Trautman v. City of Stamford

• Decision Date: 30 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 150458,150458
• Citation: 32 Conn.Supp. 258,350 A.2d 782
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Timothy TRAUTMAN v. CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

Page 782

350 A.2d 782

32 Conn.Supp. 258

Timothy TRAUTMAN v. CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

No. 150458.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Fairfield County at Bridgeport.

June 30, 1975.

Willis & Willis, Bridgeport, for plaintiff.

Joel E. Freedman, Corp. Counsel, J. Robert Bromley, and Fraser, Bello & Lapine, Stamford, for named defendant and others.

SADEN, Judge.

The plaintiff's complaint alleges that he was seriously injured after being struck by an automobile while standing on a public sidewalk in the city of Stamford. He alleges that the injuries and damages sustained by him were the result of the negligence of the defendants Joseph Coviello and Henry Crawford, two patrolmen employed by the city of Stamford, in that they allowed automobile drag racing to occur in their presence for a substantial period of time on the street adjacent to the sidewalk on which plaintiff stood when they knew or should have known, in the exercise of due care, that such activity could cause injury; in that they failed to stop such drag racing when they knew that such activity in public was a violation of ordinance and statute; in that they failed to disperse the persons congregating on the public sidewalk or to arrest the participants of the drag races when they had the authority and the duty to do so; in that they failed to warn the public lawfully using the sidewalk of the danger involved; and in that they failed to properly and adequately control and supervise the street in accordance with their duties as police officers although they knew or should have known that to allow drag racing to occur upon the public highway in the presence of the public constituted a hazard.

In his second count, directed against the city of Stamford, the plaintiff incorporates the same allegations and concludes that as a result of the actions of the defendant patrolmen the city is liable in damages for the plaintiff's physical injuries in accordance with General Statutes § 7-465.

The defendant patrolmen demur to the first count, claiming that insofar as it purports to state a cause of action in negligence, the alleged breach of duty is one owed to the public generally rather than to the plaintiff individually and, therefore, the first count must fail. The defendant city demurs to the second count, claiming that if the patrolmen owe no duty to the plaintiff individually and therefore cannot be held liable to him in this negligence action, no recovery against the city can be had pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465.

The court agrees with the plaintiff that the essential test of patrolmen's accountability, as explained in Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429, is whether the duty alleged to have been violated by them is one owing to plaintiff individually rather than to him as a member of the public generally. Because Leger involved a determination of the liability of a public official for his failure to perform a precise, statutorily defined ministerial act, the court's actual holding cannot be considered as controlling in the present case. On the other hand, in Stiebitz v. Mahoney, 144 Conn. 443, 448, 134 A.2d 71, the extensive discretion in the performance of his governmental duty to select and supervise the policemen in his department rendered the chief of police immune from suit so long as his official acts were done 'in good faith, in the exercise of an honest judgment, and not in abuse of . . . discretion, or maliciously or wantonly,' quoting from Wadsworth v. Middletown, 94 Conn. 435, 439, 109 A. 246, 248. The court in Stiebitz points out (p. 447, 134 A.2d 71) that there is a shadowy line, difficult to trace, that separates the duties owed to the general public from those owed to individuals. On the allegations of that case asserting that defendant Mahoney, a police officer, stopped a car in which the two plaintiff women were riding and at the point of a gun and under threat of death to them, forced the operator to drive to a secluded spot where he handcuffed them and committed acts constituting battery, an indecent assault, attempted rape, and armed robbery, the duty to appoint proper persons to the police force and to remove and suspend officers who might indulge 'in such outrageous acts' as defendant Mahoney is alleged to have committed, was a duty owed both to the general public and every individual 'who might come in contact with such officers.' Id., 447, 134 A.2d 73. Nevertheless, liability of the defendant Schendel, chief of police, who had the authority to appoint, suspend, and discharge officers, within his sound discretion, does not attach for his failure to act if his judgment is merely negligent and not malicious or wanton.

It is clear that the issue in Stiebitz concerned solely the liability of the chief of police, not the police officer himself who allegedly indulged in the outrageous conduct toward the two plaintiffs individually. It is also clear that the allegations of the instant case nowhere assert any conduct directed specifically by the defendant police officers toward the plaintiff individually. The conduct of the defendant patrolmen is directed, according to the plaintiff's allegations, toward the general public of which the plaintiff happened to be a part at the time in question. Stiebitz, therefore, even if the court were to accept its dictum as the law of...