Jurgensen v. New Phoenix

• Decision Date: 05 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 63,63
• Citation: 843 A.2d 865,380 Md. 106
• Parties: Harold C. JURGENSEN v. The NEW PHOENIX ATLANTIC CONDOMINIUM COUNCIL OF UNIT OWNERS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

843 A.2d 865

380 Md. 106

Harold C. JURGENSEN v. The NEW PHOENIX ATLANTIC CONDOMINIUM COUNCIL OF UNIT OWNERS.

No. 63, Sept. Term, 2003.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 5, 2004.

James W. Almand (Ayres, Jenkins, Gordy & Almand, P.A., of Ocean City), on brief, for petitioner.

Joseph E. Moore (Christopher T. Woodley of Williams, Moore, Shockley & Harrison, L.L.P., of Ocean City), on brief), for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE, (retired, specially assigned), JJ. CATHELL, Judge.

This case concerns a condominium unit owner's use of a designated parking space on the condominium property and whether he acquired exclusive use of that parking space based upon the legal theories of easement by prescription or estoppel.

On March 9, 2000, Harold C. Jurgensen, petitioner, filed a five-count "COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND RELATED RELIEF" against The New Phoenix Atlantic Condominium Council of Unit Owners, respondent, in the Circuit Court for Worcester County. On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a five-count "AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, TO QUIET TITLE AND RELATED RELIEF." In his complaint, petitioner was seeking a declaration that the owners of Unit 505 had the exclusive right to utilize parking space 32. Respondent filed an Answer, a Motion for Summary Judgment, and an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.

Following a hearing on January 19, 2001, the Circuit Court issued a one-page Order on February 7, 2001, granting summary judgment for Respondent. Petitioner then filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In the Court of Special Appeals, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand the Case, which was granted by the Court on December 26, 2001.

Upon remand, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, to which petitioner filed a response. After a hearing on March 22, 2002, the Circuit Court granted the motion as to Counts IV (Estoppel) and V (Breach of Fiduciary Duty).

The three remaining counts of petitioner's Amended Complaint¹ were addressed at a subsequent hearing on July 17, 2002. By Opinion and Order dated August 16, 2002, Judge Eschenburg of the Circuit Court granted summary judgment on the remaining counts in favor of respondent. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. On June 13, 2003, in an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court, and, on September 10, 2003, we granted the petition. Jurgensen v. New Phoenix, 377 Md. 111, 832 A.2d 204 (2003). Petitioner presents one question for our review:

"Can a condominium unit owner acquire exclusive use of a general common element based upon easement by prescription or estoppel?"

We hold that, under the facts of the case sub judice, petitioner did not acquire the exclusive use of a general common element of a condominium based upon the legal theory of an easement by prescription.

We also hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel, even if applicable, is not appropriate in this instance. Respondent cannot be said to have acted in such a manner as to give petitioner the impression that he had an exclusive interest in the parking space. Furthermore, petitioner had the ability to view the Condominium Declaration and other documents, which did not grant petitioner an exclusive interest in the parking space.

I. Facts

The New Phoenix Atlantic Condominium ("Condominium") is located in Ocean City, Maryland, and consists of 36 residential units. The Condominium was established by declaration, bylaws and plats recorded among the land records of Worcester County in March 1975. The New Phoenix Atlantic Condominium Council of Unit Owners, respondent, is the unincorporated association of all unit owners that was established by the bylaws to govern the Condominium.²

When the Condominium was established in 1975, the recorded Plats and Plans of the Condominium showed 31 parking spaces on Condominium property and each space was designated by the developers as a limited common element for the exclusive use of one specific unit at the time of the initial sale of each unit.³ The rights to use these 31 spaces were considered appurtenances to the units to which they were assigned.⁴ Unit 505 was one of five units originally without a dedicated parking space on Condominium property. Before the first transfer of Unit 505, however, the developers of the Condominium created two new parking spaces on Condominium property, identified as parking spaces number 32 and 33. A sign was thereafter posted on parking space number 32 designating it as parking for Unit 505. The Condominium Declaration was never amended to reflect the existence of parking spaces 32 and 33. From 1976 until 1999, 23 years in total, three successive groups of owners of Unit 505 apparently used parking space number 32.

