Trantham v. Henry County Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 10 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO.:4:10CV00058,:4:10CV00058 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | DONALD TRANTHAM, JR., Plaintiff v. HENRY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, ET AL., Defendants |
By: Jackson L. Kiser
On November 17th, 2010, the Plaintiff, Donald Trantham, Jr. filed a Complaint against the Henry County Sheriffs Office, the Henry County Commonwealth's Attorney, Gardner, Barrow, Sharpe & Reynolds, P.C., the Martinsville City Police, the Virginia State Police, Martinsville/Henry County Memorial Hospital, and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. Compl., Nov. 17, 2010, ECF No. 1. All of the named Defendants filed motions to dismiss and briefs in support. Gardner, Barrow, Sharpe & Reynolds Mot. to Dismiss, Dec. 8, 2010, ECF No. 4; Gardner, Barrow, Sharpe & Reynolds Br. in Supp., Dec. 8, 2010, ECF No. 6; Martinsville Police Mot. to Dismiss, Dec. 15, 2010, ECF No. 8; Martinsville Police Br. in Supp., Dec. 15, 2010, ECF No. 9; Commonwealth's Attorney Mot. to Dismiss, Dec. 23, 2010, ECF No. 12; Sheriff's Office Mot. to Dismiss, Dec. 23, 2010, ECF No. 13; Br. in Supp. for Commonwealth's Attorney and Sheriff's Office, Dec. 23, 2010, ECF No. 14; Hospital Mot. to Dismiss, Dec. 23, 2010, ECF No. 15; Hospital Br. in Supp., Dec. 23, 2010, ECF No. 16; State Police Mot. to Dismiss, Dec. 29, 2010, ECF No.27; State Police Br. in Supp., Dec. 29, 2010, ECF No. 28; DEA Mot. to Dismiss, Feb. 3, 2011, ECF No. 33; DEA Br. in Supp., Feb. 3, 2011, ECF No. 34. The Plaintiff was sent three Roseboro notices, the last of which the Clerk's Office mailed on February 3rd, 2011, setting the response deadline for February 24th, 2011. ThirdRoseboro Notice, Feb. 3, 2011, ECF No. 35. To date, the Plaintiff has not responded to any of the motions to dismiss. For the reasons discussed herein, the Plaintiff's claims against all the named Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Defendant Gardner, Barrow, Sharpe & Reynolds, P.C.'s Motion for a Hearing is DENIED.
The Plaintiff's Complaint begins with the death of his son due to a drug overdose on October 7th, 2009. Compl. 2. The overdose occurred when the Plaintiff's son placed a Fentanyl1patch over his heart. Id After his son's death, the Plaintiff sought help from government agencies, all of whom are named Defendants, and the Defendant law firm to determine the source of the Fentanyl patch that caused the overdose. Id The investigation first fell into the hands of the Henry County Sheriff's Office. Id Unsatisfied with "the thoroughness of the investigation, " the Plaintiff contacted "officials" several times, one of whom finally advised the Plaintiff to hire an attorney "to get information regarding results of the investigation." Id
The Plaintiff hired B. Patrick Sharpe of the defendant law firm. Id The Plaintiff brought Mr. Sharpe the envelope in which the Fentayl patch had been stored and "asked him to help...track the lot number back to the responsible party." Id In less than a month, the Plaintiff became dissatisfied with Mr. Sharpe's services and again tried to take matters into his own hands. Id The Plaintiff went to the Henry County Sheriff's Office to inquire about whether "an arrest had been made in regard to the report."2 Id When the Sheriffs Office advised the Plaintiff that no arrest had been made, the Plaintiff called the Virginia State Police. Id It appears the purpose of the call was to complain about the Sheriffs Office and Mr. Sharpe. Id at 2-3. The Plaintiff then called both the Sheriffs Office and the Henry County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office "to request [that] the investigation be turned over to the Virginia State Police." Id. at 3. When both the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office and the Sheriffs Office declined to pass the case to the State Police, the Plaintiff went back to the Sheriff's Office and asked that the case be handed over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id The Sheriffs Office again declined to contact another agency. Id
Undeterred, the Plaintiff then contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration's Roanoke Resident Office. Id The DEA set up a meeting with the Plaintiff at the Henry County Sheriffs Office where, "[t]heir questioning of me had the tone that I was in trouble." Id In sum, "[t]his meeting did not seem good." Id The Plaintiff then made another call to DEA Roanoke to complain about the agent with whom he met. Id After calling Roanoke, the Plaintiff called the DEA's Richmond District Office and spoke with the Assistant Special Agent in Charge ("ASAC")3. Id Evidently dissatisfied with that exchange, the Plaintiff demanded to know the name of the ASAC's supervisor. Id The ASAC declined to provide the information. Id
