Transport Workers Union v. New York City Transit
| Decision Date | 12 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02 Civ. 7659(SAS).,02 Civ. 7659(SAS). |
| Citation | 342 F.Supp.2d 160 |
| Parties | TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO; Roger Toussaint, as President of Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100, AFL-CIO; Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO; Sonny Hall, as President of Transport Workers Union of America; AFL-CIO; Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 726, AFL-CIO; and Angelo Tanzi, as President of Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 726, AFL-CIO, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Walter M. Meginniss, Jr., Margaret A. Malloy, Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss, LLP, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs Local 100, Roger Toussaint, Local 726, and Angelo Tanzi.
David B. Rosen, Transport Workers Union of America, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs TWU and Sonny Hall.
Richard Schoolman, Michele Sheridan, New York City Transit Authority, Brooklyn, New York, for Defendants.
This case presents two important questions concerning the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1 First, whether a labor union has standing to assert claims of employment discrimination on behalf of, or regarding, its members under either Title I or Title II of the ADA. And second, whether a claim of employment discrimination may be maintained under Title II, as opposed to Title I, of the ADA. Because I answer both questions in the affirmative, the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety.
The allegations of the complaint are remarkably straightforward and can be summarized, for the purposes of this motion, as follows. Plaintiffs are three labor unions (and their respective presidents): Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100; Local 100's parent union, the Transport Workers Union of America; and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 726 (collectively, the "Unions").2 Defendants New York City Transit Authority and Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (collectively, the "Authority") operate mass transit within New York City. The Unions collectively represent the majority of the Authority's hourly employees who work in the subways and bus depots in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn.3
In this action, the Unions are challenging a sick leave policy codified in the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the Authority and the Unions.4 5 Under the terms of the challenged policy — the details of which are not relevant here — Authority employees who seek sick leave must produce documentation containing a diagnosis and treatment plan, and may have to submit to medical examinations.6 The Unions complain that this policy discriminates against their members, in violation of the ADA.
Although the sick leave policy does not "discriminate" in the ordinary sense of treating some people less favorably than others,7 Title I of the ADA defines discrimination as including "medical examinations and inquiries."8 In particular,
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.9
Unless the Authority can demonstrate a "business necessity" — an issue not presented by this motion — it is easy to see that the challenged sick leave policy may run afoul of the ADA.10
The Unions assert two causes of action, both on their own behalf and on behalf of their members, alleging unlawful discrimination in violation of the ADA. The first claim is premised on Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by any "public entity" on account of a person's disability.11 The Unions' second claim is based on Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employment discrimination by any "covered entity."12 The Authority concedes, as it must, that it is both a "public entity" within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, as well as a "covered entity" within the meaning of Title I.13 The Authority moves to dismiss this case in its entirety, arguing that the Unions lack standing to assert these claims, and that, in any case, Title II of the ADA does not give rise to claims for employment discrimination.14
"Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, `[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.' "15 Thus, a plaintiff need only plead "`a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."16 Simply put, "Rule 8 pleading is extremely permissive."17
At the motion to dismiss stage, the issue " "18
The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "`merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'"19 When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor.20
The Unions assert claims of discrimination under Titles I and II of the ADA. Title I explicitly addresses employment discrimination, prohibiting discrimination based on a person's disability with respect to "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."21 Peculiar to Article I's definition of discrimination is that it "include[s] medical examinations and inquiries."22 Article II, on the other hand, provides in relevant part:
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.23
Unlike Title I (and Title III), Title II contains no specific definition of the term "discrimination" at all, much less the particular provision regarding medical examinations and inquiries.
The Authority thus asserts two independent bases for dismissing the Unions' claims. First, it argues that because the Unions themselves have not been discriminated against by virtue of the Authority's sick leave policy, they have no standing to sue under the ADA. Second, even if the Unions do have standing, their claim under Title II must be dismissed because that title does not permit claims of employment discrimination. As standing may be jurisdictional, I address that argument first.24
Standing can be constitutional or prudential. Constitutional standing arises from the requirement of Article III, whereas prudential standing involves "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction...."25 Included in this latter category is "the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked."26 Also included within the broad rubric of prudential standing is statutory standing, the requirements laid out by act of Congress for who may bring suit.27 In this case, the Authority challenges the Unions' standing to sue both under Article III and under the ADA.
The Authority makes a lengthy argument as to why it believes the Unions are not proper plaintiffs under the ADA. In fact, the Authority reads a standing requirement into the text of the ADA that does not exist.
With respect to Article II of the ADA, the Authority contends that only a "qualified individual with a disability"28 — which obviously excludes the Unions — has standing. This is a misreading of the statute. It is true that Title II prohibits discrimination against such qualified individuals; Title II provides a cause of action, however, for "any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability."29 Title II therefore imposes no standing requirement whatsoever. If there was any doubt about this fact, it was definitively dispelled by the Second Circuit, which held that "the use of such broad language in the enforcement provisions of the statute[] evinces a congressional intention to define standing to bring a private action under ... Title II as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution."30
Title I similarly imposes no statutory standing requirement. Indeed, Title I contains the same enforcement language as does Title II, specifying that the "powers, remedies, and procedures" provided to "any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability" are supplied by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 And even if one looks to the language of Title VII, as the Authority urges, that statute provides a remedy for any "person aggrieved,"32 language just as sweeping, if not broader, than that used in the ADA itself. Indeed, such language has consistently been...
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