Transit Co. v. P.U.C.
| Citation | 163 N.E. 713,119 Ohio St. 264 |
| Decision Date | 14 November 1928 |
| Docket Number | 21184,21098 |
| Parties | The Interstate Motor Transit Co. Et Al. v. Public Utilities Commission Of Ohio. Grubb, D.B.A. The Tri-State Transit Co., v. Public Utilities Commission Of Ohio. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Public Utilities Commission - Motor transportation companies - Commission not confined to application and applicant's testimony - Evidence of good faith and applicant's prior conduct under other certificates, competent - Interstate certificate sought to enable carrying of intrastate passengers - Commission may modify entry after orally granting certificate and filing memorandum.
1. The Public Utilities Commission, when considering an application for an interstate certificate of necessity and convenience is not confined entirely to the terms of the application filed and to the testimony of the applicant concerning his ability to furnish the transportation in question and his intention to comply with the provisions of law and the rules promulgated by the Commission. The Commission may receive any competent evidence offered bearing on the question of the good faith of the applicant, and in this respect may take into account facts known to the Commission as evidenced by its own records, with respect to prior conduct of the same applicant under different certificates issued to him for motor-bus transportation over the highways of the state; and when a consideration of all the evidence on that subject makes manifest the fact that the applicant is seeking a certificate with respect to any portion of his route for the purpose of enabling him, while actually operating under an interstate certificate, to carry intrastate passengers, the same as though he were operating under an intrastate certificate, the Commission may deny his application with respect to that portion of the route designated.
2. The fact that the Commission announces orally that an application will be granted as applied for, supplemented by the further fact that the Commission then enters upon the files of the case a memorandum in like effect, does not bar the Commission from a further investigation of the case or from modifying the entry made upon the files of the case when the Commission comes to issue its formal and final certificate to the applicant.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. D H. Armstrong and Messrs. Blair & Ball, for Interstate Motor Transit Company and Cannonball Transportation Company.
Mr. A R. Johnson, for Ohio Valley Electric Railway Company and Ohio Valley Bus Company.
Messrs. Miller & Searl, for Portsmouth Public Service Company.
Mr. John F. Carlisle, Mr. Frank M. Raymund, and Mr. Edwin D. Ricketts, for J. P. Grubb.
Mr. Edward C. Turner, attorney general, and Mr. A. M. Calland, for Public Utilities Commission.
These two proceedings in error were heard together in this court and will be disposed of in one opinion.
The plaintiff in error in case No. 21184, J. P. Grubb, doing business as the Tri-State Transit Company, filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission for a certificate to operate an interstate motorbus line between the city of Columbus, Ohio, and the city of Huntington, W. Va., and return. The route designated in the application passed through the border cities of Portsmouth and Ironton, Ohio, crossed the Ohio river at Ironton to Russell, Ky., and thence through the states of Kentucky and West Virginia to Huntington. The route also embraced a short side loop from Portsmouth, Ohio, to South Portsmouth, Ky., and return to the main route at Portsmouth. The principal contention here arises out of the action of the commission with respect to this side loop between Portsmouth and South Portsmouth.
The plaintiffs in error in case No. 21098 filed protests, stating many reasons why Grubb's application should be denied by the commission. They averred that no necessity existed for supplementing the service then being rendered over the route in question by other transportation companies then duly operating over that route, claiming that such existing service was not only ample, but more than ample, to meet every convenience and necessity of the traveling public; that Grubb's application was not made in good faith, but was a mere scheme and subterfuge to compel other operators to purchase their peace against ruinous competition and unfair operation by Grubb in the carrying of intrastate passen gers, while pretending to operate as a...
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