Transport Workers of America, Local 223, AFL-CIO v. Transit Authority of City of Omaha

• Decision Date: 11 December 1979
• Docket Number: AFL-CI,A,No. 42512,42512
• Citation: 205 Neb. 26,286 N.W.2d 102
• Parties: , 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3081 TRANSPORT WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 223,ppellee, v. TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF OMAHA, doing business as Metro Area Transit, Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 102

286 N.W.2d 102

205 Neb. 26, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3081

TRANSPORT WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 223, AFL-CIO, Appellee, v. TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF OMAHA, doing business as Metro Area Transit, Appellant.

No. 42512.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Dec. 11, 1979.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Commission of Industrial Relations: Jurisdiction. Where the Commission of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction in the subject matter of the action, all proceedings in such action are void.

2. Commission of Industrial Relations: Administrative Law. The Commission of Industrial Relations is not a court and is in fact an administrative body performing a legislative function.

3. Administrative Law: Jurisdiction. An administrative agency cannot enlarge its own jurisdiction nor can jurisdiction be conferred upon the agency by parties before it. Accordingly, it is held that deviations

from an agency's statutorily established sphere of action cannot be upheld because based upon agreement, contract, or consent of the parties, nor can they be made effective by waiver or estoppel.

4. Commission of Industrial Relations: Labor and Labor Relations: Jurisdiction. A uniquely personal termination of employment does not constitute an industrial dispute over which the Commission of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction.

5. Commission of Industrial Relations: Public Policy: Statutes. The public policy of the Commission of Industrial Relations is expressed in section 48-802, R.R.S.1943, of the act and points out that the act is intended to provide public employees who do not otherwise have the right to strike an opportunity to mediate and arbitrate matters of employment which have not yet been agreed to by the employer.

6. Commission of Industrial Relations: Labor and Labor Relations: Breach of Contract: Jurisdiction. The Commission of Industrial Relations' authority to resolve disputes concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment is limited to situations in which the parties have not yet reached agreement. Once an agreement is reached and a subsequent breach is alleged to have occurred, the parties are required to litigate their dispute in a competent court having jurisdiction of the matter.

7. Administrative Law: Powers: Constitutional Law: Legislature. As a general rule administrative agencies have no general judicial powers, notwithstanding they may perform some quasi-judicial duties. Moreover, unless permitted by the Constitution, the Legislature may not authorize administrative officers or bodies to exercise powers which are essentially judicial in their nature, or to interfere with the exercise of such powers by the courts.

Soren S. Jensen of Swarr, May, Smith & Andersen, Omaha, for appellant.

John P. Grant of Robert E. O'Connor & Associates, Omaha, for appellee.

Heard before KRIVOSHA, C. J., and BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, CLINTON, BRODKEY, WHITE and HASTINGS, JJ.

KRIVOSHA, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the Transit Authority of the City of Omaha, doing business as Metro Area Transit (MAT), from an opinion and order of the court of Industrial Relations, now the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), resolving an alleged industrial dispute between MAT and the Transport Workers of America, Local 223, AFL-CIO (Union), pursuant to section 48-801 et seq., R.R.S.1943 (the Act). The plaintiff Union represents employees of MAT in the Omaha metropolitan area. Collective bargaining agreements between the parties were in effect during the period from 1973 to1977, and the alleged industrial dispute involved in this appeal grows out of those agreements. For reasons more particularly detailed hereinafter, we find that the CIR was without jurisdiction in this matter. We therefore reverse the order of the CIR and remand the cause to the CIR with directions to dismiss the petition.

Union instituted these proceedings before the CIR by filing a petition which in summary alleged that Union and MAT had executed a collective bargaining agreement which was in full force and effect; that by Article XIII of said agreement MAT agreed to provide a short-term disability benefit for all participating employees; and that MAT now refused to pay the short-term disability benefit for all participating employees. Union therefore prayed that the CIR conduct a hearing and declare the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties under their agreement and, upon completing such declaration, order MAT to render an accounting of all amounts due and owing to participating employees under the agreement.

