Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Dunlap

• Decision Date: 28 March 1896
• Citation: 43 N.E. 765,160 Ill. 642
• Parties: TRAVELERS' INS. CO. v. DUNLAP.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

160 Ill. 642

43 N.E. 765

TRAVELERS' INS. CO.

v.DUNLAP.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 28, 1896.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Mary J. Dunlap against the Travelers' Insurance Company on an accident policy issued to her husband. From a judgment for plaintiff, which was affirmed by the appellate court (59 Ill. App. 515), defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C. C. Bonney and L. M. Paine, for appellant.

Peck, Miller & Starr, for appellee.

The following is the statement of the case made in the appellate court: ‘This was an action in assumpsit by appellee against appellant upon a policy of accident insurance, dated December 2, 1889, and issued by the appellant to William T. Dunlap. The declaration contains two counts, in the first of which the policy is set forth in full. The second count purports to give only the promissory effect of the policy. Three special pleas were filed to the second count, to which a general demurrer was sustained, and appellant elected to stand by the pleas. The case came on for trial before the court without a jury upon the first count, with the plea of nonassumpsit alone to the second count. The evidence tended to show that the deceased came to his death on June 14, 1890, as the result of taking, from his own hand, a considerable quantity of carbolic acid in place of a medicine which he desired to take for sickness from which he was suffering at the time. He died within a few minutes after taking the fatal dose. The policy declared on insured William T. Dunlap for the term of twelve months from noon of December 2, 1889, in the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25) per week ‘against loss of time, not exceeding twenty-six consecutive weeks, resulting from bodily injuries effected during the term of this insurance, through external, violent, and accidental means, which shall, independently of all other causes, immediately and wholly disable him from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation; or, if death shall result from such injuries alone within ninety days, said company shall pay five thousand dollars ($5,000) to M. J. Dunlap, if surviving, subject to the following conditions: This insurance does not cover disappearances, nor suicide, sane or insane, nor injuries of which there is no visible mark upon the body, nor accident, nor death, nor loss of limb or of sight nor disability resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from any of the following causes, or while so engaged or affected: Diseased or bodily infirmity, hernia, fits, vertigo, sleep-walking, medical or surgical treatment (amputations necessitated solely by injuries, and made within ninety days of the occurrence of the accident excepted), intoxication or narcotics, taking poison, contact with poisonous substances, inhaling gas, sunstroke or freezing, dueling or fighting, war or riot, violating law, violating rules of a corporation, internal injuries (inflicted by the injured or any other person), voluntary over-exertion, wrestling, lifting, racing, gymnastics, voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, entering or trying to enter a moving conveyance using steam as a motive power, riding in or on any such conveyance not provided for the transportation of passengers, walking or being on a railway bridge or roadbed (railway employés excepted).’'

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts).

It is settled by the judgments below that the death of the insured was caused by accident. Mistaking a bottle of carbolic acid for peppermint, which he wished to take for some ailment, he poured a portion of the acid into a glass of water, drank it, and died from the poison. The only question presented for our decision is, is the appellant exempted from liability on the ground that the insured died from ‘taking poison’ within the meaning of the policy? Appellant contends that it is so exempt by the terms of the contract; that the term ‘taking poison,’ as used in the policy, and according to its ordinary signification, includes accidental as well as intentional taking; and cites Pollock v. Accident Ass'n, 102 Pa. St. 230, which so holds. Appellee, however, contends, and in this she is supported by the appellate and circuit courts, that the words ‘taking poison,’ as...