Harold C. Jurgensen, petitioner, acquired title to Unit 505 of the Condominium by virtue of a recorded deed dated December 28, 1984. Thereafter, petitioner used parking space number 32. Petitioner enjoyed the use of this parking space for many years, but, beginning in the fall of 1999, respondent, by its board of directors,⁵ reconfigured a portion of the Condominium parking area, thereby reducing the size of space number 32.⁶ Despite petitioner's protests, respondent completed this reconfiguration in 2000. Petitioner sued respondent for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. He looked upon the Condominium's action with respect to parking space number 32 as an unwarranted invasion of a property right belonging exclusively to him as the owner of Unit 505. Six months after filing the last amendment to his complaint, however, petitioner, in June 2001, sold Unit 505. Petitioner claims that the Condominium's action in not continuing Unit 505's exclusive right to use the parking space and its actions in reconfiguring the parking area, and thereby decreasing the size of parking space number 32, unfairly created a situation in which he was unable to sell his Unit for the price it would have sold for had the parking space retained its original dimensions.⁷

II. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Beyer v. Morgan State Univ. 369 Md. 335, 359, 800 A.2d 707, 721 (2002); Schmerling v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, 443, 795 A.2d 715, 720 (2002); see also Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. 366 Md. 201, 210, 783 A.2d 194, 199 (2001). "The trial court will not determine any disputed facts, but rather makes a ruling as a matter of law. The standard of appellate review, therefore, is whether the trial court was legally correct." Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 114, 753 A.2d 41, 48 (2000) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 42-43, 656 A.2d 307, 311 (1995)); see also Eng'g Mgmt. Servs. v. Md. State Highway Admin., 375 Md. 211, 229, 825 A.2d 966 (2003) ("[w]hether summary judgment is properly granted as a matter of law is a question of law. The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment is whether it is `legally correct.'").⁸

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must make the threshold determination as to whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, and only where such dispute is absent will we proceed to review determinations of law. See Todd, 373 Md. at 154-55, 816 A.2d at 933; Beyer, 369 Md. at 359-60, 800 A.2d at 721; Schmerling, 368 Md. at 443, 795 A.2d at 720. In so doing, we construe the facts properly before the court, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933 (citing Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178, 757 A.2d 118, 127 (2000)).

III. Discussion

A. The Maryland Condominium Act

Although petitioner contends that he has acquired the exclusive use of parking space number 32 based upon easement by prescription or equitable estoppel, it is necessary for this Court to first examine the numerous statutes that embody the law relating to condominiums in Maryland. The Maryland Condominium Act, Maryland Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol.), §§ 11-101 et. seq. of the Real Property Article,⁹ regulates the formation, management, and termination of condominiums in Maryland. It is with the application of Maryland Condominium Act principles that we shall determine, first and foremost, whether parking space number 32 is to be classified as a general common element of the Condominium.¹⁰ Then, and only then, can we determine whether petitioner has any exclusive interest in the parking space.

Petitioner, as an owner of a unit in the Condominium, is deemed under the Maryland Condominium Act to own an undivided percentage interest in the common elements of the Condominium. See § 11-107(a). Therefore, in regard to the common elements, petitioner can be said to have a tenancy in common in the general common elements with all of the other Condominium unit owners. As this Court explained in Ridgely Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Smyrnioudis, 343 Md. 357, 681 A.2d 494 (1996):

"A condominium is a `communal form of estate in property consisting of individually owned units which are supported by collectively held facilities and areas.' Andrews v. City of Greenbelt, 293 Md. 69, 71, 441 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1982).

`The term condominium may be defined generally as a system for providing separate ownership of individual units in multiple-unit developments. In addition to the interest acquired in a particular apartment, each unit owner also is a tenant in common in the underlying fee and in the spaces and building parts used in common by all the unit owners.'

4B Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property ¶ 632.1[4] (1996). A condominium owner, therefore, holds a hybrid property interest consisting of an exclusive

...