At some point thereafter, the Henry County Commonwealth's Attorney set up a meeting between the Plaintiff and the State Police. Id at 4. The trooper with whom the Plaintiff met advised the Plaintiff that it was not possible to track the Fentanyl patch using the bar code on theenvelope that had contained the patch. Id Unconvinced, the Plaintiff called the Food and Drug Administration and told the person with whom he spoke to contact the State Police. Id The trooper with whom the Plaintiff had earlier met then called the Plaintiff and told him to call the DEA. Id The DEA advised that the Fentanyl patch had been tracked to the Martinsville-Henry County Memorial Hospital. Id.
Armed with this information, the Plaintiff set up a meeting with the administrators of the hospital. Id The same trooper from the aforementioned meeting was present at the hospital when the Plaintiff arrived. Id The meeting ended with the Plaintiff being escorted out of the hospital by security guards, supposedly because he brought a copy of the patch envelope to the meeting instead of the original. Id.
After the meeting, the Plaintiff returned to the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office, where he was told that the Commonwealth's Attorney was out of town. Id The Plaintiff then went back to the Sheriffs Office, where three deputies met him in the lobby to advise him that the case was closed. Id A few days later, the Plaintiff was served with two restraining orders, one for the Commonwealth's Attorney and one for the Sheriff. Id
The Plaintiff attempted to retain another attorney, who indicated that he was unable to help. Id at 5. The Plaintiff also sought out the Martinsville City Police Department, which "denied [him] any assistance." Id On November 17th, 2010, the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit.
A Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must take all of the Plaintiffs assertions of fact as true, but need not give weight to the Plaintiffs conclusions of law. Id (); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The facts alleged are sufficiently plausible when they "[allow] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although a plaintiff need not convince the Court that a defendant is probably liable, the plaintiff must do more than simply raise a possibility that the defendant is legally responsible. Id,
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's power to hear a case on the grounds that the Court lacks the necessary subject matter jurisdiction. Although subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity do not coincide perfectly, there is a recent trend among the district courts within the Fourth Circuit to consider sovereign immunity under Rule 12(b)(1). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (); Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 525 (4th Cir. 2000) (); Pettiford v. City of Greensboro, 556 F.Supp.2d 512, 531 (M.D.N.C. 2008) (); Beckham v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 569 F.Supp.2d 542, 547 (D.Md. 2008) (). Rule 12(b)(1) motions are either facial or substantive. Kerns v. U.S., 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). Facial challenges to subject matter jurisdiction contest the sufficiency of the language the Plaintiff has used to allege federal jurisdiction. Id Substantive challenges, on the other hand, contest the factual merits underlying the Plaintiff's allegation of federal jurisdiction. Id
The Defendants in this case are presenting substantive challenges. Substantive challenges differ from Rule 12(b)(1) facial challenges and Rule 12(b)(6) challenges in that theydo not require the Court to accept the Plaintiff's factual allegations as true. Id Furthermore, substantive challenges allow the Court to engage in factfinding, provided that the Court's factfinding does not venture into the merits of the underlying case. To further the Court's factfinding, it may consider extrinsic evidence. Id.
Although the Plaintiff does not clearly state what relief he is seeking, because his "complaint was filed pro se. we are. obligated to construe it liberally to assert any and all legal claims that its factual allegations can fairly be thought to support." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 868 (4th Cir. 1988) (). With the Fourth Circuit's guidance in mind, it appears the Plaintiff is asking the Court to order "a full...
To continue reading
Request your trial