Transcare Md., Inc. v. Murray

• Decision Date: 22 April 2013
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2012.,No. 24,24
• Citation: 431 Md. 225,64 A.3d 887
• Parties: TRANSCARE MARYLAND, INC., et al. v. Bryson MURRAY, et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

431 Md. 225

64 A.3d 887

TRANSCARE MARYLAND, INC., et al.

v.Bryson MURRAY, et al.

No. 24, Sept. Term, 2012.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 22, 2013.

Robert W. Goodson, (Kathleen H. Warin and Christine M. Costantino of Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Washington, D.C.), on brief, for Petitioners.

Jesse E. Cox and Jason A.L. Timoll, (Stephen L. Snyder and Michael B. Snyder of Snyder & Snyder, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA, McDONALD and ALAN M. WILNER (retired, specially assigned) JJ.

McDONALD, J.

In the parable of the Good Samaritan, a man on the way from Jerusalem to Jericho is robbed, beaten, and left for dead. Two passers-by of significant social and religious status see the injured man, but choose to cross to the other side of the road. A third traveler of less repute, a Samaritan, comes to the man's aid, takes him to an inn, tends to him through the night, and then pays the innkeeper the next morning to continue the man's care.

We do not know from the parable whether the fear of civil liability discouraged the first two passers-by from intervening. In modern-day Maryland, a State law known as the Good Samaritan Act seeks to remove that disincentive, particularly for individuals who have the knowledge and skills to provide useful medical assistance at an emergency, by granting those individuals immunity from liability should something go awry. In some instances that immunity extends to an entity when its personnel provide emergency aid.

Another source of immunity—sovereign immunity—derives from the ancient tenet that “the King can do no wrong.” ¹ Public agencies and employees, including first responders, have long enjoyed a broad qualified immunity from liability as an aspect of sovereign or governmental immunity. A State statute, popularly known as the Fire and Rescue Act, extends similarly broad immunity to fire companies, rescue companies,and their personnel for “any act or omission in the course of performing their duties.”

These two statutes—the one potentially applicable to a broad class of actors but focused on emergency situations, the other applicable to a narrower class but broader in the scope of the immunity it confers—provide overlapping protection to some extent. This case concerns whether one, or both, of these statutes necessarily relieves a commercial ambulance company of liability for the allegedly negligent actions of one of its employees in providing assistance to a patient when an emergency arose while the employee was in training. We hold that they do not.

Background

The Transport of Bryson Murray

On November 15, 2007, Respondent Bryson Murray,² a minor who was suffering from congestion and was having trouble breathing, was taken to Easton Memorial Hospital (“Easton Memorial”) in Talbot County.³ At the hospital he was fitted with an endotracheal breathing tube. Because Easton Memorial was not equipped to handle intubated children, hospital officials sought to transfer him to the pediatric intensive care unit at the Medical Center of the University of Maryland Medical System (“UMMS”) in Baltimore.

UMMS arranged for PHI Air Medical to carry out the transport by helicopter. Present on the helicopter was a flight paramedic team that included a UMMS pediatric intensive-care nurse, a PHI flight paramedic, and a PHI flight nurse. Also present was Chris Barbour,⁴ a paramedic employed by Petitioner TransCare ⁵ who had been invited to ride along by the UMMS nurse (with PHI's permission) for orientation purposes. TransCare, a licensed commercial ground ambulance transport company, was under contract with UMMS to provide ground ambulance services for patients between the Medical Center and area hospitals.⁶ Mr. Barbour was a licensed emergency medical technician-paramedic.

After the helicopter arrived at Easton Memorial, Mr. Barbour set up equipment and the team placed Bryson on the aircraft. Shortly after take-off, however, Bryson's heart rate and oxygen blood level began to drop, because, according to the allegations in the complaint, the endotracheal tube had become dislodged and was blocking his airway. Members of the flight team searched for a pediatric air mask to restore Bryson's breathing, but were unable to locate it. The helicopter then landed at Bay Bridge Airport in Stevensville, where the flight paramedic retrieved the mask from its storage compartment and Bryson was reintubated. Bryson's cardiac activity returned to normaland the helicopter completed its trip to the Medical Center.

The Murrays' Negligence ActionComplaint

Bryson, by his mother, Karen Murray, subsequently filed a complaint against TransCare alleging medical malpractice on the basis that its employee, Mr. Barbour, had failed to provide the requisite standard of care and that TransCare was vicariously responsible under the principle of respondeat superior.⁷ According to the complaint, Bryson suffered hypoxic brain injury due to alleged acts and omissions of Mr. Barbour during the helicopter transport and, as a result, is blind, deaf, and mentally disabled. The complaint did not name Mr. Barbour individually as a defendant.⁸

Summary Judgment Motion

TransCare moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under both the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Act. The Circuit Court for Talbot County ⁹ was initially persuaded that there were disputes of material fact as to TransCare's corporate relationship with the other medical providers involved and as to whether it had received a “ fee or compensation” that would preclude application of the Good Samaritan Act. The Circuit Court also tentatively concluded that the Fire and Rescue Act did not apply to a commercial ambulance company such as TransCare. Accordingly, the Circuit Court initially denied TransCare's motion for summary judgment based on those immunity provisions.

TransCare thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, submitting two affidavits that established the company's independent corporate status and described its billing practices. Following a hearing on that motion, the Circuit Court concluded that there were no remaining disputes of material fact and that TransCare was immune under both the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Act. It therefore granted summary judgment in favor of TransCare.

Appeal

The Murrays appealed and the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that neither statute applied to a private, for-profit ambulance company. 203 Md.App. 172, 37 A.3d 987 (2012). TransCare petitioned this Court for certiorari. We granted the petition to determine whether either the Good Samaritan Act or the Fire and Rescue Act relieves a commercial ambulance company of civil liability for the alleged negligence of an employee committed when an emergency arises during a transfer of a patient between medical facilities.¹⁰

Standard of Review

Whether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law; we review the Circuit Court's decision to determine whether it was legally correct. Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 1, 14, 852 A.2d 98 (2004). Like the Circuit Court, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to ascertain whether there is a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jurgensen v. New Phx. Atl. Condo. Council of Unit Owners, 380 Md. 106, 114, 843 A.2d 865 (2004).

Analysis

In order to assess TransCare's claims of immunity, we must construe two statutes—the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Act. This Court has frequently reiterated the principles that guide statutory interpretation, which we summarize as follows:

• give effect to legislative intent

• look first to the “ordinary, plain meaning” of the language

• do not add or delete language

• do not apply forced or subtle interpretations

• keep in mind the statutory context

• consider the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature

• avoid constructions inconsistent with common sense

• presume that each section is to work harmoniously with others

See, e.g., Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 536–37, 3 A.3d 448 (2010).

Whether TransCare Has Immunity under the Good Samaritan ActGood Samaritan Laws

Under the common law, there is no general duty to provide assistance to those in peril. See Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.1971) § 56 at 340–43 (“the law has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation, of common decency and common humanity, to come to the aid of another human being who is in danger ...”). Moreover, under general principles of tort law, one who voluntarily chooses to aid another owes that person a duty of care; a failure to exercise such care may result in legal liability. See Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 589–90, 831 A.2d 18 (2003); see also57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 104 (2012); Restatement 2d of Torts, §§ 323, 324. This risk of potential liability led to the unsatisfactory result that health care professionals capable and willing to provide emergency medical services had (in theory, at least) a disincentive to do so. See Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 423, 428 (1985).

Beginning in California in 1959,¹¹ legislatures in every state enacted laws designed to eliminate this disincentive and to encourage medical professionals (and, often, volunteers in general) to provide emergency assistance by granting them immunity from liability for ordinary negligence. Silver, supra, 26 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. at 427–28. The Maryland General Assembly first enacted such a statute in 1963. Chapter 65, Laws of Maryland 1963. From the outset, such laws have generally been labeled the “Good Samaritan Act” or “Good Samaritan Law,” both in Maryland and elsewhere. See Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 294 (2012); 64 Opinions of the Attorney General 169 (1...