, and that Trans Shuttle therefore bore the burden of proof to show that it was acting in compliance with its FMCSA certificate.
Trans Shuttle appeared at its civil penalty hearing and was represented by counsel. However, even though its motion to dismiss had already been denied, Trans Shuttle presented no evidence to refute the PUC's allegations. Thus, the only evidence before the ALJ was the evidence presented by the PUC. The ALJ ruled that Trans Shuttle had violated section 40-10-104(1) on three occasions and civil penalties should be assessed. Trans Shuttle did not file exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and it therefore became the final PUC decision.
On February 5, 2001, a PUC investigator received a ride from a Mo's Express vehicle. The investigator was transported from DIA to the Westin Hotel in Denver. During the trip, the driver stated that he did not leave the Denver metropolitan area except for occasional trips west into the mountains. The driver further stated that he did not operate on a schedule. The investigator paid a fare of $17 and received a receipt which indicated "door-to-door" service.
Based on this information, the PUC issued a CPAN against Mo's Express for providing intrastate passenger service without a CPCN,9 in violation of section 40-10-104(1). Mo's Express did not appear at its penalty assessment hearing, although its FMCSA certificate authorizing a variety of scheduled interstate and intrastate transportation was apparently entered into evidence. The ALJ found that the scant evidence in the record indicated that Mo's Express did not use any of the authority granted to it under its FMCSA certificate, as the services provided in this case were entirely intrastate and not offered as part of any scheduled operations. The ALJ therefore ruled that Mo's Express had violated section 40-10-104(1) and a civil penalty should be assessed. Mo's Express filed an exception to the ALJ's recommended decision, but this exception was denied by the PUC. Thus, the ALJ's ruling became the final PUC decision.
The district court, considering both cases together, affirmed the PUC's assessment of civil penalties against Trans Shuttle and Mo's Express. After observing the standard of review mandated by section 40-6-115(3), the court found that the PUC regularly pursued its authority to regulate intrastate transportation of passengers, pursuant to section 40-10-104(1). The court therefore held that "it was not beyond the scope of the PUC's authority to issue a penalty against the Plaintiffs." The court noted that the ALJ's conclusions were adequately supported by evidence in the record. The court also noted that neither Trans Shuttle nor Mo's Express provided any evidence which might refute the PUC investigators' allegations, nor did they provide any evidence to establish that they were in compliance with their FMCSA certificates. The court declared that Trans Shuttle and Mo's Express bore the burden of proof on the issue, and that in presenting no evidence they had failed to meet this burden.
In a related matter, Trans Shuttle filed suit against the PUC in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief from the PUC's assessment of civil penalties against them.10 The district court ruled that the case should be dismissed because Trans Shuttle (and the other plaintiffs, none of whom is a current party to this proceeding) had an adequate remedy at law in the state courts. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, No. 00-K-1458, slip op. at 3 (D.Colo. Dec. 12, 2000). The court stated:
[Plaintiffs] have already been afforded the opportunity to present evidence to support their position that they were lawfully providing intrastate transportation services in the state of Colorado pursuant to federal authority and that such federal...
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