Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moates
| Decision Date | 01 December 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 38471,No. 2,38471,2 |
| Citation | 102 Ga.App. 778,117 S.E.2d 924 |
| Parties | TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY et al. v. Mrs. Clarence MOATES |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The finding and award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation in favor of the claimant was authorized by competent evidence, and the superior court did not err in affirming it
Mrs. Clarence Moates as the widow of Clarence Moates filed a claim for workmen's compensation against the H. & J. Williams Lumber Company and its carrier, the Travelers Insurance Company. The claim was contested by the company and the carrier on the ground that the claimant's decedent was not an employee of the lumber company but was an employee of Vernon Guthrie, who occupied the relationship of an independent contractor toward the company.
Briefly, the evidence adduced at the hearing before the deputy director disclosed the following material facts: In 1956, the defendant lumber company entered into a contract for a period of five years to sell wood chips, a waste by-product of its lumber operation, to the St. Mary's Craft Paper Corporation. The Contract provided for delivery of the chips to the paper company's manufacturing plant in Camden County with the lumber company to receive a stated price per cord for the chips plus the prevailing freight rate for delivery. In January, 1957, Horace Williams, Jr., president and general manager of the lumber company, employed Vernon Guthrie to haul the wood chips to the paper company. As to the contract between them, Mr. Williams testified that Guthrie owned the trucks; that he was to haul the chips from the chip bin located in the lumber company's yard at Nashville, Georgia, to St. Mary's, Georgia; and that he was to be paid the freight rate allowed under the contract with the paper company. He further testified that the payments were made through the lumber company; that the chips were to be hauled as they became available; and that if Guthrie did not keep the chips hauled out or do his job properly a new man would be hired. Mr. Vernon Guthrie testified in substance that under the hauling contract he was to furnish the trucks, the drivers, the trailers, the equipment and to bear all expenses of transporting the chips for which he would be paid the freight allowed for such transportation. He further testified that it was his responsibility to load the trucks at the chip bin located in the lumber company's yard; that he hired the drives, including the decedent Clarence Moates, and paid them; that he alone had the right to fire them; and that neither Mr. Williams nor anyone connected with the lumber company had authority over his drivers and never gave them any directions concerning the carrying out of the hauling contract.
Other evidence adduced at the hearing disclosed that the truck which the decedent was driving at the time he was killed was registered in the name of the lumber company and a tag registration slip so stating was found among the effects of the deceased; that the lumber company had secured a motor fuel tax number from the Revenue Department of the State of Georgia for the purpose of fuel tax exemption on said truck; that until several months prior to the death of the decedent the lumber company had deducted insurance premiums on the life of Clarence Moates from the amount of money paid to Vernon Guthrie; that after Clarence Moates was killed, Horace Williams, Jr. made arrangements for the funeral of the decedent and agreed to stand behind Vernon Guthrie for the purpose of paying same; and that a Mr. Wade formerly operated under the same purported agreement that Vernon Guthrie was operating under and that when Mr. Wade became unsatisfactory he was discharged and Mr. Guthrie was hired.
The deputy director found in favor of the claimant and on appeal to the full board the award was affirmed. This award was appealed to the Superior Court of Camden County. To its judgment affirming the award of the full board the lumber company and its insurer except.
Bennett, Pedrick & Bennett, John W. Bennett, Waycross, for plaintiff in error.
James M. Newson, Atlanta, Charles H. Hyatt, Decatur, Thomas, Howard & Moran, Hubert H. Howard Jesup, for defendant in error.
The sole question for decision in this case is whether there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the finding and conclusion of the deputy director that Vernon Guthrie, the person under whom the claimant's decedent was working, occupied the relation of an employee rather than that of an independent contractor toward the alleged employer, H. & J. Williams Lumber Company, and that consequently the claimant's decedent was an employee of the H. & J. Williams Lumber Company.
As pointed out by Judge Jenkins in Liberty Lumber Co. v. Silas, ...
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