The parties stipulated in writing: "Insofar as the Court is required to resolve the industrial dispute between the parties, the only issue which is to be submitted to the Court for decision is whether employees who are receiving workmen's compensation benefits are also entitled to receive short term disability benefits As provided in the relevant collective bargaining agreements." (Emphasis supplied.)

On September 6, 1978, the CIR entered an opinion and order in which it found that the provisions of the contract were clear and unambiguous and did not require interpretation in that the contract required payment for short-term disability for either work-related or nonwork-related accidents from the first day. In essence, the CIR declared the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties under the agreements, finding that MAT had breached its contract with Union. It then ordered that an accountingbe had between the parties as to the claims payable under the determination made by the CIR. The order specifically provided that it was "in the nature of instructions to the parties" and "shall not be considered a final order of the court."

Thereafter, on November 13, 1978, the CIR vacated its order of September 6, 1978, and entered a new opinion and order which was identical in all respects to the previous order except it did not contain the final paragraph which made the opinion and order instructive and not a final order. Simply stated, the dispute involved in this case was a question of whether MAT had breached its contract with Union and, if so, what damages were due and owing to the alleged injured parties by reason of the breach.

MAT maintains the order of the CIR was erroneous in several respects. However, the first issue which must be decided before proceeding to consider the various assignments of error raised by MAT, and a matter of first impression, is whether the CIR had jurisdiction to declare the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties under an existing agreement and to order an accounting in connection therewith. If, in fact, the CIR is without jurisdiction to declare the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties under an existing agreement and thereafter grant equitable relief in the form of an accounting, we need not consider any assignment of error claimed by MAT.

We have earlier held that where the CIR has no jurisdiction in the subject matter of the action, all proceedings in such action are void. Nebraska Dept. of Roads Employees Assn. v. Department of Roads, 189 Neb. 754, 205 N.W.2d 110. The fact that the parties may have agreed that the CIR could take jurisdiction does not change the result.

We have heretofore said the CIR is not a court and is in fact an administrative body performing a legislative function. American Assn. of University Professors v. Board of Regents, 198 Neb. 243, 253 N.W.2d 1.

An administrative board has no power or authority other than that specifically conferred by statute or by a construction necessary to accomplish the plain purpose of the act. City of Auburn v. Eastern Nebraska Public Power Dist., 179 Neb. 439, 138 N.W.2d 629; Slosburg v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 839, 165 N.W.2d 90; City of Schuyler v. Cornhusker P. P. Dist., 181 Neb. 704, 150 N.W.2d 588.

An administrative agency cannot enlarge its own jurisdiction nor can jurisdiction be conferred upon the agency by parties before it. Accordingly, it is held that deviations from an agency's statutorily established sphere of action cannot be upheld because based upon agreement, contract, or consent of the parties, nor can they be made effective by waiver or estoppel." 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 331; Bair v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 256 Iowa 660, 129 N.W.2d 85.

The authority of the Commission of Industrial Relations is carefully circumscribed. Its procedures are prescribed by statute. Its jurisdiction is clearly defined and is limited to what are clearly legislative concerns. University Police Officers Union v. University of Nebraska, 203 Neb. 4, 277 N.W.2d 529.

If the CIR has authority to hear cases involving an alleged breach of contract, declare rights, duties, and obligations of parties and grant equitable relief such as an accounting, that authority must be found in the Constitution and statutes creating and authorizing the CIR. We are unable to find such authority.

While it is true that section 48-801(7), R.R.S.1943, defines an "industrial dispute" to include "any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment," a reading of the entire Act, as well as our earlier decisions, discloses that not every controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment is indeed an industrial dispute under the Act giving jurisdiction to the CIR. A uniquely personal termination of employment may in fact involve a controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment, yet we have heretofore held that such...