Trant v. Murray

• Docket Number: Case No. 20-cv-1457 (APM)
• Decision Date: 05 March 2022
• Citation: 589 F.Supp.3d 50
• Parties: Jennifer TRANT, Plaintiff, v. James MURRAY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

589 F.Supp.3d 50

Jennifer TRANT, Plaintiff,

v.James MURRAY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-1457 (APM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 5, 2022

Christopher Charles Hair, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Amit P. Mehta, United States District Court Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Since 2015, Plaintiff Jennifer Trant has served as an Officer for the United States Secret Service. She brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting two claims. First, Trant alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment caused by months of sexually suggestive comments and unconsented-to touching by a male colleague. Additionally, Trant claims that, when she reported this harassment, her employer retaliated against her by discouraging her from participating in the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") process, relocating her desk within the office she shared with her harasser, and transferring her laterally to another office location.

Defendants—the heads of the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security, in their official capacities—have moved for summary judgment on both claims. Having reviewed the record evidence, the court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude (1) that Plaintiff faced a hostile work environment and (2) that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by discouraging her from reporting the colleague's harassment and by transferring her to a different location. On the other hand, the court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by moving her desk. The court therefore grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14 [hereinafter Defs.’ Mot.].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court should grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of" the record that "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has made an adequate showing that a fact cannot be disputed, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party may oppose the motion using "any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves." Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, "[t]o defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must offer more than mere unsupported allegations or denials." Dormu v. District of Columbia , 795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). In other words, if the nonmovant's "evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). Summary judgment, then, is appropriate when the nonmoving party fails to offer "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. DISCUSSION

The court begins with Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim before turning to her theories of retaliation.

A. Hostile Work Environment Claim

1. Acts Comprising Plaintiff's Claim

To make out a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show that she was subjected "to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment." Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether the evidence meets that standard, "the court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. ; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) ("[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances."). "[I]n order to be actionable under the statute, a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) ; see also Baird v. Gotbaum , 792 F.3d 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("[T]he standard for severity and pervasiveness is ... an objective one." (citing Harris , 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 )).

A reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts are as follows. From March 2017 through October 5, 2017, while temporarily detailed to the White House Branch Time and Attendance subunit of the Time and Attendance Office, Plaintiff shared a small office with Officer Dung "Jackie" Duong, among others. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp'n to Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 16 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp'n], Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. of Material Facts to Which There Is No Genuine Dispute, ECF No. 16-2 [hereinafter Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Undisputed Facts], ¶¶ 21–23. The office space was shared by at least eight people who occupied it on a rotating basis. Id. ¶ 24. Officer Duong was on a rotating schedule, which meant that he and Plaintiff shared the office space one or two days per week. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. Over the course of approximately seven months, Duong harassed Plaintiff in the following ways¹ : referring to Plaintiff as his girlfriend in videochats with his children, id. ¶ 208(a)–(b); swiveling his chair around so that his legs almost touched Plaintiff's, id. ¶ 208(d); staring into her eyes and calling her "beautiful" or "hot," id. ¶ 208(e), (g); sliding "his open palm down the side of her whole fac[e] while calling her beautiful," id. ¶ 208(k); asking her out to dinner or on vacations, id. ¶ 208(h)–(i); commenting on her breast size, id. ¶ 208(o); showing her "pictures of women's vaginas during childbirth," id. ¶ 208(n); and commenting on her "pee-pee," id. ¶ 208(p). Plaintiff consistently told Duong "that she did not approve of his behavior," and that it was "creepy, unacceptable, and it made her feel uncomfortable." Id. ¶ 208(c), (f), (h). Even though Plaintiff and Duong only overlapped in the office once or twice each week, Plaintiff stated that during those periods Duong's harassment "was happening on a continuous basis." Id. ¶ 55.

Duong's behavior "unreasonably interfere[d] with [Plaintiff's] work performance." Durant v. District of Columbia , 875 F.3d 685, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff had previously suffered from migraines, but they increased in both frequency and severity. Pl.’s Opp'n, Dep. of Jennifer L. Trant, ECF No. 16-5 [hereinafter Trant Dep.] at 98–99. She visited a neurologist for the first time, went to the emergency room, and was prescribed anti-seizure medication. Id. at 98–101. And the migraines caused her to miss work. Id. at 99. She also experienced severe nausea, anxiety, stomach pain, and insomnia. Id. at 96, 97, 99. She had nightmares Duong sexually assaulted her. Id. at 108. The pervasiveness of Duong's harassing behavior, the escalating nature of his conduct, and the substantial impact it had on Plaintiff, taken together, are sufficient to make a showing of a hostile work environment. See Johnson v. Shinseki , 811 F. Supp. 2d 336, 346 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment where the harasser's behavior became "more aggressive over time," including "attempts to kiss [the plaintiff], uninvited visits to her office, solicitations for sex, grabbing and pinching of her breast, and grabbing and spanking of her behind," and impacted the plaintiff's mental health and caused her to leave to the workforce); id. (citing cases).

Defendants cite a number of cases from this District to avoid this conclusion, but the court finds them distinguishable. Defendants rely on this court's prior decision in Tucker v. Johnson to argue that "numerous alleged incidents between [a plaintiff] and a male colleague failed to establish an actionable" sexual harassment claim. Defs.’ Mot., Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 14-1 [hereinafter Defs.’ Mem.], at 8. But Tucker is different in multiple ways. First, the alleged harassment in Tucker consisted of a colleague's comments about the plaintiff and other colleagues’ "physical characteristics" and at least three instances of the colleague sneaking up on the plaintiff and "looking down [her] shirt." Tucker v. Johnson , 211 F. Supp. 3d 95, 100 (D.D.C. 2016). Here, in contrast, Plaintiff has alleged escalating, "continu...