Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 October 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. A-4144,A-4144 |
| Citation | 261 S.W.2d 549,152 Tex. 551 |
| Parties | TRANSPORT CO. OF TEXAS et al. v. ROBERTSON TRANSPORTS, Inc. et al. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Kelley, Looney, McLean & Littleton, Rogers C. Kelley and Jackson Littleton, Edinburg, for petitioners.
John Ben Shepperd, Atty. Gen., and Dean Capps and V. F. Taylor, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Albert Walker, Austin, Bracewell & Tunks and Harry Patterson, Houston, for respondents.
A preliminary statement of the factual background of this case will serve to point up the questions before this court for determination.
On December 30, 1948, respondent, Robertson Transports, Inc., then holding a certificate as a specialized motor carrier, filed its application with the Railroad Commission of Texas for an amendment to the certificate which would authorize it to transport certain named chemicals as well as 'liquid chemicals in bulk'. On motion of other carriers, protesting the application, the examiner for the Commission struck the general phrase 'liquid chemicals in bulk' from the application, and the order of the Commission thereafter entered on April 9, 1949, amended the existing certificate so as to authorize the transportation of some twenty chemicals specially named. Suit to invalidate that order was filed by protesting carriers, many grounds of invalidity being asserted, and in due course this court by its judgment in the case of Thompson v. Railroad Commission, Tex.Sup., 240 S.W.2d 759, invalidated the order because of the failure of the Commission to make certain statutory fact findings. Thereafter, Robertson filed a new application for an amendment of its certificate to permit it to transport the named chemicals and the application was granted by order of the Commission on July 18, 1951. No appeal was taken from that order.
On June 18, 1952, Robertson filed with the Commission the application involved in this suit by which it sought an amendment of its certificate so as to be authorized to transport 'chemicals, liquid chemicals and chemical products in bulk in tank trucks to, from and between all points in Texas.' The application was opposed by petitioners, Transport Company of Texas, R. P. York, d/b/a/ York Transport Company, and York Transport Company, Inc., and by the Texas Railroad Association representing the rail lines of Texas. After a hearing the Commission ordered the amendment sought. A motion for a rehearing was overruled.
Fifty seven days after the motion for rehearing was overruled, this suit was filed by petitioners to invalidate and set aside the Commission's order, the petition seeking also a restraining order and a temporary injunction, pending a trial on the merits, to restrain and enjoin Robertson from operating under the order. A restraining order was granted and a hearing was set on the prayer for a temporary injunction. To the prayer for a temporary injunction respondent, Robertson, filed a plea in abatement by which it set up: (1) that petitioners had an adequate remedy at law by their right of advancement of the case for trial on the merits; (2) that a temporary injunction would accomplish the whole object of the suit; (3) that a temporary injunction would destroy rather than preserve the status quo, and (4) that petitioners were not entitled to the equitable relief sought because they had been guilty of laches in filing the suit. The plea in abatement was overruled and the trial court granted a temporary injunction as prayed for.
Respondent had many points of error before the Court of Civil Appeals but that court considered only the point that the trial court's order granting the temporary injunction did not set forth the reasons for its issuance as required by Rule 683, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. It sustained the point and reversed the judgment of the trial court and dissolved the injunction 256 S.W.2d 134.
Rule 683 provides in part: 'Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; * * *.'
The trial court's judgment found that by the Commission's order of July 18, 1951, Robertson had been authorized to transport certain named chemicals and continued:
'that the said order of August 19, 1952, extends the authority of the prior order to include an authorization to transport all liquid chemicals of any nature whatever both present and future; that if the defendant, Robertson Transports, Inc., proceeds to operate under said order of August 19, 1952, and such extension of authority, he would interfere with the markets established by the plaintiffs and would probable divert freight tonnage and revenue from the plaintiffs, that such interference with customers and markets and diversion of freight tonnage and revenues would result in irreparable and inestimable damage to the plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs in said hearing have made a proper showing of a probable right and probable injury of the matters in the temporary injunction prayed for. * * *.'
The Court then ordered 'that the clerk of this court issue a temporary writ of injunction pending a final hearing and determination of this cause restraining and enjoining the defendant, Robertson Transports, Inc., from operating or commencing to operate under the order of the Railroad Commission of Texas issued to the said defendant under date of August 19, 1952.'
There is but little authority on the precise question here involved. As authority for its holding that the order was fatally defective under the Rule, the Court of Civil Appeals cited the cases of Gonzalez v. Rodriguez, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W.2d 253, (no writ history), and O'Daniel v. Libal, Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W.2d 211, (no writ history). The opinion in the Gonzalez case undoubtedly stands for the proposition for which the Court of Civil Appeals cited it, that is, that the provisions of Rule 683 are mandatory, but the opinion in that case reflects, if it reflects anything in that regard, that the order there reversed contained no reasons for the granting of the writ. In the O'Daniel case a temporary injunction was sought to restrain the defendant from using a barn located in a residential area for the storing and selling of livestock. After hearing evidence, the trial judge orally advised the parties that he would grant the writ and gave his reasons therefor, but the judgment first entered simply ordered the clerk to 'issue a writ of injunction in all things as prayed for in plaintiff's petition.' The Court of Civil Appeals, after stating that 'the purpose of the Rule above referred to (683) is to inform a party just what he is enjoined from doing and the reasons why he is so enjoined' (196 S.W.2d 214), nevertheless expressed the opinion that the order was in sufficient compliance with the rule because the party 'knew what he was enjoined from doing and the reasons why.'
In addition to the foregoing cases, respondent cites Hodges v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 150 (no writ history) and Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corporation, 3 Cir., 182 F.2d 800, 801 as supporting the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals. In both of those cases the order under attack failed to set out any reasons for the granting of injunctive relief.
Rule 683 was adopted from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., where it is found as Rule 65(d). One United States District Court held sufficient an injunctive order which contained as a reason therefor only that 'irreparable damage may result.' In re Rumsey Mfg. Corp., D.C., 9 F.R.D. 93, 98; reversed on other grounds, McAvoy v. United States, 2 Cir., 178 F.2d 353. But we need not go so far in this case for the order here involved contains much more.
In a hearing on an application for a temporary injunction the only question before the court is the right of the applicant to a preservation of the status quo of the subject matter of the suit pending a final trial of the case on its merits. James v. Weinstein & Sons, Tex.Com.App., 12 S.W.2d 959, 960. To warrant the issuance of the writ, the...
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