Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1955
• Docket Number: CURTISS-WRIGHT
• Citation: 1 Misc.2d 477,148 N.Y.S.2d 284
• Parties: TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, Inc., Plaintiff, v.CORPORATION, Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and United Aircraft Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 284

148 N.Y.S.2d 284

1 Misc.2d 477

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, Inc., Plaintiff, v. CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION, Wright Aeronautical Corporation Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and United Aircraft Corporation, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part III.

Nov. 29, 1955.

Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, for defendant Curtiss-Wright (Bruce Bromley, Donald Cronson, J. G. Williams, New York City, of counsel).

Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside, Wolff & Brophy, New York City, for plaintiff (Ralph D. Ray, Allen S. Kuller, Paul M. Bernstein, New York City, of counsel).

EDER, Justice.

Defendants Wright Aeronautical Corporation and its successor, Curtiss-Wright Corporation (herein called Curtiss-Wright) move on the complaint, their answer and plaintiff's bill of particulars for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the third cause of action on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

In the first two causes of action--not here involved--plaintiff Trans World Airlines, Inc. (herein called T W A) seeks damages of $3,000,000 as the result of a crash of one of its airplanes near Cairo, Egypt, in August 1950. These two causes are against Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (manufacturer and seller of the airplane), United Aircraft Corporation (manufacturer of the propellers on said plane), and Curtiss-Wright (manufacturer of the engines on said plane).

The third cause of action, now under attack, alleges against Curtiss-Wright alone damages in T W A's use of other engines (wholly unrelated to the Egyptian crash) manufactured by Wright Aeronautical Corporation and contained in airplanes purchased by T W A from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Damages of $650,000 from September 1949 to date of complaint, September 1952, resulting from Wright Aeronautical's negligence are claimed, in that, due to latent defects in said engines, the engines 'failed to operate while in regular service' and 'made the aeroplanes on which they were installed imminently dangerous to life and property.' T W A's bill of particulars lists 55 such engines. In answer to the request for a statement of 'the items comprising the alleged damage of $650,000' and a statement with respect to each engine of 'the items of damage therein claimed', the bill referred to no damage except to the engines themselves, claiming only the 'cost to plaintiff of making the necessary repairs to the engines to eliminate the latent defects caused by the negligence of defendant Wright Aeronautical Corporation and correcting the damage to the engines resulting from these latent defects.'

T W A could, of course, have claimed such damages from Lockheed for breach of the warranty arising from the purchase of the airplanes, and Lockheed in turn could have claimed over against Curtiss-Wright for breach of the warranty arising from its purchase of the engines. It did not choose to do so, and we may not concern ourselves with the reason therefor. The question here is: May it sue directly the manufacturer, with whom it has no privity of contract, for damage limited to the allegedly defective product itself? The answer requires an analysis of the authorities in the field of liability imposed on a manufacturer in a direct suit by the ultimate user, wherein MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 1916, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696, stands as a landmark.

It had always been the general rule that the only person liable for damages caused by defects in goods sold was the immediate seller by virtue of express or implied warranty to the immediate buyer. Any other rule, it was felt, would hamper the enterprising manufacturer whose ingenuity was the chief factor in causing the economy to expand. It would have made it 'difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties immediately concerned.' Curtain v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244, 245, 12 L.R.A. 322. This general rule is the doctrine of privity of contract.

The assault upon this 'citadel of privity', Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445, 74 A.L.R. 1139, began even before MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. Manufacturers of dangerous articles were held liable to subvendees having no privity of contract with them for defects therein causing personal injuries, Thomas v. Winchester, 1852, 6 N.Y. 397; Devlin v. Smith, 1882, 89 N.Y. 470; Torgesen v. Schultz, 1908, 192 N.Y. 156, 84 N.E. 956, 18 L.R.A.,N.S., 726; Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 1909, 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063. These cases were cited and reviewed by Judge Cardozo in MacPherson, holding an automobile manufacturer liable for personal injuries to one who had purchased from one of its dealers a car which collapsed while he was in it. The doctrine imposed direct liability for articles which were inherently dangerous when negligently made.

MacPherson referred to, but did not answer, the question of the liability of the manufacturer of a component part of the article. That remained for Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 1932, 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576, wherein a 'broad rule of liability' was applied to any negligent manufacturer, whether of a component part or of the assembled article, shown to be responsible for the injury sustained.

The Court of Appeals did not, however, pass upon the question of whether property damaged by the defective article, as distinguished from personal injuries, could be recovered in a direct suit against the manufacturer until 1934, Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551. The court said, 'To hold that an owner of a building injured by an explosion and fire caused by the use of the material could recover for his personal injury but could not recover for the damage to his clothing or the destruction of his building would be anomalous'. 263 N.Y. at page 469, 189 N.E. at page 553.

The specific question here involved--whether the manufacturer may be sued in negligence where the damage to the ultimate user is limited to the article itself and affects no other property--was presented in A. J. P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 1939, 171 Misc. 157, 11 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664, affirmed without opinion 258 App.Div. 747, 15 N.Y.S.2d 424; Id., 283 N.Y. 692, 28 N.E.2d 412. The affirmance without opinion does not necessarily imply approval of the entire opinion below and the parties here disagree as to its meaning and limits. In that case plaintiffs had purchased through a supplier building laths manufactured by defendants. After installation they discovered that the laths failed to retain plaster when applied, thus making it likely that plaster might thereafter fall and cause injury. Plaintiffs sued in negligence for the cost of removing the defective laths and installing new laths. The court dismissed the complaint as against the manufacturers, saying: 'The duty